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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the research subject
'O«e fhing «// /iberaZ pro/essions fewc/i as /ouri/ers, nrcwitecfs, auditors, doctors,
rt«d p/wrmrtrisfc/ fradifionn/Zy Iwre in common is <7 /»'g/i /ere/ 0/ re^u/nfion. /
wow/rf /ifce to sfress Ziere f/ie tford 'frrtd/fionrt//y'. /...] 7f is interesh'ng to ziofe
f/ie mosf re^w/aterf professions «re n/so Wie o/desf ones, such <?s p/wrwjflrisfs
notaries: fnese nre professions f/wf were esfaWis/ied nf f/ie f///ie o/f/ie #uiWs.' By
confrnsf, nether professions, w/nc/i cow/d, in f/ieory, nspire to « spec/n/ stofws, nre
not regu/rtfed of «//. / om f/iinfci»g ^)r exnmp/e 0/ computer scienfrsfs: f/ie
'engineers' 0/ our pnper/ess society, IÜ/IO /10/d f/ie fceys to t/ie systems 0/ mnny
bi/sinesses. 77iey «re »of organised us « pro/ession in most Member Spates - und
/ flin nof suggesf/ng f/iey s/iou/d be/' '
Said the Commissioner for Competition of the European Commission in a speech to
an audience consisting mainly of lawyers in Germany on 21 March 2003. This quote
forms a perfect introduction to the (broader) topic of this thesis, namely the regula-
tion of and by the liberal professions. In addition to a high level of public regula-
tion, professions generally are subject also to self-regulation by professional bodies
comprised exclusively (or predominantly) of members of the profession itself. This
self-regulation may on the one hand restrict the entry into the profession and limit
competition within the profession, while on the other hand it may improve the
quality of professional services. Because professional bodies are usually dependent
on the interests they regulate, it is especially interesting to investigate the effects of
this self-regulation on social welfare. On a more narrow level, I study the pharma-
ceutical profession in the Netherlands and Belgium. From this comparative study of
the pharmaceutical profession I will, however, be able to draw conclusions that go
beyond the regulation of Dutch and Belgian pharmacists only. That is, this research
European Commission, Compefifion in Prq/pssiona/ Smwes; N«c Lighf and Neu> Ota//<?nges,
speech by Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti for Bundesanwaltskammer, Berlin, 23
March 2003, pp. 2-3.
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will to some extent apply to other professions and other countries as well. I will
come back to this in more detail below.
As far as the entry into a profession is concerned, one can generally note two types
of entry barriers. Entry may be regulated either directly, e.g. through the fixing of a
numerus clausus (that is, if only a pre-determined number of practitioners is per-
mitted per territory) or indirectly, e.g. through obligatory apprenticeships with par-
ticularly heavy duties and a lack of appropriate remuneration. In addition, often the
regulator awards a professional monopoly, such as the monopoly to plead for attor-
neys or the duty to contact an architect when a building is constructed. The profes-
sions may achieve a limitation of external competition by a large definition of this
professional monopoly. Furthermore, self-regulation may also contain restrictions
on competition within a profession. Examples are a prohibition on advertising and a
prohibition of partnerships and cooperation with other professions. Such 'rules of
conduct' aim at protecting professional integrity and dignity, but often at the ex-
pense of consumers. Also, competition within a profession may be restricted by the
direct regulation of fees, either by the government or by self-regulating bodies.
In recent years the (public and self-) regulation of professions has received more
and more attention from politics, i.e. regulators and competition authorities, and as
a result also from judges and the media. In addition to the European Commission,
which asked the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna (IHS) to do an extensive
investigation into the regulation of several professions in the EU Member States,
reports on the regulation of professions have been published by, e.g. the Office of
Fair Trading in England (on accountants, architects, lawyers and pharmacists), and
by the economic consultancy bureaus Indecon and London Economics with respect
to several professions in Ireland (for the Irish Competition Authority).- In the Neth-
erlands the professions have received special attention from the government within
the framework of the so-called 'MDW projects: since the mid-1990s inquiries have
been made into, among others, accountants, lawyers, brokers, and health care pro-
fessions (dentistry and physiotherapy).^ The Dutch Competition Authority NMa has
played an important part as well in recent years, and it still does, as I will show later
on in this thesis. The basic question in all these reports and competition cases is al-
ways if, and how, more competition can be introduced into the markets of the pro-
fessions.
IHS (2003), OFT (2001, 2003) and Indecon - London Economics (2003). For more information
about these reports: iii/rn, § 2.5.1.
MDW is the abbreviation for Functioning of Markets, Deregulation and Quality of Law
(Marktwerking, Deregulering en Wetgevingskwaliteit). These projects are usually carried out
jointly by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Law. Website:
<http://www.minez.nl>.
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One of the professions that is characterised by a high level of self-regulation is the
pharmaceutical profession. There seems to be a clear informational asymmetry,*
since most consumers of pharmaceutical products and other services provided by a
pharmacist cannot be assumed to have adequate information on the quality of the
services provided. Some form of regulation may then be used to guarantee a mini-
mum quality. However, other parties in the pharmaceutical market (such as the
government, health insurers, physicians, organisations of patients, etc.) may already
have some information on the quality of pharmaceutical products and services. It
needs to be examined whether there are indeed information problems in this mar-
kets In addition, the extent to which the pharmaceutical market is regulated needs
to be examined more carefully: is all this regulation necessary in order to solve the
information problems, or are the negative effects on social welfare larger than the
positive effects? In the pharmaceutical sector self-regulation co-exists with govern-
mental regulation. It is essential to both analyse the instruments of governmental
regulation and the rules enacted by the profession itself.
In this thesis I will examine the regulation of pharmacists in two countries: the
Netherlands and Belgium. Some of the results of this 'case study' have previously
been published - in an amended version - in papers in acadamic journals." The rea-
son I have chosen these countries for the analysis is that, although it concerns two
neighbouring countries, the regulation and the number of pharmacists are very dif-
ferent. Hence, it is particularly interesting to compare these two regimes and to ex-
amine whether the difference in the market structure of pharmacies in the two
countries is related to the varying scope of the regulation. Moreover, it is interesting
to focus on these two - rather different - legal regimes since similar approaches to-
wards the regulation of pharmacies can be found in other European legal systems as
well. Hence, I expect that the findings have some relevance also outside the Dutch-
Belgian context.
It should be made clear from the outset that the analysis in this thesis is necessarily
limited to certain aspects of the regulation of pharmacists. I will deal in particular
with those regulations that limit the entry into the pharmaceutical profession and
those that restrict the competition between pharmacists. To this end, however, the
main tasks of a pharmacist today and his/her place in the pharmaceutical market
need to be defined. In connection with that also the way in which those tasks are
regulated needs to be analysed. I strive to keep the analysis of the regulatory
framework as concise and to-the-point as is necessary for the economic analysis, of
course without omitting any important aspects. It should be stressed that, this being
a thesis in law and economics, my intention is that it should be comprehensible both
for economists and lawyers who are interested in the field of law and economics, as
well as for profession members and politicians interested in the topic of regulation
* The concept 'information asymmetry' will be discussed in chapter 2.
^ Or other problems, such as externalities, /n/ra, § 2.2.
* Maks, Philipsen and Faure (2001); Philipsen and Faure (2002a); Philipsen and Faure (2002b).
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of professions. In some places I will have to refer to other sources for details regard-
ing the economic or legal background, although I tried to keep this to a minimum.
1.2 Problem definition
In the light of the diverse arguments pro and contra (self-)regulation, the question
arises whether the positive effects of regulation on social welfare - following, for
example, from quality improvements and information provision - or its negative
effects - following from restrictions on competition - dominate. The problem state-
ment in this thesis is therefore as follows: do Mere exisf/orms 0/(se//-)reg«/r7toH /;/ f/ie
p/wrwinceufiaj/ pro/ession f/mf increase soa'n/ u>e//(?re in f/ie economy, or is fhis regi//flfion
mere/y n resu/f 0/ renf-seeib'ng be/wt>JOMr? In order to answer this main question four
other questions will have to be answered first.
The first of these questions concerns an economic analysis of (self-)regulation:
does econowi/c f/ieory fenc/i MS flfrowf (se//-)re£ii/<7fio« in f/iepro/ess/oHS? The arguments of
the so-called public interest approach and the private interest approach to regula-
tion will be examined in this respect. While the former approach looks at regulation
as a correction for market failure and assumes that governments and other public
agencies are able to ameliorate identified market failures at low cost, the latter ap-
proach stresses the role of interest groups in the formation of regulation and points
to the danger of government failure as a result of lobbying by interest groups.
The second question is: what national regulations and self-regulatory measures is-
sued by professional bodies exist in the Netherlands and in Belgium with respect to
the pharmaceutical profession? Naturally, it is impossible to examine the effects of
self-regulation on social welfare without having analysed first the current state of
this regulation. Moreover, since there is a lot of government intervention in the
pharmaceutical market, obviously an analysis of self-regulation only will not be suf-
ficient: one needs to consider both self-regulation and public regulation.
Next, the regulations that restrict competition in the pharmaceutical market will
have to be examined more closely, following the line of reasoning of the economic
theory presented earlier. Hence the third question: does f/ie (se//-)regi//flfio/i 0/ f/ie
p/wnHflceHrim/ pro/ession promofe sonn/ u»e//nre, or s/ioi</d if (fo n /esser or grenfer exfenf)
be cwisi'rfem/ ns n foo/1» f//e linnrfs o/priiwfe /'/iferesf groups? The outcome of this r/i/n/i-
fnfii'e analysis might be that (a part of the) self-regulation is merely used to seek
rents from a limitation of competition, instead of it being used to ensure an optimal
quality or the continuity of pharmaceutical services.
Finally, it is necessary to carry out a quanfitofipe analysis of the rent-seeking behav-
iour by pharmacists if one wants to draw any firm conclusions. Empirical data with
respect to, inter alia, the number of pharmacies and the incomes of pharmacists
need to be acquired, both for the Netherlands and for Belgium. The fourth question
is therefore as follows: is f/iere nny empiric«/ evidence o/renf-see/cing be/wi'ioi/r by p/wr-
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mnrisfs? This part of the analysis is a practical complement to the theoretical analy-
sis based on the economic literature presented earlier.
On the basis of these four questions an answer to the central problem statement will
be formulated. From a policy point of view it will be suggested which parts of the
current regulatory system are economically efficient and which parts decrease
rather than improve social welfare in the economy.
1.3 Research methodologies
The research methodologies used in this research are on the one hand an economic
analysis of (self-)regulation with an application to the specific case of the pharma-
ceutical market, and on the other hand a comparative law and economics approach
to the self-regulation of pharmacists in the Netherlands and in Belgium.
The first part of the book focuses upon the economic literature in the field of regula-
tion, in particular with respect to the liberal professions. The arguments for (self-)
regulation that follow from the public interest approach (and which are based on
welfare economics and the concept of market failure), and against it, as identified
via the private interest approach (based upon the capture theory, public choice the-
ory and the economic theory of regulation), are investigated there. Furthermore, I
will, from an economic point of view, consider some regulatory instruments and
compare regulation to liability rules.
The second part of the book consists of a presentation and examination of the
pharmaceutical market, more specifically the regulation of and by pharmacists. Af-
ter a brief introduction to the pharmaceutical market in general, a posi'fitWegn/
fl/ifl/i/sis of the regulation of the pharmaceutical market in the Netherlands and in
Belgium is carried out. Next, these legal rules will be analysed from a qua/itorwe-
ecoiiomic point of view in order to estimate the effects of the intense regulation on
the amount of rents. The differences between the two legal systems will be ex-
plained, as far as the intensity of regulation of the pharmacists is concerned, using a
com/mrflrwe ta/> nwrf eco/iom/cs «ppronc/i. The rent-seeking hypothesis will be applied
to the pharmaceutical profession and the particular legal tools in the Netherlands
and Belgium will be reviewed in the light of the economic literature. In addition, I
will present a qiMinfitofiz'? (empiric«/,) n««/ysis of the rent-seeking behaviour by Dutch
and Belgian pharmacists, by means of a presentation and analysis of acquired em-
pirical data. The word 'acquired' should be stressed here: obtaining exact data on
some of the indicators, e.g. the incomes of pharmacists and take-over prices of
pharmacy buildings, was impossible. Some data were either unavailable or were
not released for the purpose of academic research because of non-disclosure poli-
cies. Other data were not available as a time-series, which excludes the use of statis-
tic methods such as regression equations. The latter was also the case when sources
contradicted each other, which occurred as well. Therefore, the empirical analysis
consists in some places necessarily of circumstantial evidence based on own compu-
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tations and in other places of comparative and time-series analyses. Two case stud-
ies are included as well, which, next to providing some (tentative) evidence of rent-
seeking behaviour, give some insights into the developments that are taking place
in the pharmaceutical market in the Netherlands.
1.4 Structure
The structure of the book follows directly from the research questions defined
above. In chapter 2 an economic analysis of the regulation of the liberal professions
will be presented. The main argument of the puWi'c i>;teresf npprodc/i to regulation
appears to be that professional services are expenence goods in markets characterised
by «symmetric iri/brmnftoM and ndi'trse se/ecfiow; and regulation may be needed in or-
der to improve on this situation. Self-regulation may in some cases be the most ef-
fective kind of regulation, instead of e.g. information remedies and quality
standards enforced by the government, or liability rules. The priunfe mferesf oppronc//
to regulation, however, claims that the behaviour of self-regulating professions can
often be characterised as rent-seeking. Professional bodies are considered to be in-
terest groups pursuing private goals instead of public goals. The private interest
approach to regulation predicts that interest groups are most successful in appro-
priating rents if they are small, single-issue oriented and well organised. At least
two of these three criteria often apply to professional bodies.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of several important aspects of the market for
drugs. The production, distribution and consumption of drugs will be discussed
briefly, as well as the evolution of the pharmacists' profession. Chapter 4 and chap-
ter 5 deal with the regulation of pharmacists in the Netherlands and in Belgium re-
spectively. Together, the chapters 2-5 constitute the framework for the economic
analysis in the following chapters.
This framework will be reviewed in the light of the economic literature in chapter 6.
The particular regulations will be evaluated according to the public and the private
interest approach to regulation. Then a 'theoretical' answer to the problem state-
ment can be given, based on the insights of economic theory. The strengths and
weaknesses of the Dutch and the Belgian regulatory systems regarding pharmacists
will hereby come to the fore.
In addition to this qualitative analysis, chapter 7 provides for an empirical, i.e.
quantitative, research of self-regulation in the pharmaceutical profession. This em-
pirical analysis is supplemented by two case studies with respect to the Dutch
pharmaceutical market, dealing with the chemist's chain Boots and the wholesale
chain OPG respectively. A conclusion can then be formulated, finally, in chapter 8.
There I will provide an answer to the central problem statement defined above
based on my findings. Also an assessment will be made as to which particular legal
or professional rules are effective in enhancing social welfare, and which are not.
Chapter 1
This thesis describes the situation as of 1 July 2003. Developments after that date
could only be taken into account to a limited extent.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS
2.1 An introduction to the problems of (self-)regulation in the
professions
Many liberal professions such as lawyers, architects, physicians and pharmacists are
subject to self-regulation by public professional bodies. These professional bodies
are often drawn exclusively or predominantly from members of the profession it-
self. Thus, while public regulatory bodies are usually independent of the interests
they regulate or at least should be, this independence is totally absent in the profes-
sions. This makes it interesting and useful to investigate the effects of this self-
regulation on social welfare. On the one hand, self-regulation may restrict entry into
the profession and limit competition within the profession, while on the other hand
it may improve the quality of professional services. In this chapter an economic
analysis of self-regulation is presented. The first question defined in the introduc-
tion will therefore be answered: what does economic theory teach us about self-
regulation in the professions? Of course, this question cannot be answered without
a thorough analysis of the problems concerning the public regulation of professions.
There exist different instruments that could be used to regulate the economic activi-
ties of professionals, such as mandatory information disclosure, regulation of adver-
tising, quality standards, licensing, and certification. These regulatory instruments
can be used by self-regulatory agencies as well as by public (or: government) bod-
ies. Moreover, in practice one often sees a mixture of public and private regulations.
In order to analyse self-regulation it will therefore have to be compared to public
regulation. Naturally, the question whether government intervention of any kind is
necessary at all will have to be answered first. In addition the question should be
addressed whether the regulatory measure chosen is an appropriate remedy for the
problem that it is supposed to solve.
The economic analysis in this chapter is based on two different approaches towards
regulation. The public interest approach will be discussed first (§ 2.2). Some argu-
ments for regulation will thereby come to the fore. These arguments have in com-
An economic analysis of the regulation of professions
mon that they consider regulation as a correction for market failure. Section 3 pre-
sents the private interest approach to regulation. This approach, which stresses the
role of interest groups in the formation of regulation, presents arguments against
(self-)regulation. After this rather general discussion of the economic theory with
respect to the coming about of regulation, I will analyse some regulatory instru-
ments (§ 2.4). More specifically, the relative benefits and costs of information regula-
tion, quality standards and prior approval (licensing and certification) will be
presented. The topic of section 5 is self-regulation by professional bodies. There I
will present an overview of the pros and cons of self-regulation as suggested by the
public and private interest approach respectively, as well as a survey of some arti-
cles on self-regulation from the economic literature. In the section after that the eco-
nomic theories will be evaluated (§ 2.6). The resulting framework will be used for
the subsequent research in later chapters. Section 7 closes the chapter with a short
summary.
2.2 Regulation as a correction for market failure: the public interest
approach
The approach of the 'public interest' gives a number of grounds for regulation. Of
course, what exactly constitutes the public interest is not a constant, but will vary
according to time, place and the specific values held by a particular society." For the
purposes of this research, I will only look at public interest in the sense of social
welfare as defined in the economic science, especially in welfare economics. The
grounds for regulation presented in this section have in common that they are de-
rived from the perceived shortcomings of the market system itself to deal with cer-
tain problems leading to less social welfare. I leave out other possible justifications
for regulation, such as those resulting from distributive purposes or paternalistic
arguments.
2.2.2
Welfare economics teaches us that, if we have a general equilibrium in an economy
with perfect competition on all markets, the resulting allocation will be Pareto-
efficient. A Pareto-efficient situation is a situation wherein it is impossible to enlarge
someone's utility (or: welfare) without making someone else worse off." This situa-
tion requires a number of conditions:
Ogus(1994, p. 29).
The Pareto criterion is very strict in the sense that even potential changes that would increase
the utility of many people and that would only slightly decrease the utility of one person,
would not be approved by it. According to the so-called K«/ifor-Hicfc> criterion, a welfare im-
provement requires that the gainers from a change are (theoretically) able to compensate the
losers. In other words: the gainers have to gain more than the losers lose. See e.g. Ogus (1994,
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(1) on every market there should be many small and identical producers, who
cannot significantly influence the price level and who sell homogeneous prod-
ucts in their respective markets;'
(2) there should be perfect information in that economy, meaning that all market
participants are informed about all (equilibrium) prices and characteristics of
goods;
(3) there are no externalities; and
(4) the products are private goods.
In practice these conditions will never be completely satisfied. In other words: there
is - some degree of - market failure (or: there are market distortions).'" The regula-
tion as a remedy for market failure aims to lead to an increase in social welfare. This
does not mean that the regulation of a market should attempt to realise perfect
competition." Were the government to have at its disposal all information on all
markets and their distortions, it could compute and pursue a so-called 'second best'
Pareto-optimum. Such omniscience does not exist in practice.'- However, the regu-
lation of a market can be focussed on the partial realisation of welfare improve-
ments." In order to be able to show the effects of regulation on the level of social
welfare in a partial market, one has to analyse the changes in consumer surplus,
producer surplus, and the deadweight welfare loss that result from this regulation.'*
pp. 24-25), Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp. 43-44) and Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001, pp. 24-
25; 29-30).
In addition, there must be a large number of consumers, who cannot significantly influence
the price level. However, 1 do not deal with this condition here, nor with the related market
failure called monopsony that occurs when this condition is not fulfilled, i.e. when there is
market power on the demand side of the market. For an introduction to monopsony, see e.g.
Carlton and Perloff (2000, pp. 105-107).
For a more elaborate discussion on Pareto-optimality and market failure see e.g. Varian (1984,
pp. 190-209; 253-262), Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 66-95), Mamuth (1992, pp. 119-128; 181-
190), Tirole (1992, pp. 6-7; 106-114), Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp. 12; 40-44) and Van Velthoven
and Van Wijck (2001, pp. 51-63).
Lipsey and Lancaster (1957) prove the existence of this so-called sfcom/ fas/ problem.
Despite that it is, according to Ng (1983, pp. 231-233), still the best strategy for a government
to pursue first best optimum conditions in case of in/brnMf/on potfrfy on a market, if it wants
to maximise welfare. However, if the government does have some information on the aver-
age divergences between price and marginal costs in an economy (in/brniation soirri/y) it
should according to Ng not pursue first best conditions, but the so-called 'third best' rules,
whereby the ratio price/marginal cost on a certain market is made equal to the average ratio
in the economy. See Ng (1983, pp. 233-242). For a more formal treatment see Green (1961),
Boadway and Harris (1977), Hatta (1977) and Ng (1977).
Here one has to make sure that the regulatory intervention does not go too far. To partially
intervene in a certain market will after all affect other markets in the economy as well.
Economists disagree on the question whether only the consumer surplus should be taken as a
decisive criterion for regulation, or the total surplus. Aiginger ef n/ (1998, p. 804) present the
results of a survey of industrial economists, in which (among other questions) this question
was put to 114 experts. 63% of the interviewees thought that the total surplus should be re-
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If one of the above mentioned four conditions for perfect competition is not met
there is, hence, a form of market failure. In the law and economics literature one
finds a discussion of regulation as a remedy for these forms of market failure, di-
rected towards an improvement in social welfare. The assumption is made that the
government and other public agencies predominantly act in the public interest (or
at least try to do so). As stated above, this approach to regulation is generally
known as the pwWi'c »ifaresf approach, to make the contrast with the private interest
approach explicit. '* It is important to remember that the public interest approach
only tells us when there is a prim« /ncie case for regulation: that is, market failure
always has to be compared with (possible) regulatory failure. Regulation may fail if
the efficiency gains to which it does give rise are outweighed by increased transac-
tion costs or misallocations in other sections of the economy.'"
Obviously, the four forms of market failure to be discussed in this section are the
following: market power, imperfect information, externalities and perfect goods.
2.2.1.1 Market power
In economic theory many market structures have been analysed that do not satisfy
the first condition mentioned above: that of many small and identical producers
who cannot significantly influence the price level and who sell homogeneous prod-
ucts.'" At the other end of perfect competition there is pure monopoly. Compared to
firms under perfect competition, who sell their- products at the level where price
equals marginal costs (which in turn are equal to the minimum average costs), a
monopolist will sell its (smaller) output at a higher price level: where its marginal
costs of producing equal its marginal benefits.'" While the firms in a setting of per-
garded, 26% was of the opinion that only the consumer surplus should be the final yardstick
and 11% was indifferent.
'5 Posner (1974, pp. 336-341). See also Van den Bergh (1993, pp. 33-42), Ogus (1994, pp. 29-75),
De Bijl and Van Damme (1996, pp. 10-21) and Den Hertog (2000, pp 25-231). Hägg (1997, p.
356) points out that to some extent the distinction between the public and the private interest
approach has lost validity due to the entry of game theory and institutional research during
the last decades of the 20th century. He concludes that 'f/ie pi<fr/ic interest a/'proadi am/ t/ie spe-
cia/ interest rt;>i>ronr/j ore /x'fter i'l'eavd to mirror frw «/istini't niston'ca/ p/wses m //«? economic' re-
searrn, emr>/wsisi>ig t/ie torrcctiiv din/ l/ie redisfriftiifiiv impact o/ piiWic regulation respectn^/i/.
Hantke-Domas (2003) argues that a public interest theory as such does not exist because it
does not have any known origin. He states that Posner's characterisation of the public interest
theory has indeed similarities with the welfare rationale for regulation, but that '/«''"IM' re-
srarrri is needed to prore or deny a connection rVrnvrn fcotn f/ie concepts o/puMic interest and fne i<>eZ-
yänr economics rafiomi/f /iir regii/nfion' (p. 190).
'* Ogus (1994, p. 30). Lazzarini and Carvalho de Mello (2001) analyse regulatory failure for the
specific case of derivative markets, where they make a distinction between regulatory failure
in governmental regulation and in self-regulation.
'^ Supra, note 9.
'* For an introduction to the efficiency consequences of monopoly in the law and economics
literature, see Posner (1998, Ch. 9), Van den Bergh (1997, Ch. 2), Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp.
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feet competition are price takers, a monopolist is a profit maximiser. As a result, a
monopolist always operates in a Pareto inefficient manner.''* Other market struc-
tures that have been analysed in economic theory include oligopoly, duopoly and
monopolistic competition.-" On such markets there is a risk of cartel formation or
abuse of a dominant market position by undertakings.-' Regulation in the form of
competition law may be used to offer a solution for this. The markets of the liberal
professions are characterised by product heterogeneity and all kinds of coopera-
tions. In the practice of Belgian and Dutch competition policy since the late 1990s it
has already been shown that professionals are subject to the supervision of the
competition authorities.^
It is important to keep in mind that the public interest argument here is not that
regulation has to be used to create as much competition as possible, but only that it
may be in the public interest to regulate cartels and abuse of dominance. Indeed,
there are also cases where it will be better to have only one or a few producers in the
market rather than many small firms. Such cases, which result from economies of
scale and economies of scope in production, are called natural monopolies or natu-
ral oligopolies. Theoretically, a natural monopoly exists when there is sub-additivity
of costs, meaning that the costs of producing certain goods together are smaller than
the costs of producing these goods separately.^ Formally this means that the follow-
ing must hold for « goods:
C (q,, qz,..., q„) < C, (q,) + C2 (qz) + ... + C„ (q„)
In practice it is often difficult to determine whether there is really sub-additivity of
costs. Therefore usually a monopoly is already called 'natural' when its average and
marginal cost functions are both decreasing.^ However, even in these situations
26-33), Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2002, pp. 78-88) and Van Velthoven and Van Wijck
(2001, pp. 250-261). An elaborate microeconomic analysis can be found in many standard
textbooks; see e.g. Mamuth (1992, Ch. 7), Tirole (1992, pp. 66-75) and Carlton and Perloff
(2000, pp. 87-105).
" Varian (1984, pp. 79-85).
2" See e.g. Mamuth (1992, Chs. 7-8) and Varian (1984, Ch. 2).
2' Carlton and Perloff (2000, Chs. 4-5) analyse both the behaviour of an undertaking with a
dominant market position and the conditions under which a cartel could arise. See also Vis-
cusi f / a/ (2000, Chs. 5-9) for a discussion on oligopoly, collusion and monopoly power.
^ See for the Netherlands e.g. the decisions of the Dutch Competition Authority NMa in cases
concerning veterinary surgeons (DECISION nr. 397/199S), notaries (»ir. 952/1999), general practi-
tioners (nr. 537/2001) and pharmacists (iir. 972/2OOJ). For a general article on the Belgian situ-
ation, see D<? /»ris(c»Jrra«(, Vrije beroepen en concurrentierecht: de strijd gaat verder, 16, 2000.
An overview of the approach of the EC in applying competition law to the professions, in-
cluding a brief overview of the most important cases in this area, is provided in Andrews
(2002). That article also deals with the US approach.
^ Viscusi e« a/ (2000, p. 340). See also Bos (1995, p.22) who states that sub-additivity of costs is a
'sufficient condition' for the existence of a natural monopoly.
*• Bos (1995, p. 23). See also Ogus (1994, pp. 30-31) and Viscusi ef a/ (2000, Ch. 11).
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regulation may be needed to control the behaviour of the natural monopolist: every
unregulated monopolist may after all be inclined to abuse its dominant position.
The regulation of natural monopolies is a very difficult but important topic. The
central question in the economic literature that discusses this topic-^ - as well as in
the enforcement of the competition rules by national competition authorities and
the European Commission^" - is whether or not a certain facility or infrastructure is
a so-called essCTififl/yfrci/iry (like telecom networks: one needs access to the network
to be able to provide the telecom service) and if so, how access to the essential facil-
ity should be regulated. Moreover, for a public authority it often appears to be diffi-
cult to regulate (i.e. supervise) the tariffs to use the natural monopoly, because a
government normally does not have at its disposal the very specific information on
e.g. costs needed to effectively regulate an undertaking that owns an essential facil-
ity.^
2.2.1.2 Information problems
A second possible reason for regulation according to the public interest approach to
regulation is the existence of information problems on a market. This argument is of
particular importance for the topic of this thesis, being the regulation of the profes-
sional services offered by a pharmacist. Here the public interest argument for regu-
lation starts from the perspective that professional services are expenence goods of
which the quality cannot be immediately recognised by the consumer. The term
experience goods has been introduced by Nelson to indicate the difference with
seflrc/; £oorfs.-" In the case of search goods, consumers already know where they can
obtain each of the options available to them, but they have to evaluate the utility of
each option first on price and quality. According to Nelson this evaluation is subject
to two restrictions: 1) the consumer must inspect the option; and 2) that inspection
must occur prior to purchasing the brand. However, this search process will not
work properly when the quality of a product can only be determined after having
consumed or used it. If the properties of a product can only be determined after
consumption the product is called an experience good. Professional services will
often fit into this category, although some services, such as medical care and finan-
cial advice, would probably be more correctly classified under a third category: the
For a quite recent contribution to the essential facility concept see Temple Lang (2000) and for
an overview of cost-based regulation methods see Knieps (2001, pp. 79-114). Viscusi e/ a/
(2000, Ch. 12) devote a whole chapter to the regulation of natural monopolies; they especially
pay attention to the regulation of electric power in the United States.
Goyder (1998, pp. 346-350) and Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2002, pp. 272-277) provide a
summary of the most important EC cases with respect to the access of essential facilities.
Of course this subsection just introduces the lack of competition problem and its social wel-
fare consequences. For in depth analyses I refer to the advanced textbooks in industrial eco-
nomics, such as Carlton and Perloff (2000) and Tirole (1992).
Nelson (1970, p. 312).
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so-called frusf goods (or: credence goods).^ These are goods or services of which the
properties can only be assessed with the help of highly technical standards and for
which there is no learning through the repeat-purchase-mechanism. If consumers
are not able to reliably judge the quality of a service before and after the transaction,
then the only factor left to save on information costs becomes trust in the profes-
sional providing the service.*
Because professional services are often experience goods (or trust goods), this leads
to iw/brn/rtf/OM nsym»ie/ry on the market. After all, consumers do not have at their
disposal all information with respect to the quality of the services rendered by pro-
fessionals, while professionals themselves do have this information. Akerlof (1970)
showed in his famous example of the market for used cars that, in an unregulated
market, asymmetric information will lead to a deterioration of quality of the offered
products." The process of quality deterioration is a result of ndwrse se/ttrftbn. In Ak-
erlof's example there is asymmetric information because sellers of used cars know
the properties of every car they are selling, but potential buyers do not. The poten-
tial buyers only know the average quality of cars in the market. Therefore, they can-
not tell whether a particular car is a good buy or a bad buy (lemon). If the market is
unregulated, this information asymmetry will not be eliminated. The market will
attract sellers of low quality cars who will depress average quality, lower prices and
drive good quality cars out of the market. This process is cumulative and may there-
fore eventually destroy the whole market. This argument can be explained in formal
terms: if 9i is the valuation by consumers of a lemon, 02 is the valuation by consum-
ers of a high quality car and n is the chance of getting a lemon, the expected value of
a second-hand car is:
9E = 71 . 01 + (l-7t) . 02
Because a buyer cannot inspect the quality of a car prior to the actual buy, he will
pay (up to) the average price of a car, which equals the average valuation 0|.;. The
market price will then lie between the value of a lemon and the value of a high qual-
ity car. However, suppliers of high quality cars will not be satisfied with this price,
in contrast to suppliers of lemons: in the end only lemons will be supplied.
This analysis can easily be extrapolated to the professions. If consumers of profes-
sional services cannot evaluate the quality of the services provided by a particular
profession member, but can only discriminate on price, professionals have no incen-
tives to provide high quality services. After all, as a result of this asymmetric infor-
mation they cannot signal relative differences in the quality of their services. The
** Darby and Kami (1973) first introduced this category.
* For a description of the differences between search goods, experience goods and credence
goods, see also Tirole (1992, p. 106) and Bos (1995, pp. 33-34).
3' See also Varian (1984, pp. 291-293), Tirole (1992, pp. 108-110) and Carlton and Perloff (2000,
pp. 423-425).
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market price will reflect only the average quality level and will thus attract average
quality professionals. A decrease in the average quality level perceived by consum-
ers will be the result, which in turn will lead to a reduction of the market price, and
so on." Good professionals will be driven out of the market by bad professionals
(quacks). Regulation might be able to convert this 'equilibrium' of low quality and
low price into a market outcome characterised by high quality and reasonable price.
In addition to the problem of adverse selection, information asymmetry on a market
can also lead to the principal-agent problem of demand generation. Lack of infor-
mation from the side of consumers (e.g. the patients of a general practitioner) may
cause professionals (in the same example the general practitioner) to provide extra
services, which consumers would not have wanted if they were fully informed. The
provision of these kinds of services is of course welfare decreasing. In economics
this kind of behaviour from professionals is called mom/ /wznrrf behaviour." A moral
hazard problem arises when agent and principal have different individual objec-
tives and the principal cannot easily determine whether the agent's actions are be-
ing taken in pursuit of the principal's goals or are self-interested misbehaviour.^
Again, regulation may be needed to solve the information asymmetry between
principal and agent that causes the problem.^
Besides asymmetric information another information problem may occur on mar-
kets for professional services: tount/er/ raf/onn/iri/ of consumers. In the neoclassical
theory it is assumed that individuals can adapt unlimited knowledge and always
use this knowledge in an efficient way.*' In reality, however, individuals can re-
member and readily recall only a limited amount of information. It is efficient for
consumers to use simplified rules to process the information they obtain, so they
rationally use only some of the information they have collected because it is costly
to process it. Economic theory predicts that such a consumer processes information
" Van den Bergh (1999, p. 126).
" Demand generation is a moral hazard problem on the supp/y side. Moral hazard often occurs
on the li-Huim/ side as well. The usual example taken in economics is the insurance business.
People who are insured against e.g. bike theft do not have incentives to optimally reduce the
risk of their bike being stolen. A classic paper on moral hazard and insurance is Shavell
(1979). Also in health insurance the problem of moral hazard exists: Arrow (1963) pointed out
that the demand for health care increases as soon as full insurance cover is available.
* Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 170).
•® For an introduction to the concept of moral hazard see e.g. Mamuth (1992, p. 189), Milgrom
and Roberts (1992, pp. 167-170) and Carlton and Perloff (2000, p. 427). For a formal approach
of moral hazard behaviour in a principal-agent relationship see Tirole (1992, pp. 51-55).
* Related to this assumption - and to the whole concept of perfect information - Stiglitz (2002)
wrote an interesting article that gives an extensive overview of the development of informa-
tion economics. The author is very critical of the assumption of perfect information, on which
most formal modelling in economics is based. Stiglitz criticises especially the way the neo-
classical models and the Chicago school of economics deal with the information problem. He
indicates that even economies with very small information problems may look totally differ-
ent from perfect information economies.
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up to the point where the marginal benefit of the information equals the marginal
cost of processing more information. This behaviour is called bounded rationality.^
Moreover, consumers may simply lack the education level, or even the intelligence,
to process all available information on products and services in a correct way. Regu-
lation could be justified here as well, if the government (or a self-regulatory body)
has more information at its disposal than consumers have.-^
2.2.1.3 Externalities
Another possible public interest justification for regulation arises from the existence
of externalities." Externalities appear if the utility or profit of a subject A is directly
influenced by the way of acting of a subject B, while this subject B does not take this
effect into account in the determination of his behaviour.'"' In other words: the cost
(or benefit) of the activity undertaken by B is borne in part by subject A. In case of a
negflftVe extenifl//ri/ B invests too much in the activity from a social point of view: B
only takes into account his private costs, which are lower than the social costs. The
social costs consist of both the private costs of subject B n»irf the external costs im-
posed on subject A. A well-known example of a negative externality is that of a fac-
tory discharging waste material in a river, forcing downstream drinking water
companies to incur costs of water purification.-" In case of a /wsifziv ex/enia/tfy sub-
ject B invests too little in the activity from a social point of view. This implies that
the social benefits of the activity undertaken by subject B are higher than his private
benefits. A textbook example of a positive externality is the pollination provided by
a beekeeper to his neighbour who runs an apple orchard.*-
A theoretical answer to the problem caused by negative externalities would be to
impose a tax on all activities that generate external costs, thereby reducing the in-
centives to take part in such activities.^ Optimally, for each harmful activity the
marginal tax rate should be equal to the marginal costs caused by it. The resulting
tax is usually referred to as a Pigouvian tax. However, Coase (1960) stressed the re-
eiprocfl/ nature of harm. According to Coase, the parties concerned often can solve a
problem caused by externalities themselves by means of negotiations. The external
costs can then be 'internalised' in a contract between the parties." The famous Conse
37 Carlton and Perloff (2000, p. 422).
* De Bijl and Van Damme (1996, p. 11).
" For an economic analysis of externalities see e.g. Varian (1984, pp. 259-263), Mamuth (1992,
pp. 183-185), Skaggs and Carlson (19%, pp. 126-129), Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp. 40-42) and
Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001, pp. 51-55). See also Ogus (1994, pp. 18-19; 35-38).
*° De Bijl and Van Damme (1996, p. 12).
4i Den Hertog (2000, p. 229).
** Cooter and Ulen (2000, p. 40).
•" Likewise, one could subsidise activities that generate external benefits.
** Coase (1960). Coase himself did not use the term 'externalities'.
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holds that in the absence of transaction costs,^ the outcome of such negotia-
tions will be economically efficient regardless of how the law allocates property
rights, because the parties involved will choose transactions that maximise their
joint utility and thus social welfare.'"' The Coase theorem deals with economic effi-
ciency only; it does not say anything about distributional aspects. Naturally, the
final distribution depends to a large extent on the initial allocation of property
rights. Furthermore the assumption of zero transaction costs is of course a very
strong one, especially if many parties are involved. In case of externalities that affect
many parties, Coasian bargaining will only take place if there is symmetrical infor-
mation among the parties concerned and if the transaction costs of bargaining are
smaller than the transaction costs of public intervention.
In cases where transaction costs are prohibitive there will be no Coasian bargaining.
Some kind of legal intervention is needed to effectuate the internalisation of the ex-
ternal costs. In other words, there may be a public interest justification for govern-
ment regulation, e.g. by prohibiting companies to undertake certain harmful
activities, or by regulating the activity level. An example of the latter form of regula- '
tion are tradable permits, such as the so-called 'rights to pollute' in the context of
environmental pollution.-''' However, even if we would assume that the government
is perfectly capable of curing the market failure problem caused by externalities,
account must be taken of the administrative costs of regulation: an externality may
give rise to a misallocation but the costs of correcting it may outweigh the social
benefits arising from such action.**
In the professions externalities may appear if the quality of a rendered service is
poor. The low quality of a professional service might affect third parties as well as
the client. This means that considerable losses may be thrown upon society if poorly
trained professionals were allowed to perform their services.^ An example would
be that of a poorly designed or constructed building that collapses and causes casu-
These are the costs of information gathering, direct contracting costs, and monitoring costs.
The Coase theorem is discussed inter a/ia in Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 38; 293-305),
Skaggs and Carlson (1996, pp. 537-539), Posner (1998, pp. 8; 55-58), Cooter and Ulen (2000,
pp. 82-87) and Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001, pp. 91-97).
The starting point for most of the literature on tradable permits is a 1968 publication by Dales
(new print, 2002). Dales proposed that a market of tradable permits would be organised by
the government whereby tradable pollution rights would be granted for a certain period. The
government would act as broker for the trade and would monitor the system. An extensive
overview of the existing literature that has been published as a reaction to Dales' proposal
can be found on the internet: <http://www.colby.edu/economics/faculty/thtieten/re-
search> (website of Prof. T.H. Tietenberg). A recent paper on emissions trading is Peeters
(2003). She analyses emissions trading from a legal point of view, i.e. as part of the new regu-
lator)' approach in EU environmental law.
Ogus (1994, p. 38).
Van den Bergh (1999, p. 108). See also Cox and Foster (1990, p. 10).
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alties.™ Furthermore, especially in the medical professions, mistakes by e.g. a physi-
cian or a pharmacist might have dramatic results not only for the patient but also
for his family (for example, in case of death of the patient) or for other persons (for
example, in case an incompetent doctor fails to diagnose a contagious disease, thus
contributing to an epidemic).
2.2.1.4 Public goods
The fourth form of market failure that may give rise to regulation is the existence of
puWic goods." A public good has two characteristics: nonrivalrous consumption (or:
non-rivalry) and non-excludability. Nonrivalrous consumption implies that con-
sumption of the good by one person is not at the expense of another person. Non-
excludability means that it is either impossible or too expensive (for a private profit-
maximising firm) to exclude people from consumption of the good." Classic exam-
ples of public goods are national defence, lighthouses and dykes.
If the product in question is a public good the market sometimes does not - or not
sufficiently - generate the product. This can be explained as follows. Since consum-
ers cannot be excluded from consumption of the good, they might be tempted to
take a free ride on the willingness to pay of others. On the one hand, this 'free-rider
behaviour' creates problems in raising sufficient money for production of the good,
while, on the other hand, it becomes very difficult to determine the exact demand
for the good. After all, consumers do not have incentives to reveal their true will-
ingness to pay. If indeed the market does not (sufficiently) generate the public good,
the government can play a role by either subsidising the production or by produc-
ing the good itself. Contrary to private firms, the government of course has the abil-
ity to use tax money to finance the production of the public good.
Information has the same characteristics as a public good: when it is supplied to
someone, it can be supplied to others at no extra cost. If one looks at the professions,
the danger exists that professionals underprovide socially valuable information be-
cause it may cost them more to provide this information than it is worth to consum-
ers. Some of the problems surrounding information as a public good will be dealt
with in section 2.4.1, where I discuss mandatory information disclosure with respect
to the quality of professional services.
Such accident actually occurred in Maastricht in April 2003: the balconies of a modem apart-
ment block suddenly fell down, which resulted in two casualties. See e.g. De Vo/Jtsfcranf, Bal-
kons störten in: twee doden, 25 April 2003, Dagb/ad De Limfcurger, Balkons störten in: twee
doden, 25 April 2003.
See e.g. Varian (1984, pp. 253-356), Mamuth (1992, pp. 185-188), Ogus (1994, pp. 33-35) and
Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (pp. 55-58).
Den Hertog (2000, p. 230).
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2.2.2 Liability uersus
Under certain conditions, a market failure may also be remedied through private
law in the form of liability rules. This implies that regulatory intervention is not
needed in those cases. In a classic paper Shavell (1984) examined the choice between
regulation and liability rules by defining four determinants: information asymmetry
between the government and private parties, insolvency risk, the threat of a liability
suit and administrative costs. In this section I describe these four determinants
briefly and after that I will show that, in the context of the regulation of professions,
private law alone will not suffice.
2.2.2.1 Shavell's criteria for liability and regulation
Shavell poses the following question: what is the socially desirable (efficient) way to
employ liability and safety regulation in situations where we want to alleviate risks,
i.e. the risk of harm to others?" Obviously, liability rules will only work effectively
if there is a victim who can bring a lawsuit against an identifiable injurer, who is
able to pay the compensation due. If not, the government may have to intervene.
From an economic point of view, there is an important difference between liability
and regulation. While liability works rather indirectly, through the deterrent effect
of a tort suit in case of damage, regulation modifies the behaviour of parties di-
rectly. That is, contrary to liability, which is employed at the initiative of private
parties, regulation is generally independent of the actual occurrence of harm.^ In
addition there is a difference in enforcement: liability is enforced by private law,
while regulation is enforced by public law and criminal law.^
The first determinant is i/i/ormflfio/; nsymmerry frefu»rai //ie £0z>er?imewf rtnrf pn'iv/fe /wr-
f/'es. In § 2.2.1.2 I indicated that information problems (such as adverse selection,
moral hazard and bounded rationality) may provide a justification for government
intervention through regulation. However, according to Shavell for every activity
first the question must be asked whether either the government or the parties in-
volved can acquire the information at the least costs. The parties in an accident set-
ting may have better information on the accident risk than that possessed by the
regulatory body, because they generally have the best information on the costs and
benefits of the activity that they undertake, on the optimal way to prevent accidents,
and on the magnitude of accidents.^ * If this is indeed so, liability will be a more effi-
ShaveU (1984, p. 358).
Shavell (1984, p. 357). Note that this argument also applies to the difference between private
insurance and social security, e.g. in social health care. See Philipsen and Faure (2002b).
For an extensive economic analysis of tort law in the law and economics literature, see Cooter
and Ulen (2000, Chs. 8-9) and Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001, Ch. 5). See also Ogus
(1994, pp. 20-21).
Shavell (1984, p. 359).
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cient instrument than regulation." But if it becomes clear that some risks are not
readily appreciated by the parties in an accident setting, this argument does not
hold. In that case, and of course in cases where the government has better informa-
tion on the factors mentioned above, regulation is preferred to liability.
The second determinant proposed by Shavell is zriso/venq/ rz's/r, or z'zzcnpnriri/ to pny/br
/inn// done. If the potential damages are so high that they will exceed the wealth of
the individual injurer, liability rules will not provide sufficient incentives to take
optimal care. Namely, costs of care are directly related to the magnitude of the ex-
pected damages, and these will under a liability system never be higher than the
individual wealth of the injurer.^ If the efficient care is determined instead by ex
rt//fe regulation (backed up by a non-monetary sanction such as imprisonment), the
potential injurer is obliged to comply with this regulation, irrespective of the in-
jurer's wealth.^
The third determinant is the f/zrenf o/n /mbz'/irj/ sz/z'f (or: the c/z/7/zce o/esazpz>z# sz/z7). If
the damage is thinly spread among a large number of victims, it is likely that an
injurer will escape liability. The reason is that individual victims in this case do not
have sufficient - if any - incentives to bring a suit; after all, their individual harm
may be very small. This will occur especially if the damage is not caused to indi-
viduals but to a common property such as a lake or a forest. Furthermore, the threat
of a liability suit is small if a long time has elapsed before the damage becomes ap-
parent, or if it is difficult to determine a causal link between the activity of the in-
jurer and the damage. This is the problem of lack of evidence. For all these reasons a
suit may never be brought, which implies that in these cases a tort system will have
no deterrent effect. Shavell therefore concludes that if there is no threat of a liability
suit, safety regulation is necessary to ensure that efficient care is taken by the (po-
tential) injurer.**
Finally, the rtrfz/zizzz'sfrafzw cosfs of both systems must be compared. The administra-
tive costs of the tort system consist of the public expenses of the legal system itself
(such as fees for the judges) and the private costs of time, effort and legal expenses
^ This argument always holds under strict liability (that is, if one assumes a unilateral accident
setting where only one party is able to influence the accident risk). Under negligence, how-
ever, one has to assume that the court has better access to this information than the regula-
tory body.
s* I assume risk-neutrality here. Of course, if one takes account of risk-aversion, insurance may
- at least to some extent - provide an answer to some insolvency problems, provided that one
is not dealing with very widespread and large risks involving e.g. great losses of human
lives. Moreover, one has to assume that the insurer is perfectly capable of monitoring the in-
sured: here we are back to the information problem again. For a discussion on attitudes to-
wards risk and the demand for insurance, see e.g. Varian (1984, pp. 158-162), Mamuth (1992,
pp. 170-175) and Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp. 46-50).
59 Shavell (1984, pp. 360-363).
*" Shavell (1984, p. 363).
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borne by private parties. If one considers regulation, the administrative costs in-
clude the public costs of passing and enforcing the regulation and the private costs
of compliance."' With respect to these costs the liability system seems to have an
advantage, because the administrative costs of the court system are only incurred if
an accident has actually happened. A lot of accidents will be prevented by the de-
terrent effect of being held liable and having to pay damages to the victim. In case of
regulation the costs of passing and enforcing the regulation are always there, irre-
spective of the actual occurrence of an accident.
Concluding this discussion of Shavell's paper, two of the determinants generally
favour liability: administrative costs and information asymmetry (provided that
private parties have the better information). The other two determinants generally
favour liability: incapacity to pay for harm done and the chance of escaping suit.
Often a combination of the two instruments will be optimal, with the balance be-
tween them reflecting the importance of the determinants.^ An example is driving
on the road: there is safety regulation (maximum speed, guard rails, rules on driv-
ing on either the left side or the right side of the road) and there is a traffic liability
system in case of accidents.
2.2.2.2 Liability versus regulation in the professions
How does the above relate to the topic of this thesis, the regulation of professions?
Following Shavell, the four criteria described in § 2.2.2.1 should be considered in
order to determine whether we need regulation or liability to cure a problem caused
by market failure. The criteria seem to apply especially to the cases of externalities
and information asymmetry, while they do not seem to be applicable at all to cases
involving market failure caused by market power or public goods.
If one looks at the first of Shavell's determinants (information asymmetry between
the government and private parries), intuitively one might be inclined to say that
the government has less information at its disposal than private parties, if the latter
group is defined as consisting only of the professionals providing the service. How-
ever, also the consumers of professional services belong to the private parties. In
fact, there may be, on the one hand, an information asymmetry between the gov-
ernment and private parties, while, on the other hand, there may also be an infor-
mation asymmetry between the private parties themselves.*' The latter will not be
solved by liability. The former is actually the problem of self-regulation versus pub-
lic regulation, which will be discussed in section 5 in/ra. The first determinant thus
clearly favours regulation in this case.
Shavell (1984, pp. 363-364).
Shavell, (1984, p. 365).
See §2.2.1.2.
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With respect to the insolvency risk, the second determinant, the question should be
posed whether professionals would be able to pay for possible harm done as a re-
sult of bad quality services causing externalities. I argued in § 2.2.1.3 that bad qual-
ity services, especially in the medical professions, may have disastrous effects. It is
obvious that we want some ex wite regulation of professional services, next to pro-
fessional liability in case of such accidents, to make sure that the optimal level of
care is taken.
The chance of escaping a lawsuit, the third determinant, is linked again to the in-
formation asymmetry argument and the fact that professional services are often ex-
perience goods or trust goods. For consumers of professional services, such as
patients looking for medical advice, it is difficult to assess the quality of such ser-
vices. If externalities result from, e.g., a poor diagnosis or bad drug therapy (think of
the earlier example of contagious diseases or even the death of a patient) it may
therefore be difficult to trace what exactly caused the problem. This would imply
that some regulation is needed to solve this problem. Generally, however, this de-
terminant does not seem to have a strong influence on the choice between liability
and regulation for the specific case of the liberal professions. The problem will espe-
cially be that victims of poor quality services by e.g. pharmacists may simply lack
the incentive to bring a suit because they do not realise that the health problems
they face are caused by poor service in the pharmacy. Hence, there is a serious en-
forcement problem.
The last determinant, administrative costs, slightly favours liability, as discussed in
§ 2.2.2.1. Summing up: if Shavell's criteria are applied, a liability system alone (al-
though clearly required) will not suffice to deal with problems caused by market
failure in the professions. Despite the higher costs, some (public or self-) regulation
is required. In particular, regulation should take care of the information asymmetry
problem between professionals and consumers (clients, patients), but it may also be
needed to prevent externalities causing large losses, for which professionals may be
insolvent or for which there is lack of evidence.
2.3 The private interest approach
The public interest approach to regulation does not explain how a public perception
as to what kind of legislative policies or arrangements would maximise social wel-
fare is translated into legislative action.** In other words, it does not specify how or
when a new regulation originates. It does, however, assume that regulation will be
formulated by government agencies to serve the public interest. The pn'zwte mteresf
approach to regulation on the other hand stresses the role of interest groups in the
formation of regulation. Actually the private interest view I will present in this sec-
tion has originated from several economic theories: the capture theory, (elements
from) public choice theory and the economic theory of regulation. These theories
" Posner (1974, p. 340).
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have in common that they all suggest that regulation is not only an answer to mar-
ket failure (if at all), but also a result of lobbying and rent-seeking behaviour by in-
terest groups.**
The cfl/>fi/re f/ieory emphasises the influence of interest groups in the formation (and
failure) of regulation. It takes as an assumption that regulatory agencies are subject
to pressure, influence and bribery of the very people who are the subjects of a par-
ticular regulation and who in this way want to protect their own interests. Eventu-
ally the private interests of the people subject to regulation may then be served
more by the regulation than the public interest is.**
In the pi/W/c c/70/re literature*'' regulatory failure has been discussed frequently. The
public choice theory explains, positively, how individual preferences are reflected in
the voting procedures adopted by public institutions. The assumption is made that
behaviour in the political arena is, in its essence, the same as behaviour in the mar-
ket.** That is, in both contexts economic subjects act rationally by maximising their
utility. Politicians are likely to strive for maximisation of votes, because they want to
be re-elected, but they may also try to maximise their budgets or prestige. This may
give rise to inefficient regulation, especially when lobbying is involved. The concept
of rent seeking*** is a central feature of the so-called Virginia School of Public
Choice.™ Moreover, Keenan and Rubin (1988) argue that rational politicians will not
only respond to lobbying activities from the already existing interest groups, but
will under certain circumstances also take into account the possible actions of po-
tential lobby groups: the so-called shadow interest groups. These are groups that
*5 Apart from their emphasis on the role of interest groups, I do not claim here that these theo-
ries are in any other way related to each other. See further the discussion of the separate theo-
ries below.
** The capture theory was already described by the political scientists Bentley (1908) and Tru-
man (1951), but came up especially in the 1960s after a number of empirical studies dealing
with the influence of lobbying on regulation in the United States. However, the capture the-
ory lacked a theoretical foundation, according to Posner (1974, pp. 341-343). See also Hägg
(1997, pp. 342-343) and Den Hertog (2000, pp. 235-236).
*? See Cullis and Jones (1998) and McNutt (2002). A summary of the public choice theory can be
found in e.g. Ogus (1994, pp. 58-71), Skaggs and Carlson (19%, pp. 134-140) and Posner (1998,
pp. 572-576).
** Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Ch. 4).
** Krueger (1974).
™ See, especially, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980).
Hägg (1997, pp. 344-345) argues that, according to the rent-seeking theorists of the Virginia
School, 'f/ie sod«/ icasfe associated «'irti loMiying hotf [...] fo (v added to o//ier/brms 0/1 wj^icirncifs
f/iflf npgiWafory Hicusures may cause'. An introduction to the Virginia School is provided in Den
Hertog (2000, pp. 243-244)'
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have not yet organised but that would have members and come into being if an
event occurred/'
In his classic paper on regulation Stigler (1971) assumes that the government is the
supplier of regulation, while the demand side exists of interest groups looking for
protective regulation (such as regulated prices or entry barriers to the market). The
demand for regulation will especially be high when the potential benefits of restric-
tions to competition cannot be obtained by the interest groups themselves, e.g. by
means of cartel formation. According to Stigler's theory, which came to be known as
the (?cottow//c f/fcon/ 0/ regw/flfion,^  it is the industry itself that asks for regulation."
Regulation originates where the benefits are concentrated (the industry) and the
costs can be divided over a large group (the consumers). Stigler claimed that every
branch of industry, which is powerful enough to do this, will lobby the government
for the erecting of entry barriers such as obligatory training or apprenticeships,
product requirements, taxes, import quotas, etc. After all, entry barriers keep the
supply of new producers on a market artificially low, which of course is beneficial
to the insiders on the market (viz. the original producers) because they will be able
to sell their products at relatively high prices. The same line of reasoning goes for
direct rules of conduct like a prohibition to advertise. Advertising bans lead to a less
transparent market where the prices asked can and will be higher than in a market
without advertising bans/''
Peltzman (1976) formalised and extended Stigler's model. His model supports Stig-
ler's conclusion that the costs of using the political process limit the size of the
dominant group. Also, it produces as a second important result that the gain ob-
tained by the winning group through political action will not be as great as is within
the power of the political process to grant it.^ In other words, the best organised
cartel will yield less to the membership if the government organises it than if it were
organised privately. Peltzman explains this by arguing that not only well organised
industries are expected to win favours on the political market, but that other interest
groups and voters will be influential as well. Politicians will distribute favours and
disfavours among pressure groups and voters in order to maximise their chances of
™ Keenan and Rubin (1988, p. 22).
^ Alternatively, this theory has been called the Oiicago fteory 0/ regu/ahon (Hägg, 1997, p. 343;
Den Hertog, 2000, p. 236; Hantke-Domas, 2003, p. 180), because it has been developed and
worked out in particular by Chicago economists: notably Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltz-
man (1976) and Becker (1983). Stripped of detail, the Chicago school of economics is charac-
terised by its trust in the functioning of the free market (the 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith)
to solve certain forms of market failure. Classic papers on the development of the Chicago
school are Posner (1979) and Reder (1982). See also De Bijl and Van Damme (1996, pp. 13-15).
^ Stigler (1971, p. 3).
*^ Benham and Benham (1975), who examined the market for eyeglasses in the USA, found that
in state markets with greater professional control on information, prices appeared to be sig-
nificantly higher than in less regulated states.
^ Peltzman (1976, p. 221).
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being re-elected. This to some extent weakens the political power of interest
groups.?*
Becker (1983) presents a model of competition among pressure groups for political
influence, i.e. taxes, subsidies and other political favours such as protective regula-
tion. He makes the assumption that politicians and bureaucrats carry out the politi-
cal allocations resulting from this competition.^ His model then shows that political
equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each pressure group in producing pres-
sure, the effect of additional pressure (from other interest groups) on their influence,
the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight costs of taxes and
subsidies.™ In the analysis Becker unifies the view that governments correct market
failures with the view that they favour the politically powerful: in his model both
are produced by the competition for political favours. He argues that pressure
groups have an incentive to demand the most efficient regulation, since regulations
that cause deadweight costs discourage their political power while they encourage
the power of pressure groups whose welfare is harmed. The model suggests that it
is not the existence of well-organised pressure groups that may be harmful to the
economy, but the unequal distribution of political power across these groups.™
The hypothesis that results from the private interest approach to regulation is, as
stated above, a combination of elements from the three theories just described. Ad-
herents of this approach claim that interest groups are continually influencing po-
litical decisions in order to seek rents for themselves."" This kind of behaviour is
called renf-seefci/ig Mwwowr and the corresponding hypothesis is called the renf-
seefa'ng /n/pof/zesis."' In microeconomic theory the concept of 'rent' refers to the dif-
ference between the revenue from producing a good and the cost of producing the
good. If there is competition between producers such rents will (to a great extent) be
eliminated. However, if regulation exists that protects producers this effect will be
softened. As a result of the decrease in competition, wealth will be transferred from
consumers to producers. This is unproductive from society's point of view, as re-
Viscusi e f a/ (2000, pp. 319-323) present a summary and analysis of what they call the 'Stig-
ler/Peltzman model'.
Becker (1983, p. 372) states that 'po/i/irians, po/ificn/ pnrfies and i'oters «>iH receire /ittfe attention
[in the model] because tfiey arc assumed mmnJy to transmit f/ie pressure o/actizie groups'.
Becker (1983, p. 395).
See also Hägg (1997, p. 345). Viscusi ef a/ (2000, pp. 323-327) describe the Becker model in
greater detail.
Hahn (1989a and 1989b) even argues that policy instruments, i.e. regulatory instruments such
as those to be discussed in section 4 of this chapter, are almost never used in the way sug-
gested by economic theory, because of the large influence that interest groups have on the
rule-making process. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) study in this respect the example of envi-
ronmental regulation in the USA. See also Maloney and McCormick (1982).
For a survey paper on rent seeking, see Tollison (1982). Tollison and Tullock (1995) present a
selection of the most important papers on rent seeking.
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sources are devoted to capturing a wealth transfer.^ Besides this argument of waste
of resources, rent-seeking behaviour may also be condemned on distributional
grounds. This is, however, not a private interest argument from an economic per-
spective.
Rent seeking is according to Olson (1965) most successful if groups are small, single-
issue oriented and well organised.'*' Interest groups in the professions seem to sat-
isfy at least two out of these three characteristics. They are generally very well or-
ganised and are concentrated on a clear subject: the domain of their profession.
Concerning the third characteristic it is moreover clear that the number of profes-
sionals will be relatively small compared to their potential number of customers.*'
2.4 Regulatory instruments
As explained above (section 2) the services offered by professionals are often ex-
perience or trust goods. If in an unregulated market there is information asymmetry
between professionals and consumers, adverse selection will occur, as a result of
which the quality of these services will eventually be lower than the social efficient
level (that would arise in a market with transparent information). Moreover, low
quality services may in certain cases also lead to negative externalities. In this sec-
tion I describe - in increasing order of intervention into the market - a number of
regulatory instruments that can be used to solve problems with respect to the qual-
ity of professional services. The instruments that will be discussed here are informa-
tion regulation, quality standards, and licensing and certification. It should be
emphasised that the discussed instruments may also be applied by self-regulating
groups. However, the social welfare consequences might then differ, as will be illus-
trated in section 5.
2.4.1 In/onM«ftoM regw/afio«
The least interventionist instrument that may be used to tackle information prob-
lems on a market for professional services is simply to directly supervise the level
and content of information provided by professionals. This supervision can be exe-
cuted at various levels. The government (or a professional body) may decide to pro-
ftiM_/n/se mid misiaid/Mg i/i/brwwhon, e.g. by regulating advertisements. However, the
regulation of information may also go a bit further, namely by obliging profession-
als to provide information relating to price, identity, composition, quantity or qual-
8- Tullock (1967) first emphasised the importance of income transfers and the attempts by in-
dustry to capture these transfers.
83 Olson (1965, Chs. 1-3). Posner (1974, pp. 344-347) makes a link to the theory of cartels, in
which the characteristics are defined that predispose an industry to successful cartelisation.
** It is obvious that the suppliers of the rents will in general be relatively large groups, which
are difficult to organise and which face information problems. See also Van den Bergh (1993,
p. 41).
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ity. This is called wiflndflfory disc/osure of information.^ The discussion
which can also be considered a form of information regulation, follows in § 2.4.3,
where it will be compared to licensing.
The most common method used by suppliers to provide information on goods and
services is advertising. Two types of advertising can be distinguished: price adver-
tising and quality advertising. Because information is a public good professionals
may sometimes not be encouraged to provide it. Cave (1985) investigates how the
voluntary disclosure of information on price and quality differs according to
whether search goods or experience goods are involved. He also shows that price
advertisements may in some cases even have negative effects on consumer welfare.
In the case of search goorfs there is no ground for prohibiting price advertising, since
these goods are homogeneous in all their characteristics. Advertising will therefore
lead to lower search costs for consumers and will drive prices to the competitive
equilibrium. In the limit advertising for search goods may even eliminate all price
differences, so that search costs are minimised."'' This argument does, however, not
apply to experience goorfs: goods or services that differ in quality (to which many pro-
fessional services belong). When information about price is easier to obtain than
information about quality, increasing the availability of the former might discour-
age quality competition and lead to a degradation of quality on the market. This
argument is frequently used by professional organisations to justify self-regulation
that prohibits price advertising.*' On the other hand an advertising ban will of
course lead to higher consumer search costs and higher prices of services. An obli-
gation to provide information on the quality of the service would decrease this
problem. But often this is not so easy to monitor.
The economic literature describes a mechanism that provides incentives to suppliers
of experience goods to produce goods and services of above minimum quality,
whereby information on quality is voluntarily disclosed: repenf buying by consum-
ers."* Consumers buy a product or service often more than once."'' Moreover, the
effect of repeat buying becomes larger if consumers pass on information about the
quality of the good or service to other consumers, such as relatives and friends. It
may therefore be important for professionals to make their services known through
advertising to persuade consumers to a first buy. The fact that the information value
of advertisements for experience goods is generally low does not matter according
to this analysis, because a positive relationship between quality and advertising ex-
penditures is assumed. Advertising functions as a 'signal': the supplier wants con-
»5 Ogus (1994, p. 121).
** Cave (1985, p. 346). Tirole (1992, pp. 289-295) analyses the difference between advertising for
search and experience goods.
"^  In addition to which often the claim is made that price competition would also threaten the
integrity and ethical responsibilities of the profession.
"* Cave (1985, p. 343).
** Of course, this depends very much on the product or service concerned.
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sumers to know that the product or service exists. If it turns out to be of low quality
after consumption, consumers will just go to a different supplier the next time. Ac-
cording to this analysis information regulation is therefore not needed for products
and services that have to be purchased repeatedly. However, this outcome may
change as the long term and the short term are discerned.
In the /o/ig term the reputation of a professional depends on the quality of his or her
services. The previously described mechanism of repeat buying influences the
choice of service quality. However, in the s/iorf term a professional may abuse this
reputation by lowering quality (for example by quickly and casually handling pa-
tients) and in that way make extra profits at the expense of a decrease in reputation.
Shapiro (1983) calls this a fly-by-night strategy.* This effect is predicted to be larger,
the slower consumers adjust their views of service quality and the larger the short-
term gains. The public interest approach argues that if quality degradation of this
kind occurs regularly the government has to regulate the provision of information.
In the case of products (as opposed to services), information problems of this kind
can sometimes be overcome by an obligation for producers to use labels on their
products. Labels are objective indicators of quality, because they only reproduce the
composition of a product. However, labels do have two weaknesses: they are not
always easy to understand for the average consumer and they obviously cannot be
used for professional services such as a visit to a pharmacist or a general practitio-
ner.
To sum up briefly, one can state that (with regard to information provision for pro-
fessional services) it would not be favourable if an economy only has information
on prices and no information on quality. However, to disclose information on the
quality of professional services is a complicated matter since it concerns experience
goods or trust goods. Labels cannot offer a solution for this problem. In the long
term the repeat buying mechanism may incite professionals to provide services of a
proper quality and to voluntarily disclose information, but supervision over short
term profit seeking (fly-by-night strategy) and false and misleading information
remains a prerequisite.
2.4.2 Qualify standards
A second instrument to regulate the quality of products and professional services is
the enforcement of minimum quality standards. There are three types of quality
standards: target standards, performance standards and specification standards.^'
The least restrictive standard as far as intervention in the production process of
suppliers is concerned, is the fargef sMntinrd. This implies that a government im-
poses criminal liability for eventual harmful consequences arising from the output
of a supplier. This standard only works after the product or service has been
* Shapiro (1983, p. 660).
" Ogus (1994, pp. 150-151).
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brought onto the market, in contrast with the other two types.^ A per/brmarice stan-
dard (also called o//fpw/ sfand/jrd) is used to check the quality of the final product or
service before it comes onto the market, without intervening in the production
process of the supplier. This is different if a speci/icnfio« stondflrd is enacted. That
type of standard involves control on the supply side: it forces or prohibits suppliers
to use certain production methods or materials. Therefore such a standard is also
called an iH/wf stond/zrrf. For some professional services a specification standard may
be less suitable, since the government does not always have at its disposal the spe-
cific knowledge required to set a specification standard.
As a result of a legally prescribed quality standard, all products and services that do
not meet the standard are excluded from the market. Thus, this regulatory instru-
ment interferes more with the market than the simple regulation of information.
While information regulation tends to discriminate against people with a relatively
poor educational background or intelligence, this is not the case if minimum stan-
dards are used.'*' On the other hand, it might be the case that because of minimum
quality standards some (relatively low quality) products are excluded from the
market, which some people would have wanted to buy in an unregulated market. It
is important to understand that the existence of low quality products does not nec-
essarily imply that there is a problem, as long as there is a demand for these prod-
ucts. Obviously this demand must be based on correct information about the
product or service in question and consumption of it should not cause any serious
negative externalities, e.g. with respect to safety or health of third parties. However,
if the quality of a product or service is too low from a social welfare point of view,
standards may help to solve the problem.** Unfortunately it is far from easy to de-
termine the optimal standard.
In an often cited paper, Leland (1979), building on the work by Akerlof, investigates
which market types are most likely to benefit from minimum quality standards. In
his model the market is characterised by information asymmetries between con-
sumers and suppliers: consumers do not even have any partial information, such as
information gathered from relatives and friends, own experience or signalling ac-
tivities from suppliers. Consumers only learn the true quality of a good or service
after consumption. A second important assumption in Leland's model is that the
opportunity costs,* R, of supplying a unit of service of quality level, q, are increas-
ing in q:*
For the difference between liability and regulation, see § 2.2.2.
Shapiro (1983, p. 678).
Shapiro (1983) derives an equilibrium price-quality schedule for markets of experience goods
and then analyses the effects of minimum quality standards on this equilibrium outcome. In-
deed, he concludes that it is optimal to exclude some products from the market.
The concept of opportunity cost refers to the economic cost of an alternative that has been
foregone (Cooter and Ulen, 2002, p. 30). E.g. a profit-maximising supplier has to consider the
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R'(q) = dR / rfq > 0
In other words, the opportunity costs of entering the market increase with quality.
Under these conditions minimum quality standards may be socially desirable ac-
cording to Leland. The following four market types are most likely to benefit from
quality standards according to his analysis: (1) markets with a relatively price-
insensitive demand; (2) markets with high demand sensitivity to average quality; (3)
markets where the costs associated with providing quality are low; and (4) markets
where the willingness to pay for low quality goods or services is low. When the as-
sumption above is reversed,* i.e. if R'(q) < 0, a minimum quality standard will al-
ways be socially desirable according to Leland. However, Leland's model predicts
that if professional groups set quality standards themselves it is likely that the stan-
dards will be set too high, that is, above the optimum level. He explains this result
by stating that:
' in choosing the optimal minimum standard, a professional group or industry seeks to
maximize its net gains. As with any monopoly,'* extra profits can be achieved by a
lower level of total supply than is socially optimal, [...] motivating the profession to set
the optimal standard too high'."
The introduction of a quality standard involves a number of different costs for an
economy. Ogus (1994) points to the distinction between direct and indirect costs.'""
The direct costs consist of the ndmi/iisfrariiie cosfs of defining, monitoring and enforc-
ing the quality standard and of the so-called comp/iVmce cosfs, which suppliers have
to make to fulfil the minimum quality standard, e.g. investments in new equipment
(if necessary) and the costs of adapting the plant. Also possible new maintenance
costs belong to this category, as well as any costs resulting from losses in productiv-
ity (opportunity costs). The indirect costs of a standard are the (often unintended)
side effects of the regulation. For example, standards may lead to productive or al-
locative inefficiency or act as a brake on technical change. Unfortunately, estima-
tions of these indirect costs are difficult to make. A cost-benefit analysis of
minimum quality standards will therefore not be easy. The benefits of quality stan-
dards are even more difficult to quantify than the costs, since they are very depend-
ent on the specific product or service that is regulated and thus often difficult to
opportunities foregone by committing his resources to the production of one good instead of
another.
* Leland (1979, p. 1331). Also Akerlof (1970) made this assumption.
*^  For example, if certain educational requirements must be satisfied to enter a market, 'smarter'
individuals may find it easier (less expensive in terms of opportunity costs) to meet those re-
quirements.
** For a brief discussion of monopoly power, see § 2.2.1.1 above.
" Leland (1979, p. 1338). Gehrig and Jost (1995) investigate under which circumstances self-
regulating clubs will provide and enforce quality standards themselves. See also section 5 iri-
"» Ogus (1994, pp. 154-155).
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predict in advance. Moreover, the benefits are usually spread widely over time and
space. Many positive effects of a standard are only realised long after the introduc-
tion of the standard, which means that one has to take into account some discount-
ing method if one wants to compute the current value of the benefits. A
complicating factor in the assessment of the benefits is that other factors besides the
standard itself may influence the situation in the relevant product market as well.
The causal relationship between the minimum standard and its positive effects is
then unclear.
The private interest approach to regulation warns for yet another problem: firms
and professionals who expect to be subject to a government prescribed quality
standard will use lobbying to push through their own ideas about the required
quality level. A standard can be an effective means to protect insiders on a market
against new competitors. Indeed, the introduction of a minimum quality standard is
favourable for those who already comply with the requirements defined in the
standard. That is, they do not have any compliance costs. The public choice theory
already predicted that those who formulate the regulation may succumb to such
lobbying by incumbents, in the hope that by doing so they will win votes and will
be re-elected. From a private interest point of view one therefore has to take care
that minimum quality standards will not be set too high.
Because the computation of the optimal standard is not an easy task and because
standards constitute a relatively heavy interference with the market process, it is
important to investigate first whether a standard really is the best answer to an in-
formation problem. If the purchase of a product or service of low quality involves
only small risks for third parties, private law in the form of liability rules may some-
times offer a solution to the problem. Naturally this depends very much upon the
circumstances."" However, when the damage resulting from such a purchase can be
high, liability law does not seem to offer sufficient protection and then a more far-
reaching instrument like a quality standard or a licensing system will be necessary.
2.4.3 Licensing and cerfi/icafio«
Regulation in the form of licences or certificates can be used to oblige suppliers to
meet certain predetermined conditions of education or training qualification, in or-
der to guarantee an adequate quality of goods and services. These requirements of
education and training may be determined both by public bodies and by profes-
sional groups themselves. In the professions it often occurs that members of the pro-
fession regulate the required work experience in the form of mandatory internships
(on the job training) and courses, while the government takes care of the issue of
diplomas for higher education. Title protection belongs to this category of regula-
tory instruments as well: it can be regarded as a form of certification.
"" See also the discussion of Shavell's determinants for the choice between liability and regula-
tion: supra, § 2.2.2.
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In contrast with information regulation and quality standards, licenses and certifi-
cates are issued before the regulated activity has taken place and are therefore ex
wife measures of quality control. Licensing goes further than certification. If a pro-
fession is licensed, this means that the performance of certain services is reserved to
only those professionals who have a license issued by the regulator."^ Entry into the
profession is restricted, whereas in the case of certification this is not the case. If cer-
tification is used every individual may be active in the regulated profession, but
those who do not have a certificate may not use the protected title.'"^ The private
interest economists warn for the danger that interest groups may use licenses as an
entry barrier."" The more conditions potential market entrants have to fulfil to gain
their license, the higher the entry costs.
The economic justification for licensing is that the average level of quality in a mar-
ket will rise because of exclusion of lowly-educated suppliers. The information
asymmetry problem between buyers and sellers is thereby alleviated. However, the
validity of this argument depends upon the relationship between the educational
level of a supplier and his or her marginal cost of providing high quality. If an indi-
vidual's human capital increases because of increased license requirements, it seems
at first sight plausible that his marginal cost of providing high quality decreases.
But to determine how strong this relationship is will be very difficult, especially
considering the fact that an individual's human capital may depreciate over time if
there are no periodic re-examinations. '"5 Shapiro (1986) has proven formally that if
the relationship between human capital and high quality is indeed positive and if
suppliers can build reputations over time by providing high quality, consumer wel-
fare can be enlarged by licensing or certification. However, his analysis also shows
that this holds only if consumers value high quality significantly compared to the
marginal cost of providing quality for suppliers. Moreover, licensing will never lead
to a Pareto-improvement, because there will always be consumers who would
rather have bought low quality goods or services at a lower price.'*
The danger exists that as a result of licenses such consumers will substitute the rela-
tively expensive licensed services by cheaper 'alternative' services. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that in the pharmaceutical profession more stringent educational
requirements are introduced, which lead to a higher mark-up on the cost price of
medicines in a pharmacy. Such an increase in educational requirements may be the
result of a policy that aims at improving the medical advice given to patients by
pharmacists. The higher price level of medicines in a pharmacy may cause some
'® It will in certain cases still be very difficult to determine exactly what is a lawful or unlawful
activity, if that activity is performed by someone without the license. Some key elements for
which a license is required must be isolated.
i " Curran (1993, p. 53).
"** See e.g. Stigler (1971, pp. 5-6). Also Moore (1961) points to this danger of licensing.
1« Curran (1993, p. 58).
l* Shapiro (1986, p. 856).
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consumers to refrain from buying any medicines in spite of the increased education
level of pharmacists, or (if possible) they might decide to look for substitutes at the
chemist, where they do not receive medical information about interactions of this
medicine with other medicines, but where the price is lower. In such cases it is
doubtful whether licensing will enhance the overall quality level of services, or re-
duce it because of this substitution effect.
The idea behind the introduction of certificates on a market is that these serve as a
signal of good quality. After all, the certificate (or title) can only be obtained if cer-
tain educational or training requirements have been fulfilled. If consumer prefer-
ences are heterogeneous, the advantage of certification is that consumers still have a
choice between certified (and often more expensive) and uncertified services, which
will not be the case in a licensed market. If the consequences of performance failure
of the service can be harmful (think e.g. of a wrong diagnosis by a general practitio-
ner) certification seems a less suitable instrument than licensing. However, this ar-
gument applies only if consumers generally are risk-averse instead of risk-neutral.
Shapiro (1986) points out the danger that suppliers may be inclined to 'overinvest'
in education in order to signal high quality levels.'"'' According to Shapiro total con-
sumer welfare may in these cases decrease if many consumers consider profession-
als overtrained and their services overpriced because of some license or
certificate.""
Finally, it should be mentioned here that in practice the difference between licens-
ing and certification is not always as clear-cut as described above. That is, certifica-
tion can in practice come very close to licensing if there is insufficient demand for
uncertified services and if there are little or no professionals left on the market
without the certificate. Under these circumstances it will be almost impossible for
recently graduated professionals to enter (or to be active on) the market without
owning the certificate.
The overall effect of licensing and certification thus depends on the heterogeneity of
consumer preferences for quality, even if educational level (human capital) and
quality are positively related. Summarising one can say about the difference be-
tween the two regulatory instruments that licensing intervenes further in the mar-
ket process than certification, but that risk-averse consumers are better insured by it
against possible harmful consequences of bad services. Drawbacks of licenses are
that they can be used as entry barriers by interest groups and that they may incite
consumers to substitute licensed services by alternative services.
Shapiro (1986, p. 855).
Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) use data on the dental health of incoming Air Force personnel to
analyse the effects of varying licensing stringency among US states. They find that tougher li-
censing does raise prices (for consumers) and profits (hourly earnings per dentist), while it
does not improve the market outcomes (in terms of overall dental health, as measured by
complaints to dental licensing boards and malpractice premiums).
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2.5 Self-regulation
Self-regulation can be defined as rules formulated by a professional body to govern
the activities of its members. Self-regulation exists in many forms, which differ in
legal force and in the degree of autonomy from the government. Concerning the
/egfl/ybrce, Ogus (2000) makes a distinction between four types."" According to Ogus
self-regulation can be:
'(1) formally binding, non-compliance leading to public law or private law sanctions;
(2) codes of practice which presumptively apply unless an alleged offender can show
that some alternative conduct was capable of satisfactorily meeting the regulatory
goals; (3) norms the breach of which leads to non-legal sanctions, such as ostracism; or
(4) standards compliance with which is purely voluntarily'.
Concerning the degree o/ autonomy from the government, this can range from total
absence of government intervention in the rule-making process towards self-
regulation that needs approval from the government or another public body.
Although the argument of professional groups themselves is that by means of self-
regulation they aim for a higher quality of services, self-regulation also has as a
negative side effect that it often restricts competition. The extent of restriction of
competition depends largely on the kind of regulatory instruments used in the self-
regulation. Therefore I will first present a short overview of some regulatory in-
struments that are generally used in the professions (§ 2.5.1). I make a distinction
between entry regulation and conduct regulation. After that I will offer some argu-
ments for (§ 2.5.2) and against (§ 2.5.3) self-regulation as presented by the public
and private interest approach respectively. Finally, subsection 5.4 will provide a
short overview of some of the leading economic publications that use a formal (i.e.
mathematic) approach to analyse self-regulation in the professions.
2.5.1 E«<ri/ regM/aho« and conduct
defines the conditions that have to be fulfilled by potential profes-
sionals in order for them to be allowed to practice in the profession. The best known
type of entry regulation is the requirement of a specific diploma. Furthermore, entry
into a profession may be regulated, e.g. by a mandatory registration procedure or
by requirements of nationality. In some professions even a numerws c/ausws on the
number of practitioners applies, which means that there is a quantitative restriction
on the number of practitioners that is allowed on the market. All these kinds of
rules are often determined by the legislator or are at least backed by the govern-
ment. Thus one can notice that in many cases public regulation and self-regulation
are combined. The profession itself often supplements these requirements with a
Ogus (2000, pp. 588-589).
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mandatory traineeship and/or an establishment policy with regard to the distribu-
tion of professionals in a certain market.
Also licensing may be used to restrict the entry into a profession, as I explained in
section 4.3 above. Certification on the other hand does not prohibit uncertified pro-
fessionals from entering the market but can on occasion have the same effect as li-
censing. That is, if there is insufficient demand for uncertified goods or services,
uncertified professionals will eventually disappear from the market. Because both
licensing and certification will have effects on the market structure I classify these
types of regulation among entry regulation.""
It is obvious that rorit/urf regi//«f/o/i covers all rules that directly regulate the conduct
of professionals. Many forms of conduct regulation can be found in the professional
code and rules of conduct formulated by professional bodies. In the professional
code usually a description of the tasks and duties of profession members is given.
Because it determines how profession members must perform their activities in an
ethical way it is also referred to as 'professional ethics'. In reference to the rules of
conduct, an often-occurring example is the prohibition of advertising. In some pro-
fessions, individuals are not allowed to advertise their specific qualities, prices, or
services, or make advertisements for the practice of their own; only promotion of
the profession as a whole is allowed then. The argument often used by professional
bodies to justify these kind of advertising rules is that they want to prevent 'com-
mercialisation' of the profession. A second rule of conduct that is common in some
professions is a restriction of cooperation with other professions. In the Nether-
lands, for example, a discussion took place in the 1990s regarding the question
whether lawyers should be allowed to form partnerships with accountants and no-
taries.'" Other well-known forms of conduct regulation are restrictions on incorpo-
ration, e.g. prohibitions on employment of professionals by non-professionals, and
geographical restrictions on the exercise of the profession. The last form of conduct
regulation that will be mentioned here is regulation of fees. The intensity of price
regulation may range from advisory prices on one side to administrated prices on
the other. In the last case all competition on the market is eliminated, except compe-
tition in service quality. In the case of advisory prices profession members are in
theory still free to set their prices, although the chance of collective pricing behav-
iour is rather high.
De Bijl and Van Damme (19%) assign these types of regulation to a third category called order
n'gi</afjofi. However, they come to the conclusion as well that entry regulation and order
regulation can both be classified under 'structural measures', to make explicit the distinction
with conduct regulation.
See e.g. He/ F»umrif?/e DagMad, Advocaten en accountants moeten vrij kunnen samenwerken,
11 April 1994, and MDW (1995, pp. 45-47). In 2002, the European Court of Justice concluded
in the landmark Hbuters case (C-309-99) that a prohibition on multi-disciplinary partnerships
between accountants and lawyers is necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the
Dutch legal profession.
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All these rules have in common that they impose restrictions on the internal compe-
tition, i.e. the competition between practitioners within the same professional
group. In addition also the external competition with other - but comparable - pro-
fessions may be restricted by means of a broad definition of the professional mo-
nopoly. "^ Examples of a professional monopoly are the monopoly to plead for
attorneys and the monopoly to dispense medicines for pharmacists. "^
Having just discussed a number of possible restrictions that may result from self-
regulation, the question arises how self-regulation is judged according to the public
and private interest perspectives. Therefore I will now present the arguments used
by both approaches.
2.5.2 Pwb/ic interest argwiMewfs m/auowr o/se//-regM/ario«
Three arguments in favour of self-regulation as opposed to government regulation
can be found in a paper written by Miller (1985), in which he makes a case for more
government reliance on self-regulation."'' His arguments refer to respectively the
specific knowledge of professionals, the flexibility of self-regulating agencies com-
pared to public bodies and the lower costs of self-regulation. The first argument
brought forward by Miller, the speri/Ic know/edge «rgumenf, implies that suppliers of
"^ in a recent study of liberal professions in the EU (IHS, 2003, Ch. 3), carried out by the Institute
for Advanced Studies in Vienna at the request of the European Commission, the professional
monopoly is considered part of entry regulation, i.e. the number of exclusive and shared ex-
clusive tasks is regarded as a part of the licensing system. The authors define separate indices
for market entry regulation and for conduct regulation. The market entry regulation index in-
cludes (weighted) indicators for licensing, requirements in education and quota's/economic
needs tests. The conduct regulation index consists of the following (weighted) variables: re-
gulations on prices and fees, regulations on advertising, regulations on location, regulations
on diversification, and regulations on form of business and interprofessional co-operation.
Naturally, these indicators are to a large extent subjective, because they 'are ofyecfr?>e measures
condition«/ ii/WH f/ie pnor sufyec/iif rfe/imfion o/ n nig/ier or /ow>er degree o/ regi</flfioM (as imp/e-
merifed fry tfie choice and iceigMing o/re/etwif cafegones o/regi//ahon,)' (p. 33).
' " More examples of entry and conduct regulation can be found in a number of reports pub-
lished in early 2003, which consider the regulation of several liberal professions in different
countries. OFT (2003) investigates the regulation of pharmacists in the United Kingdom and
also contains a brief comparison with the regulation of pharmacists in Canada, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the USA. IHS (2003) compares the regulations
governing lawyers, notaries, accountants, architects, engineers and pharmacists in the 15 EU
Member States. Indecon - London Economics (2003) contains an overview and analysis of the
regulation of eight distinct professions in Ireland: solicitors, barristers, engineers, architects,
veterinary surgeons, medical practitioners, dentists and optometrists. See also OFT (2001),
which identifies restrictions to competition in the professional rules of accountants, architects,
solicitors and lawyers in the UK. The report challenges a number of those rules, saying that
they should either be removed or justified. A progress report was published one year later,
on 25 April 2002.
"* Miller (1985, pp. 897-898). Miller is called by some the 'leading advocate of self-regulation':
see Curran (1993, p. 60) and Van den Bergh (1999, p. 110).
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services mostly have more knowledge on quality and risks than public authorities
have. Miller adds to this that even if they do not have this knowledge, they can
probably get this information at lower costs. Indeed, the fact that professional ser-
vices are experience goods makes it very difficult for public authorities to assess the
quality of these services or the risks attached to supplying low quality services. This
information is needed, however, in order to effectively regulate the performance of
professional services. Because of this lack of information from the side of public au-
thorities, Miller concludes that self-regulating agencies can better regulate them-
selves, i.e. control the quality level provided by their members.'^ Indeed, to
regulate effectively the government would have to hire experts, which are usually
members of the regulated profession. Self-regulation will in that case reduce costs
because it combines the regulators' and the experts' roles into one.'"'
Secondly, Miller claims that self-regulating agencies are less formalised than public
regulatory regimes and therefore /«ore /Zex/We. That is, public agencies often have to
go through a long bureaucratic and costly process before an old rule can be changed
or a new one enacted. The greater flexibility of self-regulating agencies will espe-
cially be valuable in dynamic markets, where innovation is important and/or where
consumer preferences change regularly. In other words: inefficient rules will be re-
placed by efficient ones.
The third argument advanced by Miller is that, as a result of self-regulation, the pro-
fession itself /i///y frenrs f/ie coste o/f/if regu/n/ion, instead of the government. Because
regulation governed by public authorities depends on tax income, self-regulation
saves costs to taxpayers who do not consume the regulated service or product.
Miller also claims that, because professionals regulate themselves, they have incen-
tives to minimise the costs of enforcement and compliance, while government agen-
cies may act to minimise only the enforcement costs of regulation. De Bijl and Van
Damme (1996) add to this that generally self-regulation will enlarge the chances of
acceptance and observance of conduct rules, because suppliers themselves have
been involved in the actual formation of these rules."?
2.5.3 Private i/iteresf argwme«fs against sef/-regw/afio/i
The arguments put forward by Miller are not convincing according to the private
interest approach to regulation. Namely, because professionals seem to fit the crite-
ria of special interest groups (after all, they are relatively small, single issue oriented
and well organised), they lack the appropriate incentives to enforce and control
quality standards. Taking this into account, one may cast doubts on the advantages
"5 See also Dingwall and Fenn (1987, p.55). However, they draw attention to the important un-
derlying assumption that self-regulating agencies do not abuse the monopoly position they
obtain when they become regulator (see § 2.5.3).
"* Curran (1993, p. 61).
• " De Bijl and Van Damme (19%, p. 24).
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of self-regulation discussed in the previous section. For professionals it is beneficial
if competition is excluded as much as possible. Self-regulation in the form of exces-
sively high quality standards, fixed prices, entry restrictions and stringent profes-
sional ethics may be used to achieve this goal. For example, a prohibition to
advertise individual specialities will make consumers believe that all profession
members are alike, which enables professionals to earn extra revenues because they
can provide their services without having to worry about competition from col-
leagues. The result will be a decrease in the social welfare level and a redistribution
of wealth from consumers to suppliers.
More specifically, the Miller-argument on relative flexibility of self-regulating agen-
cies can be questioned along the lines of the private interest approach: if professions
are able to limit competition by means of the prevailing self-regulation, they will
resist any changes in the regulation that generate more opportunities for competi-
tion. The same argument applies to all changes in self-regulation that may have a
negative effect on the scope of the monopoly rights of professions. The third argu-
ment of Miller has also been questioned by the private interest approach. That is,
the fact that members of a profession both make the rules and bear the costs of en-
forcing and monitoring those rules, does in practice not imply that the regulatory
costs are split in an efficient fashion between the sellers and the buyers. The profes-
sion can easily pass on most of these costs in higher prices for their services, so that
in the end consumers still pay a large part of them. This leaves only the first argu-
ment of Miller, that of the specific knowledge of professionals, intact.'"
The counter-arguments presented here can be summarised along the lines of the
rent-seeking hypothesis by the statement that self-regulating agencies are not inde-
pendent and will therefore always try to seek rents. Indeed, if one takes this as-
sumption as a starting point the analysis is straightforward. One could for example
argue that, since self-regulating agencies have special interests and at the same time
carry out the enforcement of the regulation themselves, problems like information
asymmetry and negative externalities will not be solved by self-regulation. After all,
self-regulating agencies will then maximise their own (producer) surplus instead of
that of the whole economy. Although this observation may have pnmn/floe plausi-
bility, it is obvious that it should preferably be supported by empirical evidence in
order to have scientific value. Both the public and the private interest approach
seem to contain plausible arguments regarding self-regulation. The appropriateness
of the rent-seeking argument will of course also depend on the specific market that
is analysed.
2.5.4 Se//-regH/aft'on: a summan/ o/f7ie Zt'terafwre
Although many articles and books have been written that (sometimes among other
issues) deal with the issue of self-regulation, it is not easy to find contributions to
"" See Curran (1993, pp. 62-63) and Van den Bergh (1993, p. 40; 1997, p. 111).
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the economic literature that use a formal approach (i.e. which are based on a math-
ematic model) to analyse the behaviour of self-regulating agencies."'* The leading
publications in this area are the articles by Shaked and Sutton (1981) and Gehrig
and Jost (1995). Furthermore, Shapiro (1986), Von der Schulenburg (1986) and
Donabedian (1995) have provided models that analyse the regulation of professions.
Other interesting formal-economic papers, among which some of those discussed in
section 4 above, mostly deal with the issues of self-regulation and rent seeking in a
more general way.'**
In subsection 2.4.2 I already presented Leland's conclusion that professional groups
are likely to set quality standards too high from a social welfare point of view.
Shaked and Sutton (1981) take this conclusion one step further. They argue by
means of an economic model that the granting of monopoly rights to the self-
regulating professions is likely to be welfare reducing. The intuition behind their
result is that, if a profession attempts to maximise either the relative or the absolute
incomes of its members, it will shrink to a size which is socially sub-optimal. '2'
However, they add to this rather strong statement another point, namely that it is
welfare improving to permit the entry of a so-called para-profession. Such a para-
profession can supply a 'possibly inferior service at a lower price'.'^ Gehrig and Jost
(1995) conclude in their paper that even with asymmetric information on a mar-
ket,'-^ self-regulation is socially desirable only if the profits of the supplier are given
a sufficiently high weight in the social welfare function.'*'
Von der Schulenburg (1986) analyses some mechanisms that could lead to quality
enforcement for professional services, in a situation where there are only high qual-
ity and low quality services and where all consumers prefer high quality.'^ How-
' " Scarpa (1999, p. 253) states that 'the confnhwfion f/wf economic theory con giue soybr to the ona/ysis
o/sf//-regM/ation is sfi// /w/imimjry'.
'20 E.g. Stigler (1971), Krueger (1974), Peltzman (1976), Leland (1979), Becker (1983) and Shapiro
(1983). See also Scarpa (1999) for an overview of some of the models discussed in this chapter.
'21 Shaked and Sutton (1981, p. 225).
'22 Shaked and Sutton (1981, p. 217).
'23 The authors argue that any analysis of self-regulation has to start from information asymme-
tries between market participants and the social planner, because otherwise statutory regula-
tion could implement the self-regulatory outcomes just as well. See Gehrig and Jost (1995, p.
311).
'2* In their paper, Gehrig and Jost focus on the conditions and implications of self-regulation in
markets in which professionals cannot credibly signal a higher quality of services individu-
ally, but may use self-regulation to enforce a (credible) minimum quality standard for the
profession as a whole. The authors show that under these conditions self-regulation is more
likely as monitoring costs are low, the proportion of migrants is high (in their model there is a
chance that consumers may have to migrate to other local markets) or the number of local
markets is small, ceteris paribus.
'25 Von der Schulenburg (1986, pp. 134-135) rightly refers to Lancaster (1966) in stating that con-
sumers buy products for their features and that usually products have more than one feature.
Of course, consumers may weigh some product features differently because their preferences
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ever, because it concerns experience goods some suppliers may try to benefit from
the consumer's lack of full information by providing low quality services. His
model is based on a dynamic market process in which consumers can build up
long-term relationships with high quality suppliers. The author concludes - con-
trary to the common opinion - that administrated prices can be used to motivate
new professionals to provide high quality. Entry barriers to the market should not
be used according to Von der Schulenburg, because they hinder and increase the
costs of such a quality-enforcing price policy.'*- His conclusions, however, are based
on the assumptions that a supplier's marginal costs are constant (with high-quality
production causing higher costs than low-quality production) and that the choice of
a specific quality (high or low) is irreversible.
Also Shapiro (1986) stresses the importance of long-term reputations in his model.
He analyses the effects of licensing and certification in a context where problems of
professional quality are solely incentive problems, i.e. are the result of moral haz-
ard. He concludes that licensing may improve social welfare because it alters the
incentives of professionals by reducing their marginal cost of quality provision. Li-
censing is most effective when most consumers value quality highly, while certifica-
tion is most effective when training and quality are strongly connected, according to
Shapiro. However, his model also shows that licensing and certification cannot lead
to Pareto improvements if consumer preferences for quality differ.'^
Donabedian (1995) focuses on the creation of trust in professional services. Trust,
the author states, is basic to the provision of professional services.'^ Therefore he
compares professional self-regulation, which is considered to be an input for the
creation of such trust, with other inputs that society has at its disposal, like civil and
criminal codes. The main result of his theoretical analysis is the prediction that reli-
ance on self-regulation will increase with the specificity of investments made in
human capital. In other words: professions where investments in human capital are
low should be subject to other forms of enforcement than self-regulation, e.g. courts.
A second prediction of the analysis, which has to do with the enforcement of regula-
tion, is that in professions where returns are high and mobility is low,'^ the com-
mitment to the profession of individual professionals will be high.
differ. Therefore Von der Schulenburg had to make the assumption that whenever all infor-
mation on the product features is available (which is not the case in a market characterised by
information asymmetry), the products offered on the market can be clearly categorised ac-
cording to quality.
Von der Schulenburg (1986, pp. 144-145).
Shapiro (1986, p. 856). See also the section on licensing and certification in this chapter
(§ 2.4.3).
Donabedian (1995, p. 107).
Donabedian defines a factor 'exit costs'. See Donabedian (1995, pp. 109-111).
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2.6 An evaluation of the economic theory
Having discussed the public and private interest approach to regulation, as well as
a number of regulatory instruments and the issue of self-regulation versus public
regulation, what does all this economic theory tell us about the regulation of liberal
professions? The public interest approach teaches us that in markets for professional
services (such as the market for pharmacists) there are often information problems
between professionals and consumers because many professional services are ex-
perience goods or trust goods. These information problems may hence provide an
argument in favour of regulation. Another public interest argument for regulation
that seems to be relevant here is the presence of externalities, e.g. in the case of (too)
low quality services provided by a professional. In addition, public interest theory
tells us that a well-functioning competition policy is important. Competition policy
should guarantee that welfare losses due to price fixing and other anti-competitive
practices are avoided.
The private interest approach on the other hand warns for rent-seeking behaviour
by interest groups (e.g. a professional organisation). Special interest groups may try
to influence the level and the content of public regulation to their benefit. The dan-
ger of rent-seeking behaviour is of course even more present when self-regulation is
involved, as has also been proven in the articles from Shaked and Sutton (1981) and
Gehrig and Jost (1995). However, according to the public interest approach self-
regulation also has some advantages over public regulation (specific knowledge,
more flexible, less costly), although of these advantages only one argument appears
to be undisputed in the literature: that of the better knowledge on quality and risks
by self-regulating authorities as opposed to public authorities. Hence there is a
trade-off: self-regulation seems superior to public regulation because of the superior
information of the professional, but the disadvantage is that self-regulation entails a
higher risk of rent seeking by the professionals. The question arises whether it is
possible to enjoy the benefits of self-regulation (superior quality through better in-
formation) without the welfare losses caused by rent seeking. This is largely an em-
pirical question which can only be answered by looking more carefully at a few
specific forms of self-regulation. That is what I will do - for the case of pharmacists
- in the empirical research presented in chapters 6 and 7. For these specific regula-
tions the question will always arise whether it is an appropriate remedy for a mar-
ket failure or whether the regulation in fact goes much further. It is precisely this
disproportionate character of some (self-)regulations that may qualify them as in-
struments of rent seeking.
Welfare economics tells us that the effects of regulation on social welfare can be
shown by the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and deadweight wel-
fare loss. Since I have argued that (some) regulation of service quality can indeed
enhance social welfare in cases of information asymmetry or externalities (by in-
creasing the consumer surplus or decreasing the deadweight loss), the next question
of course is what form this regulation should take. Therefore, I analysed some regu-
latory instruments, in increasing order of intervention into the market. If a certain
42
Chapter 2
profession needs to be regulated, one should take the most efficient regulatory form,
i.e. the one that solves the information or externality problems at hand while keep-
ing the restrictions to competition at a minimum. In other words, regulation should
not go further than is necessary to cure the prevailing market failure.
In that respect I showed that licenses restrict market entry more than quality stan-
dards do, while in turn quality standards restrict competition more than informa-
tion regulation (in the form of supervision of advertising, mandatory information
provision or certification). However, in certain cases licenses work better than other
forms of regulation, especially if one wants to exclude 'quacks' from the market. In
the case of physicians or notaries, for example, social welfare might decrease if un-
trained professionals are allowed to be active on the market and simple information
regulation would probably not be enough to protect consumers. What type of regu-
lation is to be used depends therefore very much on the specific circumstances of
the market. Again, one has to take care that the use of too restrictive regulations
should be avoided. Price fixing is obviously the most restrictive regulatory instru-
ment, especially when the government implements it or when it is backed by a dec-
laration of 'generally binding'. Even though Von der Schulenburg (1986) claims that
price fixing is the best way to enforce high quality production by professionals, he
had to base his analysis on very specific assumptions. Namely, he assumed that on
a market there are only high and (too) low quality services and homogeneous con-
sumer preferences, whereas in reality one sees within a certain profession a wide
spectrum of different qualities, while consumer preferences are often heterogene-
ous.
Hence, I cannot draw very firm conclusions that go into one clear-cut direction.
There seems to be room for (self-)regulation in the professions, but of course one
would like to see a guarantee of an improvement in social welfare. In this context
the general conditions for exemption of a restrictive agreement under EC competi-
tion law, as defined in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, seem to provide a useful
scheme.™ Application of these conditions may indicate the social welfare effects of
a particular (self-)regulation. The four conditions are: (1) the agreement, decision or
concerted practice must improve the production or distribution of goods or pro-
mote technical or economic progress; (2) it must allow consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit; (3) it must not impose restrictions on the undertakings that are not
indispensable to the attainment of the objectives; and (4) it must not afford the un-
dertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part
of the products. If one substitutes the word 'regulation' for the phrase 'agreement,
decision or concerted practice' it becomes clear that there is a link with the main
themes discussed in this chapter. Indeed, condition (1) states that we only need
regulation if social welfare is improved by this regulation, just as public interest
"" For a legal analysis of the conditions for exemption in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty - former
Article 85(3) - and the application thereof in individual cases, see e.g. Goyder (1998, Ch. 8)
and Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2001, Ch. 4).
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theory suggests by its focus on market failure. Condition (2) adds to this that the
consumer surplus must be given sufficient weight. Conditions (3) and (4) require
that competition should not be restricted more than necessary (also because of the
danger of rent seeking), which is just the point I stressed before. That is, one has to
choose the optimal form of regulation.
Therefore, I conclude this chapter by advancing the proposition that regulation of a
profession should preferably be measured against this scheme. Hence, if a group of
professionals formulates a regulatory scheme, it should be checked that the pro-
posal meets all the above-mentioned requirements.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter I first presented an overview of economic theories with respect to
regulation in the liberal professions. The pufr/tc interest approach of regulation con-
siders regulation as a remedy for market failure, directed towards an improvement
in social welfare. Four types of market failure in particular have been discerned in
the literature: a lack of competition, information problems (adverse selection, moral
hazard, bounded rationality), externalities and public goods. In the professions the
information asymmetry argument seems to be most important. Because many pro-
fessional services can be considered to be 'experience goods' or 'trust goods', regu-
lation may be needed to prevent quality deterioration as predicted by Akerlof
(1970). In addition, in some professions the moral hazard problem of demand gen-
eration (which occurs when a professional provides services to a consumer that he
might not have wanted if he would have had perfect information) and the presence
of externalities may provide arguments in favour of regulation. Public interest the-
ory assumes that regulation will be formulated by government agencies to serve the
public interest, but does not specify how or when a new regulation originates. Mar-
ket failure always has to be compared with (possible) regulatory failure.
The danger of regulatory failure brought us to the pmvife i/iferesf approach of regu-
lation. This approach, as it is described in this chapter, has actually originated from
three different theories: the capture theory, (parts of) public choice theory and the
economic theory of regulation. Adherents of this private interest approach claim
that interest groups are continually influencing political decisions in order to seek
rents for themselves. This is unproductive from a social welfare point of view, since
resources are devoted to capturing a wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
Rent seeking is predicted to be most successful if interest groups are small, single-
issue oriented and well organised. Self-regulating professional groups seem to sat-
isfy these criteria.
Next, some regulatory instruments were investigated. In increasing order of inter-
vention into the market, they are: information regulation, quality standards and
prior approval (licensing and certification). //i/on»nfio»i regu/ohon can be in the form
of regulation of advertising or in the form of mandatory disclosure of information.
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To disclose information on the quality of professional services is a complicated mat-
ter when it concerns experience goods. In the long term the repeat buying mecha-
nism may incite professionals to provide services of a proper quality and to
voluntarily disclose information, but supervision over short-term profit seeking and
false and misleading information remains a prerequisite. S/n/id/irds constitute a
heavier interference with the market, because they exclude certain products or ser-
vices from the market. Because the computation of the optimal standard is not an
easy task and because standards may exclude certain products from the market that
some consumers might have still wanted to buy, it is important to investigate first
whether a standard really is the best answer to an information or externality prob-
lem. When the damage resulting from a low quality service or product can be high,
a more far-reaching instrument like standards or licensing may indeed be necessary.
The latter instrument, /icensiHg, prevents professionals who do not fulfil certain cri-
teria from entering the market. The danger exists that licensing may be used by in-
terest groups to create entry barriers. Moreover, licensing might incite some
consumers to substitute licensed services by (low quality) alternative services. Cerfr-
//atf/OM, on the other hand, is only used as an instrument to provide information on
certain specialities and/or training levels of individuals. However, training level
and quality may not always be positively related, the overall effect of licensing and
certification depends on the heterogeneity of consumer preferences for quality. Of
course, which regulatory instrument should be used, depends very much on the
specific circumstances of the market.
In section 5 I looked at the topic of se//-regM/flf/oH. Many forms of self-regulation exist
in the professions, often in addition to public regulation. The main arguments in
favour of self-regulation can be found in Miller's article (1985). His arguments refer
to respectively the specific knowledge of professionals, the flexibility of self-regulat-
ing agencies compared to public bodies and the lower costs of self-regulation. The
private interest approach of regulation has brought forward some counter-
arguments. Namely, just because professionals seem to fit the criteria of special in-
terest groups they lack the appropriate incentives to enforce and control quality
regulation, according to this point of view. Only the argument of specific knowl-
edge remains undisputed. However, it seems that both approaches contain plausi-
ble arguments regarding self-regulation. The formal-economic papers on the topic
of self-regulation, which I discussed in subsection 5.4, do not seem to give clear-cut
conclusions either. Some are critical of self-regulation, whereas others provide ar-
guments in favour of self-regulation, but all are (necessarily) based on quite firm
assumptions.
I concluded the chapter by repeating that in some professional markets there may
indeed be room for (self-)regulation of quality, but one would like to see a gurt/witee
of an improvement in social welfare. The general conditions for exemption of a re-
strictive agreement under EC competition law, as defined in Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty, provides a useful scheme in that respect. Therefore, regulation of a profes-
sion should preferably be measured against this scheme.
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THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
In this chapter an overview of the market for drugs (i.e. medicines) and a brief his-
tory of the pharmaceutical profession are presented. First, the production, the dis-
tribution and the consumption of drugs are discussed (§ 3.1). I do not aim to give an
in-depth analysis of every aspect of the drug market. On the contrary, I will merely
point out its basic structure, e.g. different players, categories of drugs and relevant
regulation. After that the focus will be on the 'evolution' of the pharmacists' profes-
sion (§ 3.2). I show that the role and functions of a modern pharmacist are different
from those which he or she had some decades ago. Again, instead of an extensive
historical analysis on the regulation of pharmacists, I prefer to describe only the
most important changes that have occurred in the profession itself.
The reason to address the pharmaceutical market within the scope of this research
should be clear: when analysing the regulation of pharmacists one should first de-
scribe what function it is that pharmacists actually exercise. Do they provide a ser-
vice or are they (predominantly) sellers of pharmaceutical products? The contents of
this particular function of the pharmacist may well explain the desirability of a par-
ticular type of regulation. Moreover, changes of this function over the years might
also explain the changes of regulatory approaches.
3.1 Production, distribution and consumption of drugs
The market for drugs, on which pharmacists are active, has a number of characteris-
tics that clearly distinguish it from other markets, and also make it a very difficult
one to analyse. For one thing, many different players are active on this market be-
sides pharmacists: the pharmaceutical industry, wholesalers, physicians (general
practitioners and specialists), consumers (patients), the government, and health in-
surers. Furthermore, a distinction exists both between the prescribers (general prac-
titioners and specialists) and the sellers (pharmacists) of a medicine, and between
the consumers (patients) and those who pay (health insurers). Add to this the ob-
servation that the government intervenes heavily in the market by imposing all
kinds of regulation, and it becomes obvious that the drug market is nothing like the
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standard economic model of supply and demand that we find in teaching books
dealing with economic market structures. Therefore, one must first take a closer
look at the production, the distribution and the consumption (including insurance)
of drugs before one can investigate the specific regulation of pharmacists.
.1: The drug mnrfcef
producer/importer
-pharmaceutical industry
- producer of generics
- parallel importer
i
wholesaler
- fully sorted
- not fullv sorted
t
pharmacist
- community pharmacist
- hospital pharmacist
prescriber
• general practitioner
- specialist
..'•V \ \
health insurer
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
48
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 shows how complicated the drug market is. The arrows represent con-
nections between the market participants, with the normal arrows representing
flows of medicines, the dotted arrows representing flows of money, and the remain-
ing arrows (with the dot-stripe-dot-pattern) symbolising 'other' relationships be-
tween market participants. Using this logic, one can for example read from the
figure that medicines generally are distributed through wholesalers and pharma-
cists to the final consumer and that the financing goes via health insurers. The gov-
ernment, who as a regulator is involved in every stage of the drug market, is in
principle connected to all market players, but for easy reference the corresponding
arrows have been left out.'^' In this chapter I will discuss the most important rela-
tionships between the participants on the drug market.
3.1.2 Production
3.1.1.1 Categories of drugs
Drugs can be divided into four different categories: pharmaceutical specialites, par-
allel-imported drugs, generic drugs and own preparates. P/mr/MflceMficn/ spran/j'tes
(or: proprietary medicinal products) are 'new' and branded drugs, which are devel-
oped by the pharmaceutical industry and protected by a patent.'" If such branded
drugs are imported from other countries of the EU, outside the official distribution
channel of the manufacturer, they are called /wra//?/ iw/porfs. This may occur when
there are price differences between EU countries. The third category of drugs con-
cerns the so-called generic drugs (or: generics). Generics do not always have a brand
'•" The same argument can be made for some other relationships that are not explicitly repre-
sented in the figure, such as the direct delivery of medicines from the pharmaceutical indus-
try to pharmacists and the supply of information from producers to physicians (which occurs
regularly by means of advertisements or visits to the practices of general practitioners). Be-
cause these relationships are only of minor importance for my research topic (pharmacists)
the corresponding arrows have been left out, again for easy reference.
'•^ A patent encourages drug producers to invest in research and development for new medi-
cines (e.g. more cost-effective drugs, drugs with less negative side effects or new active in-
gredients). If such an invention would not be protected by a patent, other drug producers
could easily copy it and bring the drug onto the market at a lower price, as they do not have
to recover any investment costs (in other words: there are information externalities). This
would, of course, reduce incentives to invest considerably. If, however, the inventor is
granted a monopoly on the use of the new drug for a certain period of time, its incentives to
invest would be restored. On the other hand: because a market that is protected by a patent is
not subject to competition (see also chapter 2) and because diffusion of the innovation is pre-
vented by the patent, the duration of the patent protection should not be infinite either. The
question of the 'optimal patent life' is of course a very important one, but I will not deal with
it within the context of this research. See for a discussion, e.g., Tirole (1992, pp. 394-401), Carl-
ton and Perloff (2000, Ch. 16), and Sykes (2002). For an introduction to this topic in the law
and economics literature see Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp. 128-138) and Van Velthoven and Van
Wijck(2001, pp. 107-116).
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name. Instead, they are given the name of the active ingredient of the drug.'** It
concerns imitations of pharmaceutical specialites, which enter into the market after
the patent of the original has expired. Because producers of generic drugs do not
have to recover any investments in research and development, generic drugs are
cheaper than the original branded drugs. Finally, there is the category of own prepn-
rafcs: medicines prepared in the community pharmacy. Compared to the other cate-
gories, the number of own preparates is now very low both in the Netherlands and
in Belgium, as will be explained in section 3.2.
Furthermore, drugs are distinguished into prescription drugs and OTC (over-the-
counter) drugs.'^ The former must be prescribed by a general practitioner or a spe-
cialist before they can be obtained, and only pharmacists and dispensing physicians
are allowed to deliver them. The latter can be obtained without a prescription, and
may be sold either in the pharmacy or (in some countries) also at the chemist's or at
a special counter in a supermarket. In Belgium OTC drugs may only be sold in
pharmacies, whereas in the Netherlands there are more than 3000 chemist stores
licensed to sell (among other products) OTC drugs, as well as over 800 chemist de-
partments in supermarkets.'^ The fact that in Belgium only pharmacies are allowed
to sell OTC drugs might explain to some extent why the number of pharmacies
there exceeds the number of pharmacies in the Netherlands by a considerable mar-
gin.'*
However, the name of the producer may be linked to the generic name of the drug. See SFK
(1999, p. 21).
In some countries there is a third category of drugs that can only be obtained in a pharmacy
or in the presence of a pharmacist: the so-called 'pharmacy-only medicines'. However, this
specific category does not exist (anymore) in the Netherlands nor in Belgium, and will there-
fore not be considered separately here. In countries where pharmacy-only medicines do exist,
such as the UK and Ireland, they are considered to be a special kind of OTC drug. See OFT
(2003, volume 1, p. 13) and OFT (2003, volume 2, annexe C, p. 24).
Hef FmwiCH'Wi' DagM<i</, Drogisterijketen koestert haar adviseursrol, 23 April 2001. In the
Netherlands about 75% of all OTC drugs is sold at the chemist's, 20% is sold in the pharmacy
and 5% in supermarkets, according to Hef Fimmrieefe DagWad, Drogisten ijveren voor medicijn
zonder recept, 11 March 2000. Neprofarm, the Dutch association of OTC drug producers,
provides more precise numbers on its website for the year 2001: in that year 78% of all OTC
drugs was sold at the chemist's, 16.2% in the pharmacy and 5.8% in supermarkets. There
were 3251 chemist stores and 847 chemist departments in supermarkets. Out of these 4098
OTC outlets, 3700 were licensed to sell all OTC drugs, while 398 had a limited license only (in
particular at locations where there is no pharmacy or chemist store in the area). See
<http://www.neprofarm.nl>.
Roughly, there are about 5300 community pharmacies in Belgium, as opposed to some 1600
community pharmacies and over 600 dispensing general practitioners in the Netherlands.
The exact numbers and the developments during the last decades will be discussed in chap-
ter^
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Figure 3.2: C/assi/icflrioH 0/drugs
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In figure 3.2 the classification of drugs described above is expressed once more by
means of a diagram. For the sake of completeness I should add to the information
presented in the figure, that OTC drugs can also be prescribed by a general practi-
tioner or a specialist. However, when I talk about 'prescription drugs' I specifically
refer to those drugs that can o»/y be obtained on prescription, as shown in figure 3.2.
The share of generic drugs in the total number of prescriptions has been increasing
for years in the Netherlands, at the expense of the share of parallel imports and
pharmaceutical specialites. In 1995, 27.8% of all prescribed drugs were generics; in
1998 this number had increased to 37.4%, while in 2001 it was 42.0%. The share of
parallel imports decreased from 12.1% in 1995 to 7.1% in 2001, predominantly as an
effect of price regulation by the Dutch government, as a result of which in the Neth-
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erlands price differences between different categories of drugs have decreased."?
The market share of specialites in the total number of prescriptions was 53.5% in
1995 and had decreased to 42.8% in 2001, which is only slightly larger than the share
of generic drugs. However, if one looks at the share of specialites in the total drug
costs of prescribed medicines, one will find a larger number. As a percentage of to-
tal drug costs the following numbers can be found for the year 2001: specialites
66.6%, parallel imports 13.8% and generics 16.3%. Although here as well the share
of specialites has slowly decreased over recent years (in 1999 it was still 67.1%, leav-
ing 14.5% for parallel imports and 15.1% for generics), it remains relatively high be-
cause new and often more expensive drugs come onto the market every day."*
In the Netherlands the share of generic drugs in the total consumption of prescribed
drugs has always been very large compared to Belgium. In Belgium generics are
hardly used.'-'" The explanation for this is simple: in Belgium the law still prohibits
pharmacists to substitute pharmaceutical specialites (which have been prescribed
by physicians) by generic drugs, although quite recently proposals have been made
both by the government and by pharmacists to encourage the use of generics. I will
discuss this in more detail in § 3.2.1 and in § 5.7, where the recent developments in
the Belgian regulation are central.
3.1.1.2 Drug prices
Contrary to what one might expect, drug prices are only to a small extent based on
economic factors such as production costs and intensity of competition. Of course,
these economic factors will have an influence on the price level, but manufacturers
do not determine the prices solely by themselves.'* On the contrary, drug prices are
heavily regulated by the government, both in the Netherlands and in Belgium.
There are, for example, regulations that set maximum prices for drugs, and regula-
tions that determine the fees of pharmacists. These will be discussed in § 4.6, for the
Netherlands, and in § 5.6, for Belgium. Furthermore, rules exist that regulate the
SFK (2001, p. 27). I will discuss the regulation of the price of drugs by the Dutch government
at length in §4.6.1.
Data source: SFK (Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics).
SFK (2002, p. 48). The SFK (Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics) also writes on the same
page that in Germany and England generic medicines are used widely, while in Italy the
share of generic drugs is low, like in Belgium.
The drug production market (the pharmaceutical industry) is not examined in this thesis,
because it is only indirectly related to the retail market on which pharmacists are active. The
drug industry in Belgium is described in AVGI (1998). Information on the Belgian and Dutch
pharmaceutical industry can also be found on the websites of AVGI (<http://www.agim-
avgi.be>) and Nefarma (<http://www.nefarma.nl>).
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maximum amounts that are to be reimbursed by health insurers. These are de-
scribed in the appendix to this chapter.''"
3.1.2 DisfribMfio«
I stated above that the 'normal' arrows in figure 3.1 represent the flow of drugs (i.e.
the distribution) from the producer/importer to the final consumer/patient. A cen-
tral role in the distribution is reserved for the pharmaceutical wholesaler, who con-
stitutes the intermediary between producer and pharmacist. In this section I will
look more closely at the position of the pharmaceutical wholesaler, as well as at the
distribution function of pharmacists, the 'retailers' of the drug distribution channel.
3.1.2.1 The wholesale channel
The pharmaceutical wholesaler forms the link between manufacturers and dispens-
ers of drugs, ensuring a safe and continuous supply (sometimes even several times
a day) of medicines. Medicinal products often need special storage and secure han-
dling. Obviously, dispensers (such as hospital and community pharmacists, dis-
pensing physicians, and - in case of OTC drugs in the Netherlands - also chemists)
cannot keep every medicine in stock; not only because of lack of storage room but
also because this would be extremely costly. However, direct delivery from manu-
facturers to dispensers would be even more expensive.'''- In the Netherlands, 90 to
95% of all medicinal products are purchased via wholesalers, according to an inves-
tigation by the Dutch Competition authority NMa.'^ That leaves a share of 5 to 10%
for direct deliveries from producers and importers to dispensers.
In the Netherlands BG Pharma, a trade organisation consisting of only four mem-
bers (OPG,m Brocacef, Interpharm and Euromedica) represents 80% of the total
For a brief overview of price and reimbursement regulations in Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, see Danzon and Chao (2000, pp. 316-
321). OFT (2003, volume 1) analyses some aspects of drug pricing in the United Kingdom. In
OFT (2003, volume 2, annexe C) the regulation of drug prices in Canada, France, Germany,
Norway, the Unites States and the Netherlands is presented briefly. See with respect to drug
pricing also IHS (2003, Chs. 11-14) for case studies of the pharmaceutical profession in Ire-
land, Germany, Portugal and Sweden, and OECD (2002, pp. 193-197) for tables on price con-
trols, profit controls, and price freezes and cut measures in selected OECD countries.
See the website of the European Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, GIRP:
<http://wvirw.girp.org>.
NMa, Derision nr. 2451/2003 (MediwOTi Groep B.V. <m TTP Parfiripari« Ro/terdom B.V/Corio-
p/iurmn C. V.), p. 7.
Within this trade organisation the OPG group is dominant with a share of over 40%. The
OPG is a very interesting case in itself, as this wholesale company has bought up many
pharmacies in recent years. The OPG even has a background in retail pharmacy: it was estab-
lished years ago by pharmacists. In a case study in chapter 71 will discuss OPG in more detail
(see § 7.6 iit/ra).
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wholesale market. "^ BG Pharma organises all so-called fully sorted wholesalers
(i'o/gesorfeerrfe groof/wwtfe/s), which means that its members supply every medicine
that is available in the Netherlands. In addition to these fully sorted wholesalers,
there are a number of smaller wholesale dealers that supply only the most fre-
quently prescribed medicines (HiW-i'o/gesorteerdegroof/wwde/). Wholesalers have been
engaged a lot in backward and forward vertical integration.'*<• Brtdatwrd integration
by wholesalers takes place particularly by the taking-over of generic drug produc-
ers. For some wholesalers the production of generic drugs has become an important
additional activity. Forawrd integration takes place, e.g. when a wholesaler buys up
pharmacies in order to set up a franchise (i.e. a chain of pharmacies working under
the same formula). In this way the wholesale industry provides itself with the op-
portunity to deliver drugs directly to patients.'*' In the Netherlands the OPG group
is very active in this field.'**
The wholesale market in Belgium is less concentrated than the Dutch market. There
are many relatively small companies, most of which are regionally oriented. Since 1
January 2002, the biggest wholesaler has been Febelco, with a market share of
around 29%.'^ The German pharmaceutical chain GEHE is in second place: when
the market shares of its three members are combined, GEHE's market share in the
Belgian wholesale market in 2001 was 17%.'» Furthermore, Les CERP'*' had a mar-
'*5 Estimates of the exact market shares as published in the media differ slightly, depending on
the consulted sources. For the year 2001 the market share of OPG in the Dutch wholesale
market was estimated to be between 30% and 35% (most probably closer to 35%), while that
of its closest competitors Brocacef and Interpharm was calculated to be approximately 21 %
and 18%, respectively. See, e.g., NMa, Decision ;ir. 2457/2001 (Medit-een Groep B. V. en 7TP Par-
ficipufies Rof/en/am B. V/Coriop/iarma C.VJ, p. 7. More information can be found on the web-
sites of the wholesale companies: <http://www.opggroep.nl>, <http://www.brocacef.nl>,
and <http://www.interpharm.nl>.
146 Verfrc«/ iji/egrafioii means integration between parties that are active in different channels of
the supply chain, e.g. integration between a producer and a wholesaler, or between a whole-
saler and a retailer. Horizoiifa/ infcgntfioM, on the other hand, stands for integration between
suppliers within the same supply channel, such as integration between producers, integration
between wholesalers and integration between retailers.
" ' Nefarma (2000, pp. 23 and 57).
"« MDW (1999, pp. 22-23). With respect to OPG: supra, note 144.
'•" Febelco came about through a merger of three formerly independent wholesale companies:
ASMA (the biggest wholesaler in 2001 with a market share of 17%), Inter Nos and UFAK. See
<http://www.febelco.be>.
"* The pharmaceutical wholesale business of GEHE in Belgium consists of PCB (11% market
share in 2001), SAMBRIA (4%) and Ostend Pharma (2%). GEHE AG. is the European market
leader in the field of pharmaceutical distribution, with activities in 10 European countries in
2001. In the Netherlands GEHE was not involved in wholesale activities in 2001, although in
that year it started to buy up Dutch pharmacies (in Belgium it entered the retail market as
well: Lloydspharmay Belgium S.A.). This information about GEHE and about the market
shares of pharmaceutical wholesalers in Belgium was found on the internet:
<http://www.gehe.de> and <http://www.febelco.be>. In April 2003 GEHE A.G. was re-
named Celesio A.G.: <http://www.celesio.com>.
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ket share of 16% and Alpha Repartition a market share of 10% in 2001, while the
remainder of the market was served by smaller wholesalers.
3.1.2.2 The retail channel
There are two channels for the delivery of prescribed pharmaceuticals to the final
consumer (patient): via community pharmacies (and sometimes dispensing general
practitioners) and via hospital pharmacies. The former is called the wrrn/HHrrt/ drug
market, the latter the iMfr/imum/ drug market. In Belgium the extramural market is
by far the biggest as it generates about 76% of the total ex-factory turnover; the hos-
pital market generates the remaining 24%.'" Somewhat comparable numbers for
the Netherlands state that 14% of the total turnover of drugs in the Netherlands is
gained by hospital pharmacies, which leaves 86% for dispensers in the extramural
market.'" In this thesis I focus in particular on the extramural drug market, i.e. on
community pharmacists.
The sale of drugs via internet and the amount of drug information that consumers
can obtain through the internet have increased considerably over the last years. It
seems that a new distribution channel for drugs has opened up: the internet phar-
macy. Drugs that are distributed in this fashion still require a prescription from a
general practitioner or specialist and the distribution must be done from a commu-
nity pharmacy,'^ but there is no direct supervision by the pharmacist.'^ In order to
' " Les CERP consists of the Flemish wholesaler Aprophar (market share in Belgium: 9.20%) and
the Walloon wholesaler Cerp Phardip (6.53%). See <http://www.aprophar.be> or <http://
www.phardib.be> and for the market shares: <http://www.febelco.be> and <http://www.
gehe.de>.
' " AVGI (2002, p. 21).
1" NMa, Decision nr. 2451/2001 (Mediueen Groep B.V. en TTP Parficipaties Rofterdam B.V/Corio-
/iMflrma C.V.), p. 6. These numbers include OTC drugs.
'5* In April 2000 a Dutch internet pharmacist (Rijkeboer) had to stop his activities because - ac-
cording to the Inspection for Public Health - he did not comply with these legally determined
conditions. See Hef Fmanriee/e DagWad, Intemetapotheker stopt met activiteiten, 4 May 2000.
Another - although very different - case concerns the Dutch internet pharmacy DocMorris
(website: <http://www.0800DocMorris.com>), which had to appear before the European
Court of Justice. The DocMorris pharmacy was selling drugs via internet to Dutch and Ger-
man consumers. In Germany the prices of drugs are sometimes 15 to 20% higher than the
drug prices in the Netherlands. However, according to German law a pharmacy is not al-
lowed to send drugs by mail because of a prohibition on long distance sales. This was con-
firmed by the German court of Frankfurt in November 2000 in a case against DocMorris, but
DocMorris appealed to this decision. In July 2001 the Court of Frankfurt referred the case to
the European Court of Justice, which then had to consider the question whether European ci-
tizens should be allowed to order medicines registered within Europe by mail. In other
words: do the German rules contradict the European rules with respect to the free movement
of goods? Advocate General Stix-Hackl of the European Court of Justice was of the opinion
that DocMorris should be allowed to deliver medicines to German clients, but that the distri-
bution should be restricted to non-prescription drugs and to drugs that are authorised on the
German market (Opinion, 11 March 2003). The judgements of the Landgericht Frankfurt am
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obtain prescription drugs from an internet pharmacy, consumers have to fill out an
order form and send it, together with the original prescription, to the internet
pharmacy by regular mail. Within a few days the drugs will be delivered to the con-
sumer at the address of his/her choice. The consumer has to sign for receipt. The
advantages of an internet pharmacy over a regular community pharmacy can be
threefold: (1) internet pharmacies are sometimes cheaper: some non-prescribed OTC
drugs are offered with an 'internet discount' of up to 5%; (2) privacy-sensitive me-
dicinal products such as contraceptives, incontinence products, and AIDS inhibi-
tors, can be ordered through the internet; and (3) chronic drug users may profit
from the internet channel as they do not have to go to a pharmacy every time for
their repeat prescriptions.'^ This already suggests that the main activities of internet
pharmacies do not concern prescription drugs, but rather the products just men-
tioned, i.e. OTC drugs, privacy-sensitive medicinal products and some repeat pre-
scriptions. In the Netherlands the number of internet pharmacies in 2000 was about
40."" In Belgium the concept of internet pharmacies is still practically unknown,
although in 2003 the American company Drugstore.com announced plans to start
the sale of non-prescription drugs through the internet in 28 countries, among them
Belgium. Belgian pharmacists doubt whether this is allowed, because Belgian laws
prohibit long distance sales.'**
Main can be found on its webpage: <http://www.landgericht.frankfurt-main.de>, under /\k-
fejizeic7ien 2-03 0 365/00, /Wfenzeidieii 2-03 0 366/00, and /Ufejizeir/ieH 3/17 0 64/01. See also
ZorgHrrmif, Internetapotheek gaat naar Europees Hof, 18 August 2001. The judgement of the
European Court of Justice can be found on the official website <htttp://curia.eu.int>, under
Case C-322/0J Denfsdier Apof/ielrer;>erlwi<f.
'55 Nefarma (2000, pp. 23 and 57).
"* See, for example, the website of eFarma, one of the biggest internet pharmacies in the Nether-
lands in 2003: <http://www.efarma.nl>. H.Tjiook, initiator and owner of eFarma, suggested
the same advantages of an internet pharmacy over a community pharmacy again in various
interviews: ReybrmiiforisrJt DdgMiu/, Medicijnen bestellen bij internetapotheek, 6 June 2000;
Emmif, Miljoenenboete voor internetapotheek, 6 October 2002. Furthermore, in the former ar-
ticle H. Wieringa of Digitale Apotheek Nederland, another Dutch internet pharmacy, con-
firms that his internet pharmacy concentrates predominantly on selling privacy sensitive
products such as contraceptive devices. For more information see also the website of De Vir-
ruele Apotheek: <http://www.apotheek.org>. In early 2003 no less than 44 pharmacies were
linked to this website, which next to providing a drug delivery service, also disseminates in-
formation about drugs and health care.
'5" De Vo/Jtsfcranf, Apotheker krijgt nieuwe concurrentie, 9 August 2000. In the same year, online
pharmacies in the United States had already reached a market share of 1%. In the Nether-
lands internet pharmacies have not yet reached that market share, but initiator-owner H.
Tjiook of eFarma expects that it will be reached in 2006: E/nwce, Online apothekers ver-
wachten langzame groei, 21 July 2000; Ewerce, Beter worden, 6 October 2000.
'5** He/ Liwfsfe Meiers, De internetfarmacie, kan dat wel?, 10 January 2003. I mentioned before
that also in Germany the long distance sale of drugs is prohibited (supra, note 154). The deci-
sion of the European Court of Justice in the DocMorris case will therefore be of importance to
Belgium as well. This decision, which at the time of writing was not yet available, can be
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Another development in the distribution of drugs is mail order pharmacy. Al-
though the first two initiatives to introduce this kind of pharmacy in the Nether-
lands (by the health insurer Geove in 1992 and by health insurer Zilveren Kruis and
Caremark in the mid-1990s)'*> have failed, they had some success at first. The failure
of these mail order 'experiments' was to a large extent caused by counter-campaigns
from the side of the Dutch pharmacists and the big wholesale companies."* Nowa-
days, however, many pharmacies have their own home delivery service, which
might be considered a (late) reaction to the failed attempts at mail order pharmacy
in the 1990s.
3.1.2.3 Regulation of distribution margins
In Belgium both the margin of a pharmaceutical wholesaler and the margin of a
pharmacist are subject to strict regulation. The wholesaler is allowed to take a mar-
gin of 13.1% of his sales price, exclusive of VAT, with a maximum of € 2.18.'"' In the
Netherlands there is no such regulation of the wholesale margin, although, like in
Belgium, the prices of drugs are heavily regulated, which of course has a large effect
on competition and the margins of the players on the pharmaceutical market."*- The
regulation of the drug prices and the pharmacist's fee in the Netherlands and Bel-
gium will be presented in § 4.6 and § 5.6 respectively.
3.2.3
Figure 3.1 showed that the consumption of prescription drugs is different from the
consumption of most other products. First, consumers (patients) need a prescription
from a general practitioner or specialist in order to obtain prescription drugs. Sec-
ond, consumers often do not have to pay the full price of these drugs themselves,
because - at least to a certain extent - their health insurers take care of this."*
In the Netherlands, if a patient consults a general practitioner, in 60% of the cases
this leads to a prescription of a certain medicine. This is a low percentage compared
found on the official website of the European Court of Justice <http:www.curia.eu.int>, un-
der Cusf C-322/ÜI Dn/fsr/u-r ApotfiFforwrfoind.
's» MDW (1999, p. 24); PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999, p. 21).
'*° See, for the case of Geove, a detailed analysis by Horsten (1996-1997).
'*' AVGI, 2002, p. 24. See also PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999, p. 15). With respect to the phar-
macists' margin, I refer to § 5.6.2, where that topic will be discussed at length.
i** PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999, p. 21) presents a table with information on the average price
structure of medicines in a number of countries, among them the Netherlands and Belgium.
The price structure, divided into manufacturer margin, wholesaler margin, pharmacy margin
and VAT % was computed to be, for the Netherlands: 67.2%, 11.4%, 21.4% and 6 % respec-
tively. For Belgium the numbers are: 64.7%, 8.3%, 27%, and 6% respectively. These computa-
tions were based on data from 1997. See also KNMP (2002b, p. 16) and AVGI (2002, p. 24).
i*' In the appendix to this chapter I will outline the health insurance with respect to pharmaceu-
ncals in the Netherlands and in Belgium.
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to the European average and in particular compared to southern European coun-
tries such as Spain and Italy, where the prescription percentage can increase to more
than 90%."*' However, in its last annual reports the Foundation for Pharmaceutical
Statistics (SFK) has been noticing a slight change in the prescription pattern and the
drug consumption pattern in the Netherlands towards the European average.'^
Moreover, and this does not apply to the Dutch situation only, consumers nowa-
days take more individual responsibility than they did some decades ago, for ex-
ample by asking the general practitioner for a prescription (or even by asking for a
specific medicine) based on information found on the internet.
In Belgium the prescription percentage of physicians is much higher than it is in the
Netherlands. In the annual report 2001 of Nefarma (the Dutch Association of the
Research-based Pharmaceutical Industry) the 'percentage diagnosis with prescrip-
tion' was shown for seven European countries, among them Belgium and the Neth-
erlands. Belgium had the second highest percentage diagnosis with prescription,
namely 87%, before France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany. Only in Italy
the percentage was higher (95%). The Netherlands had - with 61% - the lowest per-
centage of all seven countries that were investigated."*
While patients generally do not have sufficient knowledge about drugs in order to
be able to co-decide on the kind of therapy they need, an exception to this might be
patients with chronic diseases. Nowadays there are many patients' associations
both in the Netherlands and in Belgium. In the Netherlands there is also an um-
brella organisation called the NP/CF, the Dutch Federation of Consumers/Patients.
The main objective of the NP/CF is to form a countervailing power on the demand
side of the health care market vis-ä-vis health insurers, health care suppliers and the
government. Furthermore, the NP/CF seeks to improve the knowledge of health
care consumers by making information available to them and to function as a con-
sultation platform for all patients' associations and health care consumers.'^
The price sensitivity of consumers with respect to prescription drugs is different
from their price sensitivity towards 'normal' consumption goods such as foods and
electrics, because there is no direct relation between the price of a prescription drug
(which is after all paid by health insurers) and the health insurance premium (paid
SFK (2002, p. 22). See also MDW (1999, p. 57) and Nefarma (2001, p. 42).
See also Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (1999, p. 30) and PriceWaterhou-
seCoopers (1999, pp. 17-18).
Nefarma, 2001, p. 42. In PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999, p. 17) numbers for the year 1996 are
presented for the same countries with the exception of Italy and based on the same source
(IMS Health). When these numbers are compared with the numbers provided in Nefarma
(2001), there is just one difference: in 19% the 'percentage diagnosis with prescription' in the
Netherlands was only 56%.
Website: <http://www.npcf.nl>.
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by consumers), unless consumers have to pay a deductible."* Furthermore, when
general practitioners have to decide which particular drug they prescribe in a cer-
tain situation, they will not only take price as a criterion but also other factors such
as possible side effects of a drug and familiarity with a particular (brand of) medi-
cine. Of course the latter makes it interesting for drug producers to pay a visit to the
practices of general practitioners and specialists in order to make them 'familiar'
with their products.
3.2 The profession of pharmacist in the Netherlands and Belgium
The pharmaceutical profession has been subject to many changes since the middle
of the last century. While in the 1950s the tasks of a pharmacist consisted merely of
the preparation (i.e., compounding) and dispensing of medicines, nowadays phar-
macists are especially considered to be the 'experts' in the field of pharmacotherapy.
Modern pharmacists not only have a role in the drug distribution process, but also -
together with physicians - in the provision of health care (the term 'pharmaceutical
care' is often used in this respect).'^
In § 3.2.1 the developments that have taken place in the pharmaceutical profession
during the last decades will be described. These changes have occurred gradually in
many countries,''" largely under the influence of the rise of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and the constantly increasing complexity of pharmacotherapy. Therefore, I
will discuss the changes in the pharmaceutical profession in general terms: the dis-
cussion below applies not only to Dutch and Belgian pharmacists, but also to phar-
macists in other countries such as, e.g., Germany, France and the United
Kingdom.'?> In § 3.2.2 I will give a definition of the 'service' of a pharmacist. I need
to define the main tasks of a pharmacist in order to be able to analyse the regulation
of the profession in subsequent chapters.
3.2.2
Until the 1950s the main tasks of a pharmacist consisted of the preparation (com-
pounding) and the dispensing of drugs to patients, on the basis of a prescription by
a general practitioner or a medical specialist. The Dutch and Belgian regulation of
the pharmaceutical profession protected these operations with a professional mo-
nopoly (which they still do now, as will be shown in chapters 4 and 5). However,
under the influence of the introduction of the industrially prepared medicine - es-
pecially after the second World War - the preparing role of the pharmacist has
168 MDW (1999, p. 21).
' " Mullan (2000, pp. 38-43). Ten Hoopen (2001, p. 379) also uses the term 'pharmaceutical pa-
tient care'.
i™ Ten Hoopen (2001, pp. 221-223) gives some examples.
'7' The regulation of the profession in the Netherlands and in Belgium will be discussed below
in chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively.
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largely disappeared. In the Netherlands, between 1970 and 1990 the share of own
preparations by pharmacists had stabilised around 5% of the turnover of a commu-
nity pharmacy.'^ For the year 2000 the Dutch Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statis-
tics calculated the market share of own preparations in a community pharmacy to
be just over 5%, relative to the total number of prescriptions.'^ With respect to Bel-
gium, the Belgian Institute of Health Economics (BIGE) wrote in its 1999 report that
between 1972 and 1992 the relative share of magistral preparations in the total ex-
penditure for reimbursable drugs had decreased from 21% to 6.5%.'^ Modern
pharmacists seem to be charged with different tasks and responsibilities instead.
Here I will sketch the development of the pharmaceutical profession, which is still
going on today.'^
Van der Mijn (1989) describes three developments that have had a big influence on
the pharmaceutical profession during the last century. While his analysis is primar-
ily directed towards the Dutch situation, most of his findings apply to the profes-
sion in general. First, he mentions the rise of industrially prepared medicine at the
expense of magisterially prepared medicine. As a result of this rise the emphasis in
the pharmaceutical profession has shifted considerably from preparation of drugs
towards distribution of industrially prepared products.'™
Second, and related to the first point, is his observation that the medicine market
has become more complex, because of the constantly growing number of new medi-
cines and active substances that are brought onto the market each year. The com-
plexity of the market makes it difficult for physicians to decide on which drug to
prescribe, especially if they would not receive help from pharmacists. Compared to
pharmacists, physicians generally know little about the chemical structure of drugs.
Within the scope of their education it is impossible for physicians to acquaint them-
selves sufficiently with pharmacology and pharmacotherapy. Pharmacists, on the
other hand, are educated less in medical-biological aspects, i.e. the human body."^
Hence, an important part of the surplus value of a modern pharmacist consists (or
'72 TK 7998-7999, 26 344, nr. 1, p. 6.
'™ SFK (2001, p. 28). In 2000, 43.2% of all prescribed drugs and bandages were specialites; 41.5%
were generics; 7.1% parallel imports; 2.9% bandages; and 5.3% own preparations and others.
The share of own preparations and others as a percentage of total drug costs for the year 2000
was 1.4%.
'™ BIGE (1999, p. 113).
' ^ For a more elaborate discussion of the history of the pharmaceutical profession (also before
the second half of the 20th century) see, in particular. Van der Mijn (1989, Chs. 2 and 5) for
the Netherlands, and Mullan (2000, Chs. 2 and 3) for the UK.
'** Van der Mijn (1989, p. 107). Patients who need own preparations are now exceptional cases,
e.g. a particular registered drug may be too strong for young children. Also, some patients
may not be able to swallow a particular registered drug and administration by means of a
cathether or infusion is required then. P/tarrnacmfisch WedtMaii, Apotheekbereidingen, vol.
134, nr. 25, 25 June 1999.
' ^ Van der Mijn (1989, p. 108).
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should consist) of the transfer of his or her knowledge of drugs to prescribing phy-
sicians. Thus a kind of transfer of information between the pharmacist and the phy-
sicians has to be organised. In the Netherlands the cooperation between pharma-
cists and physicians does not only take place on an individual basis. On the contra-
ry, the so-called p/wrmflcof/ierapewric consz/Zfatio/is (structural consultations between
groups of general practitioners and pharmacists) and p/umnflcof/iempfMr/r fraMsmMrn/
consM/toft'ons (including hospital pharmacists and specialists as well) have been
growing in importance rapidly.'^ These consultations are stimulated and supported
by the Dutch Ministry of Public Health, because the government hopes to reduce
total health care costs by encouraging physicians to prescribe more cost-conscious-
ly.'^ In many cases the pharmacotherapeutic (transmural) consultations lead to the
setting up of local formularies""' and protocols."" Belgian pharmacists and physi-
cians, however, are not familiar with the concept of pharmacotherapeutic consulta-
tions.
The third development described by Van der Mijn is the differentiation in the prac-
tice of the profession. Nowadays one can distinguish between three types of phar-
macists: community pharmacists, hospital pharmacists and industry pharmacists.'^
Of course this increased specialisation has had an influence on the specific tasks of
each type of pharmacist. In this thesis I focus primarily on community pharmacists.
In Ten Hoopen (2002) the Dutch pharmaceutical market is studied from a legal
point of view. Like Van der Mijn, the author observes that the current role of phar-
macists is very different from the one they had some decades ago. However, Ten
Hoopen suggests that this change resulted not only from an increase in industrially
prepared medicines, but also from the introduction of the computer in the phar-
macy. She mentions some of the 'new tasks' of a modern Dutch pharmacist, which
are recognised both by pharmacists and by the government: medication control (i.e.,
"* In Dutch: 'Farmaa>77ierapei<hsdi (Transnmraa/,) Or>er/eg', hereafter FTO. At the end of the 1970s,
FTO between pharmacists and general practitioners was introduced in the Netherlands on a
local level. The goal of FTO is to improve the quality and effectiveness of medication use. See
Blijleven (1998, p. 45). For a brief description of FTO and FTTO (pharmacotherapeutic trans-
mural consultations) in the Netherlands, see, e.g., MDW (1999, p. 33) and Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (1999, pp. 55-56). The Boston Consulting Group (1999) is
critical about the results of these consultations insofar as cost savings are concerned.
i™ 7K 2000-2003, 24 124 and 24 036, nr. I l l , pp. 4,17-19.
180 According to Venema (1998, p. 16) a /brmu/on/ 'incorporates f/ie preporahons fnaf snow/d prc/era-
Wy If presented and de/i!-e red". This means that a formulary always concerns a selection from
the total range of medical preparations. See also OECD (2002, pp. 143-144).
"" See Moss (1998, p. 13) and supra, note 179. In the context of pharmaceutical patient care (for
an introduction to this concept: supra, note 169) a protoco/ can be defined as 'a (forumrnf m
u'fa'cfo (/if operations regarding pnarmaceuricfl/ pafienf care/or a group o/existing or ne?e users o/a
certain medicine, ?<>/io are /aJting Me medicine /or f/ie same purpose, ore <fe/ined'. See Schiisler-van
Hees, Essink and De Smet (1998, p. 34).
>"2 Van der Mijn (1989, pp. 107-108).
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checking for possible interactions with other drugs used by the patient), monitoring
of therapy (primarily checking the prescription from the general practitioner or spe-
cialist), advising consumers on medicinal products and drugs,'"' and providing
pharmacotherapeutic information and advice to physicians.'** Indeed, in a letter of
December 1998 to the Second Chamber (i.e., the Lower Chamber), the Dutch Minis-
ter of Public Health explicitly listed some of the new tasks and responsibilities of
pharmacists: medication control, giving advice, information and documentation to
patients, cooperation with physicians and detection of side effects of new drugs that
are brought onto the market.'^ However, the regulation of the profession has not
yet been adapted much to the new role and functions of the pharmacist, as will be
shown in chapter 4.'**
If one looks at recent issues of some of the professional journals in pharmacy'*" and
at the national newspapers,"** one will note that pharmacists as well tend to empha-
sise the 'care' aspect of their profession as opposed to the distribution aspect. For
example, many articles in the professional journals deal with the relationship be-
tween (community) pharmacists and patients, or are about the above-mentioned
pharmacotherapeutic consultations with general practitioners and hospital pharma-
cists. Furthermore, health insurers in the Netherlands increasingly include the pro-
tocols, formularies and agreements resulting from pharmacotherapeutic
consultations in their contracts with pharmacists and physicians. This, however,
requires adequate information on the prescription behaviour of physicians and the
'*•* Examples are: providing information and advice related to travelling and health, to inconti-
nence products (including samples) and to diabetes (including instructions of test strips and
blood sugar meters), giving inhaler instructions, supplying needle-containers, etc. See P/wr-
matYufisc/i VVeefcWfld, Meetbare zorg, vol. 137, nr. 25, 2002. Details about the information pro-
vided in pharmacies can also be found on various websites of pharmacies. Sometimes the
information given by the pharmacist is a repetition of the information that was given by the
physician, especially in case of the first distribution of medicinal products related to inconti-
nence, asthma, diabetes, high blood pressure and menopause. The reason is that a patient in
such cases often still has to process the diagnosis of the physician and wants to hear it again
from the pharmacist, according to De Vo/Jts/cranf, Apotheker nieuwe stijl houdt spreekuur, 17
January 2002.
'*« Ten Hoopen (2001, pp. 30-31); further on in the book (pp. 216-223) she sketches the transfor-
mation process of the Dutch pharmacist as from the mid-1970s: from medication control
(medicatiebewaking) to medication guidance (medicabebegeleiding) and pharmaceutical pa-
tient care (farmaceutische patientenzorg).
185 7K I99S-1999, 26 344, nr. 1, p. 6.
'** And I will show in chapter 5 that also in Belgium the regulation is still considerably lagging
behind the development of the profession.
'*? See, for the Netherlands, P/iannareufisc/i WeeJtMad, and for Belgium, in particular Anruvrps
Farnuueuft'sWi Ti/dsrhn/r.
'** E.g. De Sfanrfaarrf, Mensen helpen geeft apotheker kick, 14 February 2000; De VoJ/bkranf, Apo-
theker nieuwe stijl houdt spreekuur, 17 January 2002; He/ Firamriee/e DagMad, Apothekers ei-
sen 40% meer salaris, 26 March 2002.
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dispensing behaviour of pharmacists; otherwise health insurers will not be able to
supervise the compliance with these provisions."^
Contrary to their Belgian colleagues, Dutch pharmacists are already allowed - and
encouraged - to substitute branded drugs by generics, be it of course under certain
conditions, among which the consent of the prescribing physician and the consent
of the patient. The (legal) possibility of substitution in itself indicates yet another
function of a modem pharmacist: to substitute, whenever possible, relatively expen-
sive drugs by cheaper drugs (which have the same active ingredient and which do
not have any negative side effects on the health of the patient in question) in order
to decrease the costs of pharmaceutical care. Recently, a debate has started in Bel-
gium about the question whether a physician should be encouraged to prescribe on
the chemical substance name of a drug instead of prescribing a specific named
drug.''* Proponents of prescription on substance name, such as the government and
pharmacists,'" argue that the level of pharmaceutical care will increase if pharma-
cists have a larger say in the drug choice and that total health care costs will go
down as a result. However, Belgian physicians, who have always been unfavoura-
bly disposed towards substitution of drugs by pharmacists,'**- might also consider
prescription on substance name to be an 'erosion of their competences'. In the Neth-
erlands general practitioners are already encouraged (not only by the government
but also by health insurers) to prescribe drugs on chemical substance name.'" The
Dutch government went even further: in 2001 it proposed to oblige physicians to
write down the diagnosis on every prescription.'^
In this respect it is interesting to refer to a research published by the Dutch pharma-
cists' association KNMP in 2001. That research concluded that in an average Dutch
community pharmacy, a pharmacist intervenes in 9 to 10% of the prescriptions from
the physician. This intervention means that the pharmacist proposes to change the
prescription of the physician. Intervention by the pharmacist is required if the pre-
scribed drug does not go together well with earlier prescribed drugs, if something is
wrong with the measurement of the dose and if a patient is intolerant of a certain
medicine. Pharmacists may also take action if they do not trust a certain prescrip-
'*• 7K 2OOO-2OO2, 24 124 and 24 036, nr. I l l , p. 8.
"" De StondflflriJ, Vandenbroucke baant weg voor stofnaam, 27 May 2002.
' " De Morgen, Apothekers willen generische geneesmiddelen promoten, 8 January 2003; De Fi-
nanciee/ Economisc/ie Ti/d, Apothekers promoten generische medicijnen, 9 January 2003.
"^ De Stafidoorii, Artsen tegen substitutierecht, 7 February 2002; Hombroeckx (2000, p. 188).
' " Hef Fi/iawciee/e Dogb/od, Proef prikkelt huisarts tot besparing medicijnen, 5 March 2002. Ac-
cording to NFVEL (the Dutch research institute for health care) general practitioners in the
Netherlands prescribe more than half of all medicines on the basis of substance name. See Hef
Firnmciee/e Dagb/fld, Artsen schrijven minder merkmedicijnen voor, 21 May 1999.
'*• TK 2000-2003, 24 124 and 24 036, nr. I l l , pp. 8-9. The professional association of physicians
(KNMG), the professional association of general practitioners (LHV) and the Order of Physi-
cians objected to this proposal. For positive comments on the proposal see Porsius (2002, p.
298-299); for criticism see Leenen (2002, pp. 786-787).
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tion, e.g. by contacting the general practitioner in attendance or by consulting the
patient. Thus, the pointing out of mistakes in the prescribing behaviour of general
practitioners and specialists seems to be an important task of a modern pharmacist.
According to the researchers in question, the fact that 93 to 95% of the Dutch pa-
tients visit the same pharmacy every time is an advantage, because pharmacists are
then in a better position to carry out this 'signalling function'.'*
I stated already that the developments observed by Van der Mijn and Ten Hoopen
do not apply to the Netherlands and Belgium only. To end this section I will there-
fore look briefly at the pharmaceutical market in the UK, which has been analysed
in detail by Mullan (2000). As recently as thirty years ago, compounding was still
one of the main functions of a pharmacist in the UK. However, Mullan defines the
primary role of the modern British pharmacist as follows:
'to use his or her technical expertise to interpret the details of the prescription, to
ensure that the prescription is valid, to dispense the drug product which has been
prescribed or, in certain circumstances, an equivalent drug, [and] to give instructions
to the patient on the use of the drug, including possible side-effects'.
As a secondary role Mullan mentions the provision of advice to patients who have a
self-formulated, or doctor-assisted therapeutic plan involving the use of drug ther-
apy.'* Obviously, in the UK as well, the relationship between pharmacist and pa-
tient has become more important over the last decades."''
3.2.2 T/ie service o/« /jftflnnacisf today
In this section I recapitulate the information from the previous section (§ 3.2.1).
There I showed that modern community pharmacists have tasks that are quite dif-
ferent from those they had some decades ago. Their main responsibility, that of be-
ing the refm'/ers of the drug channel (distributing/selling medicines to final
consumers) has remained the same, but apart from that the tasks of pharmacists
have changed a lot. The preparation of medicines in the pharmacy («Mgis/rn/ prepn-
rrtf/'o»), which was a key activity of pharmacists in the 1950s, now makes up only a
very small part of their job responsibilities. This can be explained to a large extent
by the rise of industrially prepared medicine. On the other hand, because of the
constantly increasing complexity of pharmacotherapy and specialisation of the pro-
fession, the provision of/>/uirmaceMrica/ aire has become an important task of modern
' * P/ujrmaceufisc/i WeekMad, Apotheek ageert bij 1 op de 10 recepten, vol. 136, nr. 28, 2001, pp.
1018-1022. A summary of the results can be found in De Vo/JcsJtran/, Apotheek grijpt in bij 9
procent recepten, 13 July 2001; and in NRC Hajide/sfr/aii, Apotheker haalt veel fouten uit re-
cepten, 12 July 2001. Specialists and general practitioners doubt the results, according to De
V'oHcsA'riiNt, Fout recept vaak door zelf schrijven arts, 31 July 2001.
' * Mullan (2000, p. 39).
"" OFT (2003) investigates the control of entry regulations in the community pharmacy sector in
the UK. The report does, however, not explicitly deal with the new tasks of pharmacists.
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community pharmacists. The contents of this particular task of the pharmacist may
call for a particular type of regulation. Therefore one needs to define exactly what
this 'provision of pharmaceutical care' incorporates; in other words: what is the ser-
vice of a pharmacist today next to the mere selling of drugs (and a little magistral
preparation)?
The following 'new tasks' in the field of pharmaceutical care were presented in the
previous section: medication control, monitoring of therapy, advising consumers
and providing pharmacotherapeutic information and advice to physicians. If one
considers the medzcntion cowfro/ (checking for possible interactions with other drugs
used by the patient) and the »nomton>i£ 0/ zVzerapy (double-checking the prescription
from the general practitioner or specialist), the added value of the pharmacist seems
to be in the additional check-up, often by means of a computer system. These tasks
can to a large extent be executed by pharmacists' assistants, be it under the supervi-
sion of a pharmacist.'*' This is also the case if one considers the rtrft'ice to consumers in
the pharmacy (several examples of this kind of advice are given in the previous sec-
tion). The last of the 'new tasks' mentioned above, proi»/ding /M/ürmflft'on n/;rf ndz'/ce to
p/zys/ciflns, has been growing in importance rapidly in recent years. Especially in the
Netherlands, pharmacotherapeutic (transmural) consultations between physicians
and pharmacists take place on a regular basis nowadays. Finally, Dutch pharmacists
are also encouraged to help decreasing the total drug costs in the Netherlands by
substzrufr'ng more eA e^nsziie drz<gs by c/z«iper «/ferjiflfz'i'es. This is, however, not specifi-
cally a task in the field of pharmaceutical care.
3.3 Summary
In the first section of this chapter the production, the distribution and the consump-
tion of drugs were outlined. Figure 3.1 shows the connections between the many
players in the pharmaceutical market: the pharmaceutical industry, wholesalers,
physicians (general practitioners and specialists), pharmacists, consumers (patients),
the government and health insurers. With regard to the prorft/cfzon I first introduced
the main categories of drugs: pharmaceutical specialites, parallel imports, generic
drugs and own preparates (magistral preparates). Then I showed that drugs can be
distinguished into prescription drugs (prescribed by a general practitioner or spe-
cialist and obtainable only from a pharmacist or dispensing physician) and OTC
(over-the-counter) drugs. In Belgium OTC drugs are available in the pharmacy only,
while in the Netherlands they can also be obtained in chemist stores and chemist
departments in supermarkets licensed to sell them. Figure 3.2 depicts the classifica-
tion of drugs graphically. Furthermore, I noted that the price and reimbursement of
drugs are heavily regulated, both in the Netherlands and in Belgium. The regulation
of the drug price will be discussed in more detail in § 4.6 and § 5.6; an overview of
the regulation with respect to the reimbursement of drugs is presented in the ap-
pendix to this chapter.
198 Van Dalen (1998) discusses the training and work of pharmacists' assistants.
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As far as the disfribwricm of drugs is concerned, a distinction must be made between
the wholesale channel and the retail channel. The pharmaceutical wholesaler is the
link between the drug producers and the retailers. This wholesale channel is very
important in the pharmaceutical market because medicinal products often need
special storage and secure handling, while pharmacists and dispensing physicians
obviously cannot keep every medicine in stock because of cost reasons. I examined
the structure of the Dutch and Belgian wholesale market for drugs by introducing
the undertakings active in these national markets. With respect to the retail channel
I made a distinction between the intramural market (via hospital pharmacies) and
the extramural market (via community pharmacies and dispensing physicians) and
I looked at the extramural market by briefly discussing two quite recent pharmacy
concepts: the internet pharmacy and mail order pharmacy.
The coMsi/Mi/jfr'oM of prescription drugs is different from the consumption of 'normal'
goods. The price sensitivity is relatively low because consumers do not have to pay
the full price of the drug themselves (because of reimbursement by health insurers),
and patients generally do not choose their medicines themselves, because they have
insufficient knowledge about drugs in order to be able to co-decide on the kind of
therapy they need. I briefly discussed the prescription behaviour of physicians and
the pattern of consumption in the Netherlands and in Belgium. In the Netherlands
the 'percentage diagnosis with prescription' is lower than it is in Belgium. Further-
more, I stated that consumers nowadays take more individual responsibility than
they did some decades ago, while also the number of patients' associations has
grown in recent years.
Section 2 dealt with the 'evolution' of the pharmacists' profession. Three develop-
ments have had a big influence on the pharmaceutical profession since the first half
of the last century, according to Van der Mijn (1989): the rise of industrially pre-
pared medicine at the expense of magisterially prepared medicine, the increasing
complexity of the medicine market, and the differentiation in the practice of the pro-
fession. As a result of this the role of the community pharmacist has changed. The
modern community pharmacist appears to have a number of 'new tasks' in the field
of p/umHrtreuf/Vfl/ rare, while his/her tasks involved in preparation of drugs have
decreased considerably. In addition, the distribution, i.e. selling, of drugs still makes
up an important part of the pharmacists' job responsibilities.
The 'new tasks' of pharmacists in the field of pharmaceutical care, which have been
discussed in this chapter, incorporate medication control, monitoring of drug ther-
apy, advising consumers and providing pharmacotherapeutic information and ad-
vice to physicians. Especially the last task has become very important, the first three
tasks can also - at least to some extent - be performed by pharmacists' assistants
under the supervision of a pharmacist. In the following chapters I will examine
whether the new tasks of the community pharmacist have already been acknowl-
edged by the legislator, i.e. whether they have been included somehow in public
regulation.
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 3: HEALTH INSURANCE
In chapter 3 I stated that consumers (patients) do not pay the full price of prescrip-
tion drugs themselves because either they are reimbursed by their health insurers or
their health insurers pay (part of) the price directly to the pharmacist or dispensing
physician. In this appendix I address the health insurance for pharmaceuticals in the
Netherlands'»» (§ A.3.1 and § A.3.2) and Belgium (§ A.3.3 and § A.3.4). For both
countries, an overview of the health insurance system is presented first, after which
the financing and benefits under the health care system are examined.
A.3.1 Hea/fJi insurance/or pnarmacewtica/s in fne NefnerZands: an
In general, the Dutch health insurance system is divided into three categories that
correspond to a classification system of health care.-"" The first category concerns
medical expenses associated with /ong-Jerm ozre n«d h/g/i-cosf rrert/merif, such as hos-
pital treatment and home care. For these costs there is a mandatory public insurance
scheme in the Netherlands called the Exception«/ Merfica/ Expenses Acf,~"' which is
financed by income-dependent contributions and government funds. The second
category is that of nornin/ nnd necessary wied/cn/ cnre, e.g. visits to a general practitio-
ner, hospital nursing and pharmaceutical services. For the medical costs of this
category patients can be publicly or privately insured, as will be described below.
The third category consists of medical expenses associated with forms of care re-
garded as being less essential, which are therefore predominantly covered by (vol-
untary) private insurance (e.g. most forms of dental care). The amount of medical
care provided that is not funded by one of these insurance schemes is negligible.™
In the Netherlands health insurance with respect to normal and necessary medical
care is provided both by public health insurance funds and by private insurers.™
According to the Hea/f/i Insurance Act,** hereafter HIA, public insurance is compul-
'»» In an earlier paper, Philipsen and Faure (2002b) investigate whether this Dutch system of
insurance and compensation for pharmaceuticals is efficient.
** Recently the Dutch government has proposed a number of changes in the health insurance
system. See e.g. Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (2002, pp. 12-13). Here I
will discuss the system as it was in 2002.
*" Wet van 14 december 1967 (Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten), S/b. 655,1967.
™ Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (1998, pp. 5-6).
™ There is a special (mandatory) insurance scheme for public servants other than central gov-
ernment officials and teaching staff, which constitutes only about 5% of the market. For de-
tails see Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (2002, Ch. 3).
*» Wet van 15 oktober 1964 (Ziekenfondswet), Sffc. 392,1964.
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sory for individuals meeting the criteria set by the legislation. Everyone meeting the
criteria is automatically insured and must pay the statutory contributions, whether
or not they wish to make use of the benefits offered. These contributions are to a
large extent income dependent. The most important criterion is the income ceiling
(in 2002 everyone with an income of up to € 30,700 fell under the HIA; in 2003 the
income ceiling was € 31,750), but also people who receive unemployment benefits
fall under the HIA.™ Insurance cover is extended to the partner and children of the
insured party, subject to some conditions. This co-insurance is free of charge. Al-
most two thirds of the Dutch population is covered by the HIA: the number is over
64%, while the privately insured account for ± 31 %.-*
Despite the statutory character of the HIA, individuals have to register with a health
insurance fund in order to obtain benefits. This is purely an administrative proce-
dure and does not imply entering into an insurance contract, since insurance cover
already follows from legislation. Individuals can choose from a wide variety of
health insurance funds; since 1992 health insurers have no longer been limited to
certain regions and all health insurance funds work nationally now.-"" Moreover,
health insurance funds have a duty of acceptance.™ In order to obtain medical ser-
vices individuals must apply to a practitioner (e.g. a pharmacist) with whom, or
institution with which, their health insurance fund has concluded a contract. People
have a free choice of practitioner or institution within the group contracted by the
health insurance fund.-"''
The system just described accounts for 64% of the market; 31% of the Dutch popula-
tion is insured with a private insurer.-'" Although the contents of the services to be
provided by the health care insurer are also the subject of regulation, there is much
more scope and freedom to negotiate the scope of the coverage and the correspond-
ing premiums. In private insurance the premium is in principle risk related
(through the extent of coverage and the deductible). In practice, the higher income
groups (individuals who cannot enter the HIA) take out private health insurance.
There are special rules for people older than 65 years. See e.g. Ministerie van Volksgezond-
heid, Welzijn en Sport (2002, Chs. 2-3).
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (2002, p. 9).
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (2002, p. 43).
Private insurers do not have this obligation.
There is an exception for general practitioners: once individuals have chosen a doctor from
among those who have contracts with their health insurance fund, they are registered with
that specific doctor.
Certain categories of people, like seamen and certain individuals entitled to cover who live
outside the country, are required to register with specific funds (Ministerie van Volksge-
zondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2002, p. 32). 5% is covered by the health insurance scheme for va-
rious categories of public servants. Si/pra, note 203.
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A.3.2 FiMflnciM^ and bewe/i'rs wnder f7»e D«fc/i /lea/ffi care system
A.3.2.1 Financing
The contribution for cover under the HIA consists of two parts: an income-related
part that is collected by the government (a percentage deducted from the wage,
profit, benefit or retirement pay) and a nominal (flat-rate) part, which is fixed and
collected by the health insurance fund itself. Thus, the Dutch public health insur-
ance is not only characterised by risk solidarity, but also by income solidarity. In
addition, the income-related contribution is partly paid by the employer.^" Apart
from these contributions, the public health insurance is financed by two other
sources: an annually determined government grant and special transfer payments
in respect of the elderly, paid by privately insured individuals via a statutory yearly
contribution on top of their nominal (insurance) contribution. With the exception of
the flat-rate contribution, all these fundings are channelled into a General Fund for
health insurance, which is administered by the government.
The private health insurance is financed differently. Because private insurers do not
benefit from government-collected contributions, they are completely dependent on
the nominal contributions: the - in principle - risk related premiums. The premiums
for private insurance differ - though not to a large extent yet - between insurance
companies and are of course influenced by the size of the cover and the amount of
the deductible chosen by the individual. There is no income solidarity in the private
health insurance, only risk solidarity.^'- However, next to its 'normal' health insur-
ance policies, every private health insurer in the Netherlands is obliged to provide a
so-called sfandflrrf /'//si/rai/ce as well. This standard insurance guarantees insurance
cover to certain groups of people that do not fall under the HIA and therefore have
to be insured privately. The premium for this standard policy is determined by the
government.-'^ Also, private insurers are obliged to charge - in addition to the pre-
mium - two statutory contributions, which are fixed by the government. The first
concerns a transfer that goes to the General Fund for public insurance (because
older people are over-represented in this category). The second concerns a contribu-
tion that is used to fund the standard insurance. These statutory contributions are
the same for every insurer. This shows that regulation seriously limits the scope for
charging truly risk-related premiums in private health insurance.
On average, the flat-rate contribution was NLG 216 (€ 98) per person in 1998. See Ministerie
van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (1998, p. 28).
And even there the term 'solidarity' is somewhat misleading. All this means is that risks are
spread between various members of a risk group. This is the solidarity which simply
amounts to the risk-spreading inherent in any insurance system. Solidarity does not, how-
ever, imply that good risks should subsidise bad risks. On the contrary, risks should as much
as possible be differentiated. The 'solidarity' is thus limited to insured posing a similar risk.
For specifics on the standard insurance: see Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en
Sport (2002, Ch. 3).
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A.3.2.2 Benefits
Cover under the HIA gives entitlement to benefits in kind in the form of medical
treatment and care. This is different from the private medical insurance, where in-
dividuals are reimbursed for medical expenses incurred by them. With respect to
pharmaceutical services, it is important to mention here that the Drug Reimburse-
ment System (i>i/ra, § A.3.2.3) applies. This means that the patient only gets a fixed
amount reimbursed, as determined by the Drug Reimbursement System. If he
chooses a more expensive drug he will have to cover the additional costs.
In 1997 individuals insured under the HIA were also obliged to pay charges to-
wards the cost of treatment and services. This system of charges provided for a
charge amounting to 20% of the cost of treatment and services provided under the
HIA, whereby account was taken of a maximum of € 90 per calendar year for the
insured party and persons co-insured.-'•• Such a charge effectively functioned as a
deductible, being an amount of the costs that is not reimbursed and which is borne
by the patient. Today, however, this charge no longer exists.
As far as private health care insurance is concerned, the benefits are to a large extent
dependent on what has been agreed between the insurer and the insured. However,
as stated above, a standard insurance benefit, of which the content is fixed in regula-
tion, has to be offered anyway. The amount and applicability of the deductible can,
to a large extent, be freely negotiated in private health insurance; the size of the de-
ductible will obviously have an influence on the premium charged.
A.3.2.3 Drug Reimbursement System (GVS)
Let us, given the scope of this research, turn once more to the Drug Reimbursement
System (Geneesmiddelenvergoedingssysteem), or GVS, already indicated above.
This regulation fixes the amounts the insurer is supposed to reimburse for pharma-
ceuticals and hence determines the scope of the benefits. The GVS contains reim-
bursement limits determined by the government. These reimbursement limits are
the maximum amounts that will be reimbursed to consumers by (public) health in-
surers for clusters of therapeutically equal drugs. Neu> pharmaceuticals (for which
there is no substitute) will only be included in the GVS if they have a clear added
value-" to the drug package. In practice, new drugs are therefore often placed on a
waiting list for some time before they are included in the GVS.-'" The GVS was in-
troduced in 1991 with the object of lowering the costs of health care in the Nether-
214 see Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (1998, p. 23). Some exceptions apply,
such as e.g. the cost of a visit to a general practitioner and costs related to childbirth.
*" On the European level the Committee of Proprietary Medicinal Products carries out the as-
sessment of 'new' drugs. In the Netherlands the added value of new drugs is judged by the
Drug Assessment Board (College Beoordeling Geneesmiddelen, CBG).
21* Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 1999 (pp. 25; 40-41).
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lands. However, the GVS also limits competition, because it has a big influence on
the price-setting behaviour of the drug industry, while in addition the bargaining
position of insurers decreases as a result of their duty to reimburse (up until the
statutory limit) every prescription drug included in the GVS. Moreover, the GVS
often delays the entry of new drugs into the market, as noted above. Since private
insurers have always followed the national health services (public insurance) as far
as reimbursement of drugs is concerned, in practice the GVS limits apply for both
the public and the private health insurance sector.
A.3.3 Hea/f« insurance/or/?/ianMflce«fica/s in Be/giwm: a« overflew
The health care system in Belgium differs from the Dutch system in the fact that in
Belgium the public health insurance is part of the social security system. There are
various social security agencies and among them is a special agency for the health
insurance called the RIZIV (National Institute for Health Care and Invalidity Insur-
ance), which is funded by compulsory contributions.^
The RIZIV does not pay suppliers of health care, such as physicians and dentists,
directly, nor does it refund individuals for costs incurred.*'® For the payment of
health suppliers there are a number of health insurance funds called /«Hfi/n/ifeife«,
or 'mutuals'.-" Some of these health insurance funds have a religious or political
connection due to historical reasons, but basically they all offer the same coverage
and premium; hence they can only attract new members by offering supplementary
services, by their geographical convenience and by their speed of settling claims.
Everyone who is employed by a Belgian company is obliged to join or register with
one of these funds. The contributions are deducted from the salary.^"
In contrast with patients in the Netherlands, patients in Belgium have a free choice
of physician. Physicians are paid according to the fee-for-service system, which
means that they are paid for each treatment on the basis of individual fees set by the
federal government. The Belgian health insurance law states that individuals are
entitled to the payment of the cost of medical care, which in practice implies that
they have to pay the health care supplier directly. In order to receive reimbursement
For an extensive description of the Belgian social security system, see Federal Public Service
Social Security (2001). For an overview of the history of the Belgian health insurance from
1945 to 1995, see BIGE (1998, pp. 31^9).
Paulus ef n/ (1999, p. 13).
These mutuals have united in five national confederations: the Christian, socialist, neutral,
liberal and independent confederation. There is also a government institution (for govern-
ment officials) and an institution of the NMBS (the Belgian national railway company). See
the website of RIZIV: <http://inami.fgov.be> and BIGE (1998, pp. 38-39; 188).
<Http://www.expataccess.com/belgium> (05-07-2002). See also NIVEL (1996, pp. 20-21) and
Federal Public Service Social Security (2001, p. 33).
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they have to present the receipt to the health insurance fund, i.e. the mutual.-' Only
health services that received an official registration (nomenc/flfuMr) are - partly or
completely - reimbursed.™ In case a drug is prescribed by the physician, the subse-
quent procedure is slightly different. Then a third payer's scheme applies: consum-
ers/patients do not have to pay the full price of the drug in the pharmacy, they only
have to pay the difference between the full price of the drug and the amount that
will be reimbursed by the health insurance.—^ The pharmacist will be refunded by
the health insurance funds.
A.3.4 Financing anrf berte/ite under tne Be/g«an hea/rTi care system
A.3.4.1 Financing
The RIZIV is financed by compulsory contributions and is - like the Dutch system-
characterised by income solidarity. Employees, employers and self-employed peo-
ple have to pay a contribution proportional to their revenues;^ there is no reference
to the health risk. In addition, the federal government contributes to the financing of
the RIZIV by means of direct subsidies.^ The RIZIV divides these funds among the
health insurance funds (the mutuals). The amount of the premium that individuals
have to pay in order to join a health insurance fund is determined by the govern-
ment and is therefore equal for every mutual.-''
A.3.4.2 Benefits
As was stated above, the mutuals take care of the payment of health care suppliers.
The reimbursements are equal for every individual, but there are exceptions for es-
pecially vulnerable social groups such as widows, disabled, pensioners and or-
phans. Many individuals in Belgium choose to have a supplementary (public or
private) medical insurance,^' because generally the mandatory insurance does not
reimburse 100% of the medical bill. In 1999, some 15% of total health care costs con-
- ' Van der Mei (2001, p. 261).
— Evers et a/ (2001, p. 4). According to Article 34 of the Acf o/14-7-1994 concerning Jne mandatory
insnrnmv/t>r nici/iVa/ core <wi</ /Mymrnfs (B.S. 27-8-1994), medical care in Belgium is divided in
23 different categories of medical dispensations.
223 Jn/ra, § A.3.4.2.
22* For contribution percentages and other specific contributions, see Federal Public Service So-
cial Security (2001, pp. 11-13).
225 Paulus el«/(1999, p. 12).
22* NIVEL (1996, p. 22).
22? According to NIVEL (1996, p. 21) approximately 14% of the Belgian population had a sup-
plementary insurance with a ;m'i>iite insurer in 19%.
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sisted of co-payments by patients.^ This supplementary medical insurance is di-
rectly provided by the mutuals.
With respect to the reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in Belgium, I mentioned ear-
lier that individuals have to pay the difference between the full price of the drug
and a certain amount that is reimbursed by the health insurance. Before a drug
qualifies for reimbursement by the Belgian health insurance, it has to comply with a
number of criteria stated in the Royn/ Decree 0/22-22-2001 defermining f/ie procedures,
terms nnd co»rfif/OHS re^nrrfiHg f/ie co/Hpe«s«h'on o/f/ie mnHdrtton/ /HS»r(7Hce/ür medial/
c«re n»rf pflymenfs in f/ie cosfs o/p/mrmrtcei/fiaj/ specin/ifes.- '^ They include pharmaco-
therapeutical criteria, the society's interest in the drug and price criteria.™ Depend-
ing on a number of criteria, drugs will be assigned by the RIZIV to one out of five
groups that correspond to different reimbursement rules.
This classification of pharmaceuticals is performed by the Commissie Tegemoetfcoming
Geneesmirfde/en (CTG), which is associated with the RIZIV. Life-saving drugs, the so-
called indispensable drugs (Moorfzfl/re/i/ite geneesmirfde/e/i), are placed in category A,
which means that they will be fully reimbursed. Category B holds the medicines for
treatment of non life-threatening diseases, which will be reimbursed for 75% if it
concerns pharmaceutical specialites for which there are no generic alternatives and
for 80% if it concerns drugs with generic status. Drugs that are assigned to category
C will be reimbursed for either 50%, 40% (category Cs) or 20% (category Cx). Finally
there is a category with those drugs that will not be reimbursed at all.*" For exam-
ple, all over-the-counter (OTC) products, which are freely obtainable, belong in this
category. After all, Article 2 of the Royal Decree of 21-12-2001 provides that drugs
only qualify for reimbursement if they are prescribed and delivered by persons le-
gally authorised to do this, and if these drugs are intended for entitled persons -
whether or not they are admitted to a hospital. The lists of all reimbursed pharma-
ceutical specialites and products and the category to which they belong are included
Paulus ef a/ (1999, p. 13).
Koninklijk Besluit van 21 december 2001 tot vaststelling van de procedures, termijnen en
voorwaarden inzake de tegemoetkoming van de verplichte verzekering voor geneeskundige
verzorging en uitkeringen in de kosten van pharmaceutische specialiteiten, B.S. 29-72-2007.
This Royal Decree entered into force at 1 January 2002 and replaced the Royal Decree of 2-9-
1980 determining the conditions under which the mandatory health care- and invalidity in-
surance will be prepared to bear the costs of the pharmaceutical specialites and of equal
products.
See Article 4 of the Royal Decree of 21-12-2001.
See Article 2 of the Roi/a/ Decree 0/ 7-5-7997 determining fhe persona/ snare 0/ f/ie persons enfif/ed
m fhe rosfs o/f/ie 1/1 f/ie yranienwlr o///ie mandatory insi<rflnce/or medita/ care and payments reini-
frursaWe p/iarmarewrica/ products (Koninklijk Besluit van 7 mei 1991 tot vaststelling van het per-
soonlijk aandeel van de rechthebbenden in de kosten van de in het raam van de verplichte
verzekering voor geneeskundige verzorging en uitkeringen vergoedbare farmaceutische ver-
strekkingen), B.S. 10-7-7997.
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in an appendix to the decree. The Minister of Social Affairs is charged with the en-
forcement of the decree.
For all drugs, except for those belonging to category A, patients thus have to pay an
own contribution, a deductible. In Belgium this deductible is called rew^dd. The
amount of this remge/d is limited to a maximum of € 9.90 for all drugs in category B,
irrespective of the price. However, with respect to drugs in large packagings (i.e.
containing more than 60 units) the remge/d is higher: € 14.80. The maximum re/;zge/d
for drugs belonging to category C is € 16.50; for the categories Cs and Cx there is no
maximum.^*
The fact that there is a maximum for certain categories of drugs might cause prob-
lems for the health insurers. As a result of the continuous rise in the drug price
level, the average remge/rf percentage decreased in 1999 to 21%, while before it had
been fluctuating around 25% for some years. Because the prices of reimbursed
drugs have increased enormously since 1987 and because the number of prescribed
drugs increased with 10% in the period 1987-1996, it has become more and more
difficult for the health insurers in Belgium to reimburse also new and expensive
drugs.*" This still is a topical subject.
Amounts as from 1 January 2003: see Article 2 of the Royal Decree of 7-5-1991. The maximum
rvrngriii is lower for widows, disabled, pensioners and orphans (the so-called WIGW's): € 6.60
for category B drugs (€ 9.90 in case of large packagings) and € 9.90 for category C drugs.
He» Memi'sWad, Pillen pijlsnel duurder, 10 February 1999. See also § 5.6.1.
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In this chapter an answer will be formulated to the second question posed in the
introduction: what national regulations and self-regulatory measures issued by pro-
fessional bodies exist in the Netherlands with respect to the pharmaceutical profes-
sion? In the discussion of the regulatory framework, emphasis will be laid on
regulations that restrict competition. Where necessary, some case law will be dis-
cussed as well.
In § 4.1 the Dutch professional organisation of pharmacists, the KNMP, is intro-
duced. The content of the self-regulation issued by this organisation is discussed in
the sections after that, jointly with the content of the public regulations. These sec-
tions are arranged by topic. The topic of § 4.2 is education (training) of pharmacists.
Section 4.3 discusses registration and title protection; this discussion also includes
the scope of the professional monopoly of the pharmacist. The section after that
(§ 4.4) presents an overview of regulation and case law concerning the establish-
ment of pharmacies. Applying the terminology used in chapter 2: regulation of
training, registration and establishment are examples of f/ifn/ rt'g///nfioH.-^  Subse-
quently regulation of advertising and design of the pharmacy (§ 4.5) is examined;
this is a form of co/irfi/cf regi//nh'o«. The final topic is the regulation of prices and fees
(§ 4.6). Section 4.7 gives an overview of some recent developments. I already noted
in chapter 3 that the pharmaceutical market is very dynamic and in this chapter it
will be shown that this has affected the regulation of the pharmaceutical profession
as well. Moreover, the introduction in 1998 of a strict national competition law, en-
forced by the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa), has strongly influenced the
pharmaceutical market since then.
234 Supra, §2.5.1.
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4.1 Professional code and rules of conduct
The professional organisation of pharmacists in the Netherlands is called the
KNMP, which stands for the Royal Dutch Association for the Advancement of
Pharmacy (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij ter bevordering der Pharmacie).
The KNMP issued its Pro/essiom?/ Code rmrf Rn/es 0/ Co»irfwcf ^br P/Mnnnrisfs in 1993.
With this the old rules, which had been established in the early 1950s, were with-
drawn. In general rules of conduct apply both internally, i.e. within a profession,
and towards the society, although externally they have no binding force. External
effect arises if the rules are actually accepted by third parties.-^ Over 90% of all
Dutch pharmacists are member of the KNMP, so the range of self-regulation is very
Apart from the Professional Code and Rules of Conduct, the KNMP also enacted
the so-called Dufc/i P/mrmnn/ S/(7H<i«rrfs (Nederlandse Apotheek Norm) in 1996. The
Dutch Pharmacy Standards have been enacted to work out the concept of 'proper
care' (verantwoorde zorg) from the Gjre JHsfrfwrions Qi/fl/ity /kf-''' and contain pro-
visions on e.g. the design of a pharmacy. Just like the rules of conduct, the Dutch
Pharmacy Standards have no binding external force (they bind, in other words, only
the members). However, these provisions can play a role in the medical disciplinary
rules. Moreover, the Dutch Pharmacy Standards have often been included to a large
extent in the individual contracts between pharmacists and health insurance com-
panies.
As a result of a number of decisions by the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) in
competition and health care cases in 2000 and 2001,-^ the KNMP had to alter the
content of the rules of conduct and the Dutch Pharmacy Standards. In 2002 a new
version of the Dutch Pharmacy Standards was issued, in which some provisions of
the old version have been removed. Moreover, the KNMP has now withdrawn its
rules of conduct. The prevailing self-regulation consists therefore of the Dutch
Pharmacy Standards of 2002, the Professional Code of 2001, and the so-called Pro/es-
sio/ifl/ Stofufc of 2000. The most important provisions of the old rules of conduct and
of the (old and new) Dutch Pharmacy Standards will be discussed below, together
^ Leenen (1991, pp. 43-44).
*** Van Heest (1998, p. 6). The reasons to become a member of the KNMP have been summed up
by Mr. F. Moss, Head of Legal Affairs of the KNMP, in a letter dated 8 April 2003: (1) to share
in the costs of developing and facilitating the profession and the exercise of the profession of
pharmacist; (2) to keep oneself informed of these developments; (3) to profit from certain
products and services provided by the KNMP; (4) to profit from continuing education, ad-
vancement of expertise, conferences and other events organised by the KNMP; and (5) to
maintain contact with colleagues and their way of exercising the profession. The list is non-
exhaustive.
237 YYet van 18 januari 1996 betreffende de kwaliteit van zorginstellingen (Kwaliteitswet Zorgin-
stellingen), Sffr. 80,1996.
** See § 4.7.2 in/h?.
76
? , < • '
Chapter 4
with the legislation and the case law. Provisions that (may) restrict competition be-
tween pharmacists will be emphasised."'*
4.2 Education
The entry into a profession is made more difficult if students have to satisfy ex-
traordinary high demands during their education, or if the entry into the education
is attached to special conditions. This seems not to be the case in the Netherlands as
far as the pharmacists' profession is concerned. Also, there are no special demands
with respect to obligatory internships.
The quality of the content and structure of the pharmacists' education at the Dutch
universities are supervised by the Dutch government. With regard to the content of
the education a number of requirements are laid down in the Erfucflfionn/ Re<7i/ire-
merife Decree/or P/mminc/ste (Besluit opleidingseisen apotheker, 1997). The organisa-
tional structure of the education is regulated by the Hig/ier ErfMCflf/cm n/irf Srienfi/ic
(7»d Sc/io/nr/y Resenrc/i Acf (Wet op het Hoger onderwijs en Wetenschappelijk onder-
zoek, >
The education lasts quite long, namely six years. This is longer than in any of the
other EU Member States, where the duration is generally only four or five years.*"
Until 1984 a selection committee regulated the intake of first-year students; after
that this committee has been abolished.-^ From 1984 to 1988 the number of first-
year students decreased temporarily and since then the number has increased al-
most every year until the mid-1990s. However, since then the number of first year
students has decreased drastically: while in 1995 the number of first-year pharmacy
students was still 373, in 2001 it had been reduced to only 182.*" To a large extent
this decrease is caused by the widening of the //HMierus/ixi/s for the study of medi-
cine, which came about as a result of a shortage of general practitioners in the Neth-
erlands.-«
The Professional Statute (KNMP, 2000a) does not contain specific restrictions to competition.
It is a document that more generally describes the duties and responsibilities of a pharmacist.
The pharmaceutical education is also regulated on a European level. The Directive
85/432/EEC of 16 September 1985, regarding the co-ordination of the legal and administra-
tive rules of certain activities in the pharmaceutical field, fixes the minimum duration of the
education at 5 years, whereof at least 4 years consisting of theoretical study and 6 months du-
ring practice in a public pharmacy or a hospital pharmacy. See Hombroeckx (2000, p. 181).
However, in some of those EU Member States an additional practical training of six months
or one year is compulsory (in Italy two years). See IHS (2003, p. 75).
NIVEL (1994, pp. 68-69).
Source: Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics (SFK), in P/iarmaceurisc/i WefltWad, vol. 137,
nr. 20, 2002. See also Het Financieele Dagblad, TVJtorf <um opof/ie&ers /oopf op, 17 May 2002.
Many students who are turned down for the study of medicine decide to register for the
study of pharmacy instead, some of them hoping to draw a place in medicine in a later year.
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The number of graduates had grown between 1993 and 2000, but with a few fluc-
tuations. On average around 125 students graduated every year in the period 1993-
1997, of which 60% were females.^ « While in 2001 this number was even higher (155
graduates), for the first time a huge decrease was detected compared to the previ-
ous year (192 pharmacists graduated in 2000).--"'
4.3 Registration and title protection
4.3.1 77ie pro/essioMa/ mono/JoZy o/a
The professional monopoly of pharmacists is determined by the Drw^ Swpp/y Ac/ of
1958^ and by the P/wnnrtcewrtcn/ Practice Decree of 1963.^ « Article 1 of the Drug
Supply Act defines pharmaceutical practice as the compounding (meaning the pro-
duction in pharmaceutical form, as well as the labelling and packaging thereof) and
the dispensing of medicines. Pharmaceutical practice is according to Article 2.1 re-
served for pharmacists; and under specific conditions also for dispensing physi-
cians, pharmacist's assistants, and the pharmaceutical industry and wholesalers.
With respect to physicians who want to open a practice with a pharmacy, Article 6
provides that they may only practice pharmacy if a pharmacist has not been estab-
lished either in the municipality concerned or in the adjoining municipalities.
Moreover, dispensing physicians are not allowed to prepare drugs themselves or to
dispense drugs to patients other than those living in their work area. Limited com-
petence to practice pharmacy is given to chemists (i.e. druggists) and food compa-
nies, which means that they are permitted to sell self-care drugs (OTC drugs) at
special counters. Thus, they are not qualified to deliver drugs on prescription. The
fact that in the Netherlands self-care drugs can also be sold outside of the pharmacy
at special counters, provided that such counters are supervised by chemists, is not
unique in Europe, although in most EU countries this is not allowed. Belgium, for
example, is not familiar with the concept of chemists selling OTC drugs.-•"
Next, Article 2.3 of the Drug Supply Act states that it is forbidden for persons who
are not qualified in the pharmaceutical practice to compound or to dispense medi-
cines. Given that only pharmacists may deliver drugs on prescription, they there-
fore have a professional monopoly in the extramural supply of prescribed drugs.
2« Own calculations. Source: NlVEL/ NZI/ OSA, 1998, p. 42.
*^* Supra, note 243.
247 yygt yaj, 28 juli 1958, houdende nieuwe regelen nopens de geneesmiddelenvoorziening en de
uitoefening der arsenijbereidkunst (Wet op de Geneesmiddelenvoorziening), Srf>. 408,1958.
2** Besluit Uitoefening Artsenijbereidkunst, Stf>. 75,1963.
^*' Sources: Neprofarm website: <http://www.neprofarm.nl/zelfzorg_algemeen.html>; Omega
Pharma, Annual Report 2001, p. 49. The IHS research report (2003, p. 80) gives a nice over-
view of the pharmacists monopoly in the 15 EU Member States of 2002. Apart from the Neth-
erlands, it is only allowed to sell OTC drugs in retail shops in Austria, Denmark, Germany,
Ireland and the United Kingdom.
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In 1999 the professional monopoly of pharmacists was curtailed somewhat, by the
removal of Article 15 from the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree. That (now repealed)
article prohibited the employment of pharmacists by non-pharmacists.^' Further-
more, a provision from Article 13 of the Drug Supply Act, which prohibited hospital
pharmacists to dispense drugs outside of the hospital, was repealed on 1 April
2000.25" The objective of this amendment was to make some competition possible
between hospital pharmacies and community pharmacies in the extramural supply
of drugs.^
4.3.2 Registration
Before a pharmacist is allowed to practice pharmacy in the Netherlands, he or she
must be registered with the regional Health Inspectorate (regionale Inspectie voor
de Gezondheidszorg), in accordance with Article 14 of the Drug Supply Act. Until
2002 there were five different registers: for established pharmacists, for dispensing
physicians, for observing pharmacists, for second pharmacists, and for pharmacist's
assistants. As of October 2002 the registration for observing pharmacists and for
pharmacist's assistants was no longer required.^
A number of requirements for registration as established (community) pharmacist
are laid down in the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree, among which the require-
ments for the applicant to submit a pharmacy diploma and a statement of the prop-
erty (Article 2). Once registered, a pharmacist or dispensing physician may only
practice pharmacy in one pharmacy, according to Article 19 of the Drug Supply Act.
An exemption is made for substitution during absence (e.g. in weekends) or illness
of colleagues. These so-called observation rules are specified in Article 21 of the
Drug Supply Act. However, according to a proposed amendment of the law, pre-
sented to the Second Chamber already on 26 July 2002, the government intends to
repeal Article 19 of the Drug Supply Act.^
The Pharmaceutical Practice Decree contains a prohibition for the pharmacist to en-
ter into any kind of agreement with respect to the public dispensing of medicines
with physicians, dentists or midwives (Article 18). In 1999 a provision that restricted
25" Srt>. 20, 1999. For health insurance funds, the ban on running pharmacies themselves was
lifted in the same year: as from 1 January 1999, they have been granted a general exemption
from Article 42.5 of the Health Insurance Act (provided that a qualified pharmacist is work-
ing behind the counter).
25' Sf6. 97,2000.
252 See also § 4.7.
253 See drcu/ar no 2002-10-JGZ. The argumentation g iven by the Health Inspectorate is that the
old, detailed system of registration is no longer appropriate in the current climate and that its
abolition w o u l d involve a decrease in the administrative burden of both pharmacists and of
the Health Inspectorate.
254 TK 2007-2002, 28 494. See also §4.7 .1 in/ra.
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the entry of pharmacists to the market was repealed from this decree, namely Arti-
cle 15, already briefly mentioned above. This article provided that pharmacists were
not allowed to be employed by non-pharmacists. Since the repeal of Article 15, it
has become possible for qualified pharmacists to work in e.g. a chemist's chain.
4.3.3 Tit/e protection
Although the Drug Supply Act and the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree still contain
the most important rules with respect to the compounding and dispensing of medi-
cines, they do not regulate the title protection of pharmacists. This task has been
reserved to the /«dwirfi«?/ Her?/f/i G?re Pro/essions Acf,255 hereafter Pro/essio/is Acf,
since an amendment in November 1997.^ For a number of health care professions
the ban on the unqualified practice of the profession, which existed in the past, has
been substituted by a system of registration combined with title protection and par-
tial protection of the profession through a number of so-called reserrerf o/?err?fio/is
(voorbehouden handelingen). In principle everybody is allowed to enter the area of
health care, except if by doing so they cause harm. However, the practice of a re-
served operation defined in the Professions Act is punishable by law, if performed
by an unqualified person on a professional basis.-^' For pharmacists no reserved
operations have been defined in the Professions Act. For them the protection of the
professional monopoly supplied by the Drug Supply Act still applies.
Hence, in practice pharmacists will have noticed little change since the coming into
force of the Professions Act in 1997. New is that the title 'pharmacist' (rtpof/iefar) is
now reserved to those who are registered in the BIG-register.-^ This register is
managed by the Minister of Public Health, Welfare and Sports. Article 22 states how
the title 'pharmacist' (and thus the entry into the register of the Professions Act) can
be obtained. Required is the possession of a legally obtained certificate. The un-
qualified use of the title 'pharmacist' or a similar title is subject to punishment.^
In Article 23 of the Professions Act the area of expertise of pharmacists is defined to
be 'the performing of acts in the area of pharmaceutical practice'. To be able to actu-
ally practice their profession, pharmacists registered with the Professions Act still
255 wet op jg Beroepen in de Individuele Gezondheidszorg (Wet BIG), Stf>. 655, 1993. This act
also contains the disciplinary rules. The old Act of Medical Disciplinary Rules (Medische
Tuchtwet) of 1928 was abolished in December 1997, when the Wet BIG came into force. Now
the so-called disciplinary rules for health care ('fwc/ifrer/if i>oor <te gezomi/iWdszorg'), defined in
§ 7 of the Wet BIG, watch over the quality of medical practice and the professionality of
health care.
25* Srti. 570,1997.
2^ This can be punished by a fine not exceeding € 2,250 or imprisonment of up to three months
(Article 97 in conjunction with Article 23.4 of the criminal code).
25" This is the official name of this register. BIG stands for 'Individual Health Care Professions'.
25"* Illegal use of a title protected by this Act can be punished with a fine of not more than € 2,250.
See Article 100 in conjunction with Article 23.4 of the criminal code.
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have to apply to the regional Health Inspectorate, as described earlier in this chap-
ter. In accordance with Article 15 of the Drug Supply Act, amended by the Profes-
sions Act, registration with the Health Inspectorate will be refused if the applicant
does not have the title 'pharmacist'.
4.3.4 Regisfrarion wiffe f7»e KNMP
In addition to the statutory regulations the pharmacists' association KNMP has its
own register: the register for community pharmacists. To maintain the subscription
in this private register, community pharmacists have to meet certain demands made
by the KNMP, like taking part in refresher courses or attending pharmaceutical con-
ferences organised by the KNMP. Formerly, Article 2.12 of the (now repealed) Pro-
fessional Code and Rules of Conduct stated that members of the KNMP must be
registered there.
4.3.5 Summary
To become a pharmacist first the pharmacy diploma must be obtained, then a
pharmacist has to enrol in two registers, namely that of the Health Inspectorate and
the BIG-register. The title is protected by the Professions Act, while the operations
of compounding and dispensing drugs are protected by the Drug Supply Act.
Given that only pharmacists may dispense drugs on prescription, they therefore
have a professional monopoly in the extramural supply of prescribed drugs. The
amendment of 1997, which introduced the BIG-register, did not really change this.
Practically, only a number of provisions from the Drug Supply Act have moved to
the Professions Act.
4.4 Establishment of pharmacies
4.4.2 T7«e estab/isfime«* po/icy o/fTie KNMP
In the period between 1975 and 1987 the pharmacists' association's private estab-
lishment policy applied: the KNMP EstaW/s/wieHf Po/iq/ Decree (Besluit Vestigings-
beleid KNMP). Members had to receive the permission from the executive board of
the KNMP if they wanted to establish or relocate a pharmacy. These rules were
based on the idea that a proper quality of pharmaceutical aid can only be obtained if
the financial foundation of a pharmacy is sound; and that for this a market of at
least 8000 patients per pharmacy is required.*'* But the KNMP has never been able
This norm was not based on financial foundations. It was based on the then applying sub-
scription system (abonnementssysteem) with respect to pharmaceutical care for patients of
national health services. According to that system, which remained in force until January
1988, pharmacists received a fixed amount per registered patient irrespective of the actual
drug use. The earnings from this subscription system accounted for a substantial part of a
81
The regulation of pharmacists in the Netherlands
to prevent non-members from establishing themselves. Suspension and the dis-
qualification from practice can never be private law disciplinary rules; these are af-
ter all matters pertaining to public law. However, the KNMP can punish with e.g. a
warning, a fine, a suspension from the membership of the KNMP or the deprivation
of the right of being member of a KNMP board or committee.*»'
Although in theory it has always been possible for pharmacists to establish them-
selves without being a member of the KNMP, in practice this often was very diffi-
cult, for reasons I will explain below and in § 4.4.2. In the case law of the early
1980s, the court repeatedly determined in civil law cases that non-members are not
bound by a private law establishment policy.*** The objection put forward by the
KNMP, that the establishment policy was a generally acknowledged code of con-
duct, might have been somewhat true, but this still cannot make a private rule le-
gally binding. When the number of 'black establishments' increased in the 1980s,
the KNMP therefore changed its establishment policy. From 1987 onwards an nrfpi-
sory establishment policy without sanctions applies, called the Guüfe/tHis concerning
f/ze KNMP Advisory <?stob/is/imenf po/icy (Richtlijnen betreffende het vestigingsadvies-
beleid KNMP).»
According to these guidelines, the KNMP gives advice about the establishment, re-
location and closure of pharmacies, at every member's request. Also non-members
and interested third parties may ask the KNMP for advice. Besides, the Guidelines
allow the KNMP to advise on certain issues without being asked. Article 4 of the
Guidelines provides the criterion for positive advice as to establishment or reloca-
tion:
'Within an acceptable time the new or relocated pharmacy must be able to grow to a
size that guarantees the foundation for a qualitatively good practice of the profession
by the pharmacist(s). In addition, the conditions for good practice by the adjacent
pharmacies have to be maintained. As a basis the Minimum Establishment Standard
for Pharmacies (Minimum KNMP-Vestigingsnorm voor Apotheken) shall apply'.
In a commentary to this article, it is stated that the above includes that pharmacies
have to be reasonably far apart and that newcomers may only inflict damage upon
established pharmacists as long as this damage is not 'unreasonable'. The KNMP
strives for the realisation of viable pharmacies. The above-mentioned Minimum £s-
pharmacist's gross profit. Since 1 January 1988 pharmacists have received a fee per prescrip-
tion: the fixed fee (receptregelvergoeding). See KNMP (1997, p. 6).
2»> Leenen (1991, pp. 261-262).
2« See e.g. Rb. Maastricht, 15 July 1981, Ti/dsc/iri/r iwr GezomfliWrfsredif, 1982, p. 88 and Rb. 's-
Gravenhage, 12 June 1985, Tr/dsdin/t mor Gezomflifidsredif, 1986, p. 232.
2*3 I will show in § 4.4.2 and § 4.7 that nowadays the KNMP advisory establishment policy has
become a dead letter because of the growing power of health insurers. However, it strongly
influenced the establishment of pharmacies throughout the 1990s and, moreover, it may shll
be a source of inspiration for new contracts between health insurers and pharmacists.
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tofr/is/imenf Standard /ör P/wrwwries serves as a guideline for assessing the financial
feasibility (bedrijfseconomische haalbaarheid) - or the viability - of a pharmacy.
In this assessment, inter alia the following factors are considered: the expected
number of prescriptions, the number of patients, the turnover, the number of physi-
cians in the area and infrastructural characteristics. To determine the financial feasi-
bility, the KNMP first calculates the gross profit at the expected number of
prescriptions. From this gross profit the costs of practice (among them personnel
and housing costs) and the investment and financing costs are subtracted, while the
writing-offs are being considered as well. Because the gross profit has been related
to the prescription volume since January 1988,-^ the establishment standard of the
KNMP is also defined in the number of prescriptions. The standard for financial
feasibility of a pharmacy lies at a structural (minimum) number of prescriptions of
40,000 per year. No difference is made between prescribed and non-prescribed
drugs and medical devices.-^ The estimate is flexible: the required minimum for
financial feasibility is brought up to date by the KNMP if the Health Charges Board
(CTG) makes an adjustment in the tariffs. If important market developments are
observed by the Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics (Stichting Farmaceutische
Kengetallen, SFK), those will also be included in the estimate. Dependent on the
geographical position of the newcomer, additional preconditions apply in the
judgement of financial feasibility, because a distinction is made between establish-
ment in a rural area with a dispensing general practitioner, establishment in an ur-
banised area and establishment in a demarcated new housing estate.
4.4.2 Contracts between /j/iflrm«cisfs and fiea/r/i jwswrers
Although the advices of the KNMP are not compulsory, the advisory establishment
rules of the KNMP have often been included in some way in the contracts between
health insurers and pharmacists. It appears from the case law in the 1990s that these
contracts often contained roughly the same requirements as the old KNMP Estab-
lishment Policy Decree. In one of the cases from the rather extensive case law in the
field of health insurance funds, the contracting policy of the health insurance fund
in question was that each pharmacist's sphere of activity ought to be larger than
7,500 patients and that in principle contracts would only be made with a pharma-
cist-owner-administrator (apotheker-eigenaar-bestuurder).-** This is a clear example
of market division, yet the Court decided in this case that there were plausible
grounds for this: a well-considered distribution of care, to be provided by finan-
cially viable pharmacies that are managed rightly. The condition that contracts will
only be made with a pharmacist-owner-administrator is also included in the Dutch
** Supra, note 260.
^5 These are numbers for the year 1997. The starting point of the calculations is a disposable
income of 40,000 NLG (about € 18,151) per year, excluding net living expenses of 12,000 NLG
(about € 5,445). The complete calculation can be found in KNMP (1997).
*** Gerechtshof 's-Hertogenbosch, 14 May 1996, Ti/dsc/in/i i'oor Gezond/ieidsrecM, 1997, p. 66.
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Pharmacy Standards of the KNMP: Article 8.1.0 holds that a pharmacy needs to be
governed by a registered community pharmacist. In the above-mentioned case law,
similar cases concerning contracts between health insurers (i.e. health insurance
funds and private health insurers) and pharmacists can be found.
However, the Dutch Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit,
hereafter NMa), which was founded in January 1998 to enforce the new Dutch
Competition Act of the same year, appears to be much stricter with respect to viola-
tions of the market division prohibition. In a number of decisions the NMa made
clear that certain provisions in the contracts between health insurers and pharma-
cists are prohibited by the Competition Act. In addition, the NMa decided that the
so-called collective negotiations between the representatives of health care provid-
ers (such as pharmacists and general practitioners) and health insurance funds can
not be reconciled with the Competition Act. I will come back to the involvement of
the NMa in section 7, where I discuss some recent developments in the Dutch
pharmaceutical market.
In the individual agreements between health insurers and pharmacists, the contract-
ing parties always have to take into account the so-called OM frames o/ConsM/tafio«
(Uitkomsten van Overleg) of the KNMP and the Dutch Association of Health Insur-
ers (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland).-'''' These Outcomes of Consultation have been
legally approved by the Board for Health Insurance (College voor Zorgverzekerin-
gen, formerly called Ziekenfondsraad) and are therefore exempted from assessment
under the Competition Act. They are partly based on the Dutch Pharmacy Stan-
dards issued by the KNMP. In the Outcomes of Consultation a number of condi-
tions that must be included in every individual agreement between a health insurer
and a pharmacist are written down. Although the subsequent interpretation of the
individual agreements is left to the contracting parties, this system obviously pre-
vents that the content of the individual agreements between pharmacists and health
insurers is determined on a decentralised level.-*'*
4.4.3 TafciMg over o/ « p/iamiacy
Pharmacists who want to set up their own practice by taking over an existing
pharmacy have to overcome a different obstacle. That is, it will cost them a fortune
to take over another pharmacy. The take-over costs consist of housing, stock and an
amount for goodwill. The amount for goodwill is often very high (at least one times
the annual turnover, but often much more) and the trend in recent years has shown
a considerable increase in this amount. This implies that for recently graduated
pharmacists it will be very difficult to set up their own practice after graduation. For
2*' Article 44.4 of the Health Insurance Act. See also NMa, Derision Mr. 912/2001 (CZ - Apof/idcer),
p. 3.
2*" The government has recently proposed to abolish this system, in order to give health insurers
more contracting freedom: TK 2000-2002,24 124 and 24 036, nr. I l l , p. 13.
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large chains, such as OPG (see § 7.6), Alliance Unichem, GEHE/Celesio, and previ-
ously Boots (see § 7.5), which have substantial financial means, these problems are
smaller. In § 7.4 I will discuss the goodwill problem in more detail.
4.4.4 Summary
It can be concluded that, although pharmacists in the Netherlands now have free-
dom of establishment, in practice it is still very difficult for them to start a new
pharmacy. It is difficult for a recently established pharmacist to make contracts with
health insurers in an area that does not meet the standards enacted by the KNMP,
because these standards have been adopted to a large extent by the health insurers.
Unless pharmacists succeed in concluding contracts with these health insurers, they
effectively have no chance of entry into the market for the simple reason that their
medicines will not be reimbursed (which is obviously disadvantageous for custom-
ers). For pharmacists who are members of the KNMP it has long been practically
impossible to withdraw from the advisory establishment policy anyhow: until 2001
Article 2.13 of the (now repealed) rules of conduct provided that advice by an
authorised KNMP-body had to be considered as important. Moreover, the take-over
purchase of existing pharmacies is hampered by the high amounts for goodwill that
need to be paid.
4.5 Exercise of the profession
4.5.1 Advertising/or drags
As regards advertising for drugs the Ma/iaif/on Aduerftsing Decree (Reclamebesluit
Geneesmiddelen) of 1994 is important.*''' The public advertising of prescription-
only drugs and pharmacy made medication is prohibited, while the advertising of
other medication should promote the rational use thereof, by 'objectively presenting
these products without exaggerating their qualities'. The special favours offered by
the pharmaceutical industry to pharmacists are restrained in Article 15 of the Medi-
cation Advertising Decree, albeit very generally:
'the hospitality has to remain within reasonable bounds and must be subordinate to
the main goal of the meeting'.
While advertising for drugs might benefit a pharmacist, for example if he or she
would advertise more for drugs than other pharmacists, supplying drug informa-
tion primarily seems to be a concern of the pharmaceutical industry. Anyhow, ad-
vertising frrfl/jfferf drugs should never be a job of pharmacists, just because they are
stimulated by the Dutch government to supply generic and parallel-imported drugs
Besluit van 31 Oktober 1994 houdende regels voor reclame voor geneesmiddelen (Reclamebe-
sluit Geneesmiddelen), Sfb. 787,1994.
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instead of equivalent proprietary medicinal products that are generally more ex-
pensive.™
4.5.2
Advertising by pharmacists is not regulated by law, as opposed to the advertising
of drugs. The old Professional Code and Rules of Conduct of the KNMP, which ap-
plied until late 2001, contained two articles on this subject. Article 2.16 provided the
following:
'A community pharmacist is not allowed to approach patients directly and individu-
ally, if these patients are not his own clients. In addition, he is not allowed to compare
himself with colleagues who are mentioned by name or who are distinctly
indicated'.-''
The other restriction was mentioned in Article 2.23:
'Improper competition is prohibited. As such are always considered: (a) taking over
patients/clients during duty or observation; (b) actively attracting staff from a neigh-
bouring colleague; (c) in any way affecting the patients' free choice of pharmacy.'-"-
By the end of 1997 the Economic Competition Committee (Commissie Economische
Mededinging) had already advised the Minister of Economic Affairs not to give an
exemption from Article 2.16, but the committee had approved of Article 2.23a be-
cause of the importance of a well-functioning evening/weekend observance regula-
tion. ^  Nevertheless, it took a long time - and additional investigations and
decisions by the Dutch Competition Authority NMa - for the KNMP rules of con-
duct to be adapted accordingly.
It can be concluded that until late 2001 pharmacists faced many difficulties if they
wanted to show their qualities to patients. This is a result of the combination of the
restrictions to advertising mentioned above and the prevailing information asym-
metry on the pharmaceutical market between the demand side and the supply side
*" This so-called im.'PNfire measure has been operative since 1988. Drugs have been clustered on
the basis of their generic name, pharmaceutical form, method of administration and strength.
More information on the incentive measure can be found in the next section (§ 4.6). See also
SFK (1999, pp. 37-38).
*" 'Een openbare apotheker mag niet rechtstreeks en individueel patienten, niet zijnde eigen
dienten, benaderen. Ook mag hij zieh niet vergelijken met met name genoemde of onmisken-
baar aangeduide collegae'.
272 'ledere ongepaste concurrentie is verboden. Als zodanig worden in elk geval beschouwd: (a)
het tijdens dienst of waarneming overnemen van patienten/clienten; (b) het actief aantrekken
van personeel van een naburige collega; (c) het op enigerlei wijze bei'nvloeden van de vrije
apotheekkeuze der patienten.'
2^ Commissie Economische Mededinging, Arfi'ies oz«r Onf/iej^ iiigsi'erzoelt KNMP: Bes/uif Marltf-
en, brief aan de Minister van Economische Zaken, 23 October 1997.
86
Chapter 4
of the pharmaceutical market. Competition in the quality of supplied services seems
then only to be possible by providing exfra services to customers, such as home de-
livery of medicines, or by offering a broad range of medical supplies and other
products that can be obtained without prescription. However, as a result of the in-
tervention of the NMa in the pharmaceutical market, there are - on paper - cur-
rently no more restrictions to advertising.
4.5.3 Design o/ f/ie ^fian«acy
The original Articles 32 and 34-36 of the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree contained
some requirements that pharmacies had to comply with regarding design and ac-
cessibility of the building. These articles were repealed in January 1996, because
they were considered to have 'an adverse effect on the efficiency of the functioning
of pharmacies'.2™ However, shortly afterwards most of these provisions were in-
cluded in the Dutch Pharmacy Standards. Most important were the following three:
a pharmacist must be able to deliver «»en/ sensible prescription (Article 5.1), a
pharmacy must have a separate room for magistral preparation of medicines (Arti-
cle 9.2.5) and the pharmacy must be open for at least 9 hours a day between 8 AM
and 6 PM and for at least 45 hours a week (Article 9.1.1). Combining the Articles 5.1
and 9.2.5, it followed that every pharmacist should be capable of magistral prepara-
tion of medicines. In addition to this, the Dutch Pharmacy Standards obliged phar-
macists to either join a Regional Pharmacy Laboratory or to dispose of adequate
laboratory facilities themselves (Article 9.2.7).
The Dutch Competition Authority NMa did not agree with these provisions, as it
considers them as being restrictive of competition.^ In the new Dutch Pharmacy
Standards, issued in September 2002, the above-mentioned provisions (and a few
other articles) have been changed therefore by the KNMP. The new Article 5.1 pre-
scribes that pharmacists stick to such opening hours that clients have sufficient op-
portunities to acquire medicines. With respect to the Articles 9.2.5 and 9.2.7 a phrase
has been added to the original text in order to make clear that these provisions ap-
ply only if medicines are prepared in a pharmacy.
4.6 Prices and fees
This section describes how prices for drugs are fixed in the Netherlands. Obviously
these prices depend to a certain extent on the production price and the market situa-
tion. As this is a law and economics research with respect to pharmacists, I will not
go into these aspects of price-setting, but focus on how the law (more specifically:
regulation) affects the price of drugs in a public pharmacy. In that respect two regu-
latory aspects need to be considered, namely: how regulatory action affects the price
Sfb. 545,1995. Article 33 was repealed in 2002; see Stf>. 274,2002.
NMa, Derision «r. 912/2001 (CZ - Apo/teter), p. 18.
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of drugs (§ 4.6.1) and how regulation concerning the fees for the pharmacists them-
selves impact on the price of drugs (§ 4.6.2).
4.6.1 TTie price o/ drags
In the Netherlands drugs are divided into two categories: WTG and non-WTG.
WTG drugs are drugs that may only be sold by pharmacists and dispensing physi-
cians and which therefore fall under the Hefl/f/t Core C/mrges Acf (Wet Tarieven Ge-
zondheidszorg), hereafter WTG. In order to obtain these drugs, patients always
need a prescription from a general practitioner or specialist. Non-WTG drugs may
also be supplied in outlets other than pharmacies, such as chemists or sometimes
even a special counter in a supermarket, provided that a chemist or a pharmacist
plays a supervisory role at such a counter.-"'' If supplied on prescription at the
pharmacy, non-WTG drugs may still be covered by the health insurance, but only
under very specific conditions.^ Of all drugs supplied by community pharmacies
on prescription, 80.5% were WTG drugs in 2001.-™
The fee pharmacists receive for supplying WTG drugs, called the fixed fee,^ is not
related to the cost of the product. On the contrary, the fee is fixed per prescription
and does not depend on whether the medicine costs € 5 or € 50. The fee also does
not depend on the prescribed amount. The result is that in the Netherlands tariffs
for WTG drugs do not or just barely differ between pharmacies. The purchase fee,
the refund paid by insurers to pharmacists for the dispensing of drugs in the phar-
macy, is determined by a reimbursement list in the so-called faxe of Z-index. Z-
index is a company that is connected to the pharmacists' association KNMP.-™ The
tare is a list of all drugs registered in the Netherlands and is published every month
on the basis of the CTG-*" tariff orders. The CTG tariff orders determine, inter alia,
the fixed fee per prescription and the amounts that pharmacists are allowed to
charge patients to compensate for their purchase costs. In practice, the CTG tariff
One can compare this with the general classification of drugs presented in Figure 3.2 in chap-
ter 3: non-WTG drugs are the over-the-counter (OTC) drugs as presented in that figure.
Since 1 September 1999, only prescribed non-WTG drugs that are intended for diroiiic use
(that is, which are used for a period exceeding 3 months a year) are reimbursed. In cases
where it concerns a new medicine for the patient in question, he or she always has to pay the
first prescription (the first 15 days) him/herself. See: CVZ, De jvrgivding !><m ze(/zorggei/ees-
MinMe/cii /»t'( iiigiuig J'II» 1 .«"/»(ember 7999, augustus 1999, pp. 2^1, and SFK (2001, p. 37).
SFK (2002, p. 45). In 2001 this percentage was 86.1% (SFK, 2001, p. 37); in 2000 it was 85.3%
(SFK, 2000, p. 35).
Jii/r<i, § 4.6.2.
More specifically: Z-index is a subsidiary of the KNMP Holding Ltd. See NMa, Derision nr.
9J2/200I (CZ - Apof/iefcer), pp. 3-4, and the website of Z-index: <http://www.z-index.nl>.
Health Charges Board (College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg). Among the tasks of this gov-
ernment watchdog body are the supervision and registration of all drugs (proprietary, paral-
lel-imported and generic) that have been put into circulation.
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orders allow the purchase costs of drugs to be recovered fully by the pharmacist^
The faxe of Z-index is the only reimbursement list that satisfies the tariff orders of
the CTG.
In the faxe the prices as set by the producers are entered. Only the prices reported by
drug producers and importers are entered in the faxe and not the prices of those
who actually deliver and charge the drugs to pharmacists in the vast majority of
cases: the wholesalers. This of course leads to resale price maintenance. Moreover,
because pharmacists operate on the basis of a 'pharmacy purchase price = phar-
macy retail price' principle, the producer or importer (indirectly) determines the
final retail price of the drug.^ Once a drug has been included in the faxe, the only
room left for the drug producer to compete by means of the price level is by using
the margin between the cost price (i.e. the actual costs of the production of the drug)
and the pharmacy purchase price as fixed in the faxe. This margin is used by pro-
ducers to provide bonuses and discounts to pharmacists in order to persuade them
to provide their drugs instead of those of competitors.-*" Thus, in practice the faxe
price is not the price that is actually paid by the pharmacist to the drug producer or
wholesaler. However, patients and insurers do not derive any benefits from these
practices, because the regulated faxe price is the price that pharmacists charge pa-
tients.
In the Netherlands the pharmaceutical products prescribed by a physician and dis-
pensed through a pharmacy are usually either paid directly or reimbursed (entirely
or for the largest part) via the system of health care insurance.-*^ Hence, it is in the
interest of insurers to keep consumption of pharmaceutical products within a rea-
sonable limit. As far as the reimbursement to pharmacists is concerned the faxe
prices are maximum prices: that is, the health insurers are in principle allowed to
deviate from these prices when reimbursing pharmacists. Nevertheless, although
the insurers are allowed to deviate from the faxe prices, they rarely do this because
of the administrative complexity of diversifying prices. In the current situation they
only have to deal with one price per drug. By the end of the 1990s the government
gave the fight against bonuses and discounts a prominent place in its drug policy.
Since then, pharmacists have been obliged by the government to pass on some of
their rebates by a decrease in the reimbursement prices of drugs that they may
charge.-"* This legally determined deduction of the reimbursement price is called
'claw back.'
282 M D W (1999, p. 67).
283 When drug producers make price decisions they have to take into account the provisions in
the Drug Prices Act and the Drug Reimbursement System. This will be explained below.
2*4 Ministerie van Volksgezondheid , Welzijn en Sport (1999, p. 28).
2*5 See the appendix to chapter 3.
28* Ministerie van Volksgezondheid , Welzijn en Sport (1999, p. 49). The debate concerning bo-
nuses and discounts is still very m u c h alive. In the next section I wil l c o m e back to this.
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I just explained that the pharmaceutical industry's scope for compering on the basis
of price is limited once prices have been set in the taxe, and that drug producers
therefore resort to bonuses and discounts. In principle the industry sets prices tak-
ing into account obvious elements such as the cost of production and the cost of re-
search and development. Assuming that the drug enjoys intellectual property right
protection, the producer will be able to set his price in such a way as to include a
profit to compensate for development costs. However, prices can obviously not be
set at random. On the one hand there may be competition from other pharmaceuti-
cal products with the same or similar effects. On the other hand prices are con-
trolled by government regulation. Government regulation is necessary given that
the (largely publicly financed)^ health care system in the Netherlands covers
pharmaceutical products. To control the public budget it is hence in the interest of
the government to control drug prices. This occurs in various ways. Firstly, the
Drug Pnces Acf of 1996^ grants the Minister of Public Health the right to fix a
maximum price for registered drugs of which the availability has to be guaranteed
to every citizen. This price, which has already been fixed for a great number of
drugs, is determined by the average price level in the neighbouring countries Bel-
gium, Germany, France and Great Britain. It has to be reviewed at least twice a
year.-"'' Secondly, the Drug Rei/Mfrursenienf System (Geneesmiddelenvergoedingssys-
teem), or GVS, the statutory insured drug package introduced in 1991, strongly in-
fluences the price of drugs. Under the GVS, therapeutically mutually interchange-
able drugs are clustered by the Ministry of Public Health. For every cluster the
Ministry defines a reimbursement limit. If the price of a certain drug is higher than
this limit, the price difference must be born by the patients who take the drug in-
stead of by the health insurer. As a result, drug producers do rather not set prices
above the reimbursement limit. On the contrary, many producers fix their prices
exactly at or just below the GVS l imits
4.6.2
What is now the fee a pharmacist receives for his or her services of dispensing
drugs, customer advice and looking after medication surveillance? Regulations in
the Netherlands are as follows: for every dispensed drug on prescription the phar-
macist receives a /?*«/ /«• (receptregelvergoeding), which in 2001 was € 5.65, irre-
spective of the price or the quantity of the drug.^' The fixed fee is updated each
year by the Health Charges Board. Hereby the Health Charges Board looks espe-
cially at developments in the number of dispensed WTG drugs per year. There is
also a substitution measure that makes up part of the pharmacist's fee, albeit a rela-
tively small part compared to the fixed fee. The substitution measure fits in with the
^ This is explained in the appendix to chapter 3.
*"* Wet van 25 januari 19% (Wet Geneesmiddelenprijzen), Stfc. 90,19%.
^ See Article 3 of the Drug Prices Act.
2* 1 already discussed the GVS in the appendix to chapter 3. See § A.3.2.2 and § A.3.3.
2" CTG, Tflrie/f>f!icWWcinx5200-190(W)I-2.
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idea that a prescriber (e.g. a general practitioner or specialist) in principle has to
prescribe under the substance name and not under the brand name. This so-called
incentive /«ensure (stimulansregeling) entails that a pharmacist is allowed to keep
one-third of the price difference between a proprietary drug and an equivalent par-
allel-imported or generic drug.^ The final saving for the insurer is then twice as
high as the incentive revenue of the pharmacist. However, the price differences be-
tween branded and generic drugs are becoming smaller and smaller due to the op-
pressive effect the Drug Prices Act and the Drug Reimbursement System exert on
the price levels The possibilities for parallel-import therefore have also decreased
drastically. Revenue earned by pharmacists through the incentive measure is often
lower than the amount they could earn by accepting rebates for branded drugs, so
the incentive measure loses its appeal relative to the bonuses and discounts offered
by drug producers and wholesalers.** In 1999 it became clear that the government
intended to incorporate the average incentive revenue per prescribed WTG-drug of
0.40 NLG (€ 0.18) in the fixed fee.^s Pharmacists are then more or less obliged to
obtain a minimum amount of substitution. The fixed fee and the incentive measure
came into force on 1 January 1988.^ *
The KNMP claims that the fixed fee has not been adapted sufficiently to the rising
pharmacy practice and staff costs,-''' while in addition the revenues from the incen-
tive measure have decreased as a result of the levelling of prices of pharmaceutical
specialites and generic drugs. The deficits in the pharmacy budget, which according
to many pharmacists have arisen, have been counterbalanced by bonuses and dis-
counts from industry and wholesalers. After all, price competition has already been
made virtually impossible as a result of all the government interference.
For years the government had openly tolerated the bonuses and discounts, until the
Minister of Public Health suddenly brought the issue up again at the end of the
1990s. Dr. E. Borst, at the time Minister of Public Health, was of the opinion that
bonuses and discounts must go to the health care sector, but the politicians in The
Hague disagreed on the way to deal with this problem. And pharmacists claimed
^ CTG, rarie/tesrfiiWcmg 5200-3900-02-1, Article 3.4.
293 See, e.g., P/iarmareufisc/i WeefcWad, De apotheekcijfers van 2001, vol. 137, nr. 17, 2002
(<http://www.sfk.nl>), and P/iarmaceMhsch Weefcb/ad, Waar blijft de Stimulans, vol. 135, nr.
22, 2000, p. 771.
»• Bogin (1999, p. 11).
2* With this a saving of 39 million NLG (€ 17.7 million) was intended. The underlying idea is
that it is an elementary duty of a pharmacist to dispense efficiently and that therefore the in-
comes from the incentive measure should be involved in the calculations of the fixed fee (Mi-
nisterie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, Aa«a>i/zmg sfrmu/ansopfrrengsf in de tarieren
/brmflcenfisrte zorg, 29 June 1999).
2* RVZ (1998, p. 96).
^ The fixed fee was € 4.54 in 1994 and had gradually increased to € 5.08 in 1999 and - under
certain conditions (see § 4.7.1) - to € 6 in 2002. Source: SFK. Pharmaaufisch WeekWaa", Recept-
regelvergoeding 2003, vol. 138, nr. 3,17 January 2003.
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that, if the bonuses and discounts would be taken away from them, they should re-
ceive a higher fixed fee in accordance with the increased costs of practice and staff.
Under pressure of summary proceedings by the KNMP and criticism from the
Health Charges Board, the Minister of Public Health decided to do an investigation
into the practice costs of pharmacists first. After long-lasting negotiations, the Min-
istry of Public Health, the Health Charges Board and the KNMP eventually con-
cluded an agreement on the main lines in October 1999. The bonuses and discounts
would be taken away in phases, while also the adjustment of the practice costs re-
imbursement would be taking place in phases.^" The reason behind this planning in
phases was that a generic approach might have had disproportionate and disas-
trous consequences for individual pharmacists, given that the claw-back^ percent-
age on the purchase fee is an average percentage. The phasing creates room for a
gradual development towards a new situation. In coming to this agreement the
KNMP had to reconcile to a decrease in the income of pharmacists, but the pharma-
cists' association has been able to restrict this decrease somewhat, compared to the
original plans of the Minister of Public Health, that did not take account of a fee for
the increased pharmacy practice costs at all.
In 2001 the claw-back was on average 6.82%. This brought in € 190 mln for the gov-
ernment. However, the bonuses and discounts actually received by pharmacists are
much higher than this amount. Moreover, pharmacists have reacted to the ever in-
creasing claw-back by demanding more bonuses and discounts from wholesalers
and the pharmaceutical industry. The estimations of the total amount of bonuses
and discounts received by pharmacists vary quite a lot: for the year 2001 the Boston
Consulting Group calculated the bonuses and discounts at € 520 mln, while Deloitte
and Touche came to an even higher (maximum) amount of € 644 mln.**' These esti-
mations include the legally obliged claw-back of € 190 mln. Per pharmacy this
would imply (on average) € 300.000 per year.™' By the end of 2002, the acting Minis-
ter of Public Health, Mr. De Geus, submitted a proposal to bring in an additional
€ 280 mln in 2003 (that is, on top of the € 190 mln mentioned above) via another in-
crease in the claw-back.*'* The cabinet, pursuing to curtail the expenditure on health
care and in particular the costs of medicines, accepted this proposal in November
2002. Naturally, the pharmacists were furious over these plans, while the SFK pre-
dicted that, if these plans were to be enforced, many pharmacies will run into seri-
ous financial problems and many pharmacists and pharmacists' assistants will lose
MimsterrV IWI Vo/ksgezom//iei(i, IVf/zi/ri <*»i Sport/KNMP, Minister en apothekers sluiten ak-
koord, press report Ministry of Public Health, 8 October 1999.
The legally determined deduction of the reimbursement price of a drug to pharmacists; see
§4.6.1.
Mmisferie IVIII Vo/Jtegpzofiri/ieii/, We/zi/n en Sporf, Conclusies rond bonussen bevesigd, press
report Ministry of Public Health, 17 December 2002.
De Volfcsfcn»!/, De Geus dreigt apothekers met inzet van ECD, 10 January 2003.
To be precise, the proposal is to increase the claw-back to 9% for pharmaceutical specialites
and to 40% for generic medicines.
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their jobs. The pharmacists' association KNMP and the wholesaler OPG started le-
gal proceedings against these plans and succeeded: the judge suspended the gov-
ernment plans. Obviously the debate concerning bonuses and discounts is still very
relevant.™
To the preceding discussion must be added, for the sake of completeness, that
pharmacists also receive revenues from the sale of non-WTG drugs and medical
devices (such products may be sold by chemists as well). The average profit margin
on these products lies between 20 and 30%.^ Just like the faxe for WTG drugs, the
retail and purchase prices of these products are included in a list that is issued
monthly by Z-index. Contrary to the case of WTG drugs there is some price compe-
tition between pharmacies in this field. However, since the sale of WTG drugs
makes up (by far) the largest part of the turnover in pharmacies, it concerns rela-
tively small amounts of money.-"^ Moreover, in calculating the fixed fee the Health
Charges Board takes the average revenues pharmacists obtain from trade activities,
other than the sale of WTG drugs, into account as well.
4.6.3
The price of drugs is regulated by the government via the Drug Prices Act and the
Drug Reimbursement system. The prices of WTG drugs are laid down in a price list
called the faxe. The reimbursement for the pharmacist consists of three components:
the purchase fee (the refund paid by insurers to pharmacists based on the faxe
prices), the fixed fee and the incentive measure (both determined by the govern-
ment via the Health Care Charges Act).
Looking at these regulations, the conclusion from this section can be kept short. It
appears that the possibilities for pharmacists to compete do not lie in their price
policies. Quite to the contrary, the government regulates the whole market, with the
exception of the relatively much lower revenues of pharmacists from other trade
activities than the sale of WTG drugs.
303 -j-jyg paragraph is based on a number of short articles: Elsmer, Pijn in portemonnee, 7 De-
cember 2002; Hf f Fmanrife/e DngWfld, Aanpak bonus apothekers verrraagd, 20 December 2002;
De Vo/fokranf, Apothekers: 2050 banen weg door afromen bonussen, 2 January 2003; De
Vo/fcskranf, De Geus dreigt apothekers met inzet van ECD, 10 January 2003; P/iormacew/isdi
Wee/cWtfd, 2000 banen op de tocht, vol. 138, nr. 1, 2003; OPG Groep N. V., Preliminary relief
judge grants OPG's request for suspension of clawback, press release OPG, 29 April 2003;
DflgMud De Limfmrger, Apotheker voorziet zware tijden, 30 April 2003; Hef Financrrefe Dugfc/ad,
Rechter stopt extra afromen van apothekers, 30 April 2003.
** Tinke (1998, p. 41).
^* Split up per product category, 83% of the turnover of an average pharmacy in 2001 was de-
termined by WTG drugs, against 12% by non-WTG drugs and OTC and 5% by medical de-
vices. See SFK (2002, p. 54).
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4.7 Recent developments
Since the end of the 1990s, the regulation of the Dutch pharmaceutical market has
been subject to many changes, both in the law and in the self-regulation. In this sec-
tion I will have a closer look at these recent changes. Naturally, the introduction of
the new Dutch Competition Act in 1998 and the strict enforcement of this act by the
Dutch competition authority (NMa) has had a huge impact on the regulatory
framework of the pharmaceutical market, especially where it concerns self-
regulation. Therefore I will also summarise the most important decisions of the
NMa in recent cases relating to pharmacists. The effects of these changes in the
regulatory framework - if any - will not be discussed here. As far as the changes in
the law and in the self-regulation have already had an impact on e.g. the number of
pharmacies, tariffs, prices and other indicators, this will be discussed in chapter 7.
4.7.1 Measures fafcen
As already described in § 4.3.1, the Ministry of Public Health took a number of
measures in the late 1990s with the objective of intensifying competition between
pharmacists in the market for extramural drug provision. Firstly, the professional
monopoly of pharmacists was restricted to some extent in 1999 by the removal of
Article 15 from the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree. This enabled pharmacists to be
employed by non-pharmacists. The British chemistry chain Boots Health and
Beauty immediately tried to make use of this change in the regulation. The Boots
case will be analysed in more detail in chapter 7. Secondly, for health insurance
funds (the public health insurers)**" the ban on running pharmacies themselves has
been lifted as from 1 January 1999, by granting them a general exemption from Arti-
cle 42.5 of the Health Insurance Act. Of course, this exemption applies only under
the condition that a qualified pharmacist is working behind the counter. The third
amendment was adopted in the year 2000, although an earlier proposal had already
been made in 1998. A provision that prohibited hospital pharmacies to dispense
drugs outside of the hospital was repealed on 1 April 2000. This provision was for-
merly part of Article 13 of the Drug Supply Act. The aim of this amendment was to
enable hospital pharmacies to compete with public pharmacies by giving hospital
pharmacies the possibility of also supplying patients who have not been hospital-
ised with medicines, through polyclinic pharmacies in or near the hospital. Con-
sumers are then given greater freedom of choice in obtaining medicines, whereas
public pharmacies are encouraged to improve their efficiency and quality.
Furthermore, from a proposed amendment of the law, which was sent to the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament in July 2002, it becomes clear that (a) the Dutch
government is planning to repeal Article 19 of the Drug Supply Act and (b) that it
intends to include pharmacists in the WGBO (Wet op de Geneeskundige Behan-
306 The organisation of health insurance in the Netherlands is discussed in chapter 3.
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delingsovereenkomst): the Medic*?/ Tr«ifmenf Confrncfs Acf.*'' The former implies
that pharmacists would be allowed to practice pharmacy in more than one phar-
macy. This would provide opportunities for health insurers to become more proac-
tive in the provision of pharmaceutical care.™ The latter implies that the new tasks
of pharmacists, as providers of pharmaceutical services (instead of them being con-
sidered as mere sellers of medicines), would be recognised by law.-*"
These new tasks of pharmacists were also emphasised in another way in 2002. In
that year the fixed fee was increased from € 5.65 (see § 4.6.2) to € 6 by the Health
Charges Board, but for the first time a condition was attached to this: the full
amount of € 6 would only be reimbursed if pharmacists had drawn up a plan with
respect to the innovation of pharmaceutical care within their pharmacy in the year
2002.™ Pharmacists who did not participate would be cut down by € 0.18. This
condition, formulated by the Health Charges Board in accordance with ZN (the na-
tional association of health insurers) and the pharmacists' association KNMP, was
another signal of a slowly changing pharmaceutical market. In this respect it is of
course important that the performance of pharmacies in the field of pharmaceutical
care can be measured somehow. In 2002 more and more pharmacies in the Nether-
lands started to make use of so-called 'care records' to register their activities. WI-
NAp, the Scientific Institute of Dutch Pharmacists (affiliated with the KNMP), has
appointed a number of activities for registration in a 'care record', such as distribut-
ing drug passports, samples of incontinence products and needle containers, giving
inhaler instructions to customers, consulting with physicians by telephone, etc.-"'
4.7.2 77ie impact o/ ffie Com/)eftfc'on Act on t/ie p/ianwacenf ic«/ marfcef
Since the introduction of the Dutch Competition Act in 1998, many requests for ex-
emption from the cartel prohibition have reached the Dutch Competition Authority
(hereafter NMa), as regards individual agreements between health insurers and
pharmacists. In principle such agreements fall under the cartel prohibition because
they are matters of market division. In reaction to the many requests for exemption
by the health insurers, the director-general of the NMa publicly replied (as early as
September 1999) that the NMa is of the opinion that health insurers generally try to
settle too many issues through informal consultations with physicians, pharmacists
•^ TK 2003 -2002, 28 494, nr. 2.
308 jK 2001-2002, 28 494, nr. 3, p. 1. The new role for health insurers as 'directors' in the provi-
sion of pharmaceutical care is the core of many proposals for reform of the Dutch health care
system. See e.g. MDW (1999), Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (1999), Bos-
ton Consulting Group (1999), TK 2000-2001, 24 124 en 24 036, nr. I l l , and TK 2002-2002, 24
124 en 28 008, nr. 112.
3"* For a discussion of these 'new tasks' of pharmacists: supra, § 3.2. For more information on the
WGBO in relation to pharmacists, see Ten Hoopen (2001, Ch. 5).
3io cTG^ Tarie/fcsc/iiJUttiig 52OO-39OO-O2-O2.
3» P/iarmaceMhsdi Weetö/arf, Meetbare zorg, vol. 137, nr. 25,2002
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and hospitals, instead of letting competition prevail on the health care market. The
director-general referred not only to contracts dealing with market division, but also
to agreements on tariffs. He warned the parties involved that the NMa was about to
do a targeted research of the individual and collective agreements in this sector.^
In 2001, the NMa took a decision on the policy with regard to the establishment of
practices and collective negotiations by the Dutch association of general practitio-
ners, the LHV.'" The NMa decided that agreements with regard to collective nego-
tiations, e.g. in relation to tariffs and agreements on the division of the market,
contravened the Competition Act. Naturally, this decision has had a strong influ-
ence on the self-regulation in other liberal professions (among them pharmacists),
by making explicit that agreements regarding tariffs and market division are pro-
hibited."«
Also in 2001 a decision was taken regarding collective standard agreements be-
tween a health insurance fund (CZ) and the regional representatives of pharmacists
established in the respective region.-"* This standard contract contained agreements
on tariffs and agreements with regard to the setting up and distribution of practices,
which were not allowed following the line of reasoning of the LHV case described
above. Only agreements on quality and administrative procedures are allowed by
the NMa. CZ now pursues a unilateral establishment policy and a unilateral tariff
policy, which is not prohibited by the Competition Act. Obviously the bargaining
power is shifting more and more from the pharmacists to the health insurers.
I noted in § 4.7.1 that in 2001 a provision prohibiting hospital pharmacies to dis-
pense drugs outside of the hospital was repealed from the Drug Supply Act. In the
AsfrnZeiieaj case, the NMa supported the legislator's aim of enabling hospitals to
compete with pharmacies (thereby encouraging pharmacies to improve their effi-
ciency and quality and giving consumers greater freedom of choice).'"' AstraZeneca
is a company active in the research and development, the production, and the mar-
keting of pharmaceutical products. The company gave very large discounts to hos-
pitals purchasing its medicines, on the condition that these hospitals only use the
medicines in the intramural market (i.e. for patients admitted to the hospital). By
imposing a prohibition on the resale to public pharmacies or individual patients,
"* DP Vn/lcsfcrimf, NMa roept verzekeraars in de zorg tot de orde, 28 September 1999.
313 NMa, Derision nr. 537/2003 (Lande/i/lce Huisarfsen Verenigi'ng,).
•"* The fact that professional bodies are subject to the supervision of the NMa had already been
determined before. In August 1998 the NMa decided that the KNMvD, the association for
veterinary surgeons, is an entrepreneurial association falling under the Dutch Competition
Act (Derision »ir. 397/399S, pp. 9-10). The exemption applied for by the KNMvD, with respect
to its professional code and rules of conduct, was not granted by the NMa for parts of the
rules of conduct.
-•"* NMa, Decision nr. 912/2001 (CZ - Apof/iefcer).
"* NMa, Decision nr. 19942002 (AstraZeneca).
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AstraZeneca was able to keep up an artificial price difference between the intramu-
ral and the extramural drug market. The NMa made clear in its decision that such
contract provisions are not only contrary to the legislator's aim of creating more
competition in the pharmaceutical market but also contrary to the Competition Act.
On the basis of its decisions in a number of health care cases,-"" among which those
described above, a consultation document was published by the NMa in 2002.™
This document, the so-called Guitfc/mes /or t/ie Hen/A// Core Sector (Richtsnoeren voor
de Gezondheidszorg) provides clarity on what is and what is not permitted in ac-
cordance with the Competition Act. The traditional method of (mostly collective)
contracting between health care providers and health insurers is in conflict with the
cartel prohibition of the Competition Act, while it is also in conflict with the legisla-
tor's aim of changing from a supply-driven to a demand-driven system of health
care. After all, collective contracting between representatives of health care provid-
ers and health insurers prevents individual health care providers from differentiat-
ing their services in relation to each other. Only collective agreements that are
limited to the actual advancement of the quality of care or to administrative proce-
dures are allowed.^
4.8 Summary
The regulation of pharmacists in the Netherlands consists of public regulation (no-
tably, the Drug Supply Act, the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree, the Professions Act
and various provisions regarding drug prices and fees) and self-regulation enacted
by the Dutch pharmacists' association KNMP. Currently the self-regulation com-
prises the new Dutch Pharmacy Standards of 2002, the Professional Code and the
Professional Statute. Furthermore, there is a KNMP advisory establishment policy,
but in practice this document has become a dead letter. Most pharmacists are mem-
ber of the KNMP, so the range of the remaining self-regulation is wide.
There are no extraordinary restrictions with respect to the education (training) of
pharmacists. The entry into the profession is regulated by a double registration sys-
tem. A pharmacist with the proper diploma has to enrol in the register of the Health
Inspectorate and in the title register of the Professions Act. The compounding and
dispensing of drugs are protected. Only pharmacists - and under specific conditions
dispensing physicians - are allowed to dispense prescription drugs. Hence, phar-
Notably: NMa, Decision »r. 53^/2001 (Iamfe/i/fa? HMi'sarfsen Vereniging,), NMa, Decision nr.
2452/2001 (THediiven Groep B.V. en TPP Participates Rotterdam ß.V/Coriopfwrma C.V.), NMa,
Decision nr. 912/2003 (CZ - ApoWiefcer;, NMa, Decision nr. 1915/2001 (Zi/wren Kruis - Genees-
middeferi/örmii/arium Kennemer/and), and NMa, Decision nr. 1994^2002 fAsfraZeneca,).
NMa (2002b).
NMa, (2002a, p. 32). However, small groups or joint ventures of health care providers, such
as general practitioners and pharmacists, are allowed to enter into joint negotiations with
health insurers, but subject to certain conditions. See NMa (2002b).
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macists have a professional monopoly in the extramural supply of these drugs. For
every dispensed prescription drug pharmacists receive a fixed fee: the so-called re-
cepfrege/uergoediMg. Until the end of the 1990s community pharmacists were also
protected from competition by health insurers, hospital pharmacies and chains of
wholesalers and chemists. However, a number of restrictions to competition, e.g. a
prohibition on employment of pharmacists by non-pharmacists, have been lifted by
the Dutch government. OTC drugs may in the Netherlands also be sold by licensed
chemists (druggists).
The establishment of pharmacies has long been regulated by the KNMP: between
1975 and 1987 in the form of a private establishment policy and from 1987 onwards
in the form of an advisory establishment policy. According to the advisory estab-
lishment policy a pharmacy must have a minimum number of prescriptions (for-
merly a minimum number of patients) in order to be 'financially sound'. Although,
from a strictly legal perspective, the KNMP has never been able to prevent non-
members from establishing themselves, in practice the establishment rules have al-
ways had a strong influence on the Dutch market. Naturally, KNMP members were
bound by these rules. Just as important, however, is the fact that the contracts with
health insurers, which are a necessary condition for surviving in the Dutch phar-
macy market, were based on the KNMP advisory policy. Even though collective
negotiations have explicitly been prohibited by the Dutch Competition Authority
NMa, many contracts nowadays still contain provisions that are based on similar
provisions regarding the financial feasibility of a pharmacy.
Next to the establishment of pharmacies, the self-regulation of the KNMP has until
recently also restricted the advertising for pharmacies and the competition between
pharmacists. The provisions concerned ceased to exist in 2001, when the KNMP
rules of conduct were withdrawn. Hence, on paper there are no more restrictions to
advertising. In addition, three provisions of the Dutch Pharmacy Standards, which
contained strict requirements regarding the design and accessibility of a pharmacy,
have been changed. These changes in the self-regulation can to a large extent be at-
tributed to the intervention in the pharmaceutical market by the NMa, on the basis
of the Competition Act of 1998.
There are almost no possibilities for pharmacists to compete by price in the Nether-
lands. Drug prices are regulated by the government: both the Drug Prices Act and
the Drug Reimbursement System have a large influence on the drug price. The
prices are laid down in a price list, the so-called toe. As a result the only price com-
petition that takes place in the drug market is competition in the form of bonuses
and discounts from the pharmaceutical industry and wholesalers to pharmacists.
The government wants these bonuses and discounts to flow back to the health care
sector and introduced the 'claw back' system in the 1990s. That is, the refund paid
by health insurers to pharmacists for a dispensed drug, which is based on the fnxe
prices, is not the full price: a percentage (the 'claw back') is deducted from the
price. The debate concerning bonuses and discounts is still very relevant.
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After the discussion of the regulatory framework with respect to pharmacists in the
Netherlands, I now turn to Belgium. The structure of this chapter is similar to that
of chapter 4. That is, § 5.1 discusses the most important professional associations in
Belgium, being the Order of Pharmacists and the Belgian Pharmacists Association
(APB). Subsequently, § 5.2 deals with regulation of the education of pharmacists
and § 5.3 deals with registration and the professional monopoly of the pharmacist.
In § 5.4 I consider regulation of establishment. In addition to a Royal Decree that
looks after the establishment of pharmacies, a Royal Decree exists that regulates the
takeover price. The topic of section 5 is the exercise of the profession: I examine,
successively, the advertising for drugs, the advertising for pharmacies and the de-
sign of the pharmacy. The price of drugs and the reimbursement for the pharmacist,
which are determined by law, are central in § 5.6.1 and § 5.6.2 respectively. Finally,
some recent developments in the Belgian regulation of pharmacists are presented in
§5.7.
5.1 Professional code and rules of conduct
In Belgium pharmacists are organised in the Order of Pharmacists (Orde der Apo-
thekers), which was called into being by an Act from 1949. This Act was replaced in
1967 by the Rot/«/ Decree MO 50 co/icern/>ig f/ie Orrfer o/ P/wmiflrists (Koninklijk Besluit
nr. 80 van 10 november 1967 betreffende de Orde der Apothekers), which since then
has contained the most important provisions related to this Order.™ Three years
later a Royal Decree was formulated that specifies the organisation and the func-
tioning of the boards of the order.'-' Next to the national board of the Order of
Pharmacists there are ten provincial boards, as well as a Dutch-speaking and a
320
321
B.S. 34-17-1967. Since this is a numbered Royal Decree, it can also change a law. A numbered
Royal Decree works like a formal act.
Koninklijk Besluit van 29 mei 1970 tot regeling van de organisatie en de werking der raden
van de Orde der apothekers, B.S. 4-7-1970.
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French-speaking Board of Appeal. In a case from 1993 the tasks and competences of
the Order were described as follows:
'the Order of Physicians and the Order of Pharmacists are public institutions that have
been founded by law and who have competences, which are enforced under the
supervision imposed by that law. They have as their duty to watch over the respect of
the ethical rules, as well as the compliance with the honour, the discretion, the decency
and the dignity of the Order members. They group in a compulsory way all those that
practice the profession of physician or pharmacist'.'-
The so-called professional deontology, issued by the Order of Pharmacists, provides
the ethical rules about the practice of the pharmacist's profession. Formally, these
professional rules have no legal binding force, no more than the professional code
and rules of conduct issued by the KNMP in the Netherlands. The King of Belgium
does have the possibility to grant binding force to these rules, but until now this has
never happened. The professional deontology was formulated some decades ago by
the national board of the Order and has barely changed in the course of time. In
spite of the clear need for an update or revision of some rules, so far no concrete
steps have been taken for this.'-'' The national board of the Order of Pharmacists can
also give rtrfz'ice about matters that are of interest to pharmacists. Again, this kind of
advice has no legally binding force and therefore cannot contain obligations. Should
such an advice still carry obligations or prohibitions, than it may be subjected to an
annulment by the Council of State (Raad van State).™ The most important duties of
the provincial boards are approving, postponing or refusing entries into the register
of pharmacists (which is kept up to date on the provincial level)/^ watching over
the compliance with the deontological rules in the province and taking disciplinary
measures. The provincial boards in Belgium can be compared with the administra-
tion of the disciplinary rules in the Netherlands, because the provincial boards also
have the authority to impose - rather heavy - punishments. Both (fellow) pharma-
cists and patients can file complaints with the Order of Pharmacists. Complaints are
dealt with on the provincial level. Possible sanctions that can be imposed by the
provincial boards of the Order are the following: warning, censure, reprimand, the
suspension of professional practice for at most two years and elimination from the
register of the Order. 32»
Arbitragehof nr. 68/93, 29 September, 1993, B.S. 2S-30-7993, 23.557.
The first deontological rule goes all the way back to 1951, the most recent one is the tenth
deontological rule issued in 1992. However, in a newsletter dated 4-5-2002 the Order of Phar-
macists announced that it is currently reworking the deontological rules: see <http://www.
ordederapothekers.be>.
Balthazar (1994, p. 114).
if the entry into this register is refused or postponed, the reasons for this must be clearly
stated, according to Article 6 of the Royal Decree no 80 concerning the Order of Pharmacists.
Royal Decree no 80 concerning the Order of Pharmacists, Article 16.
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Next to the Order of Pharmacists there is another federation that groups all phar-
macists on a national level: the Belgian Pharmacists Association (Algemene Phar-
maceutische Bond), hereafter APB. The APB asserts the interests of all pharmacists
and is the interlocutor of all official bodies on both the international, national and
regional level. The APB offers pharmacists and the pharmaceutical sector many ser-
vices, such as a drugs data base and a Documentation office, and publishes several
magazines. Because the APB is the national federation of all acknowledged pharma-
cists' associations in Belgium it has been empowered since 22 December 1975 to use
the title 'Royal Association' (Koninklijke Maatschappij).^'
In the following sections the effects of the Belgian self-regulation and public regula-
tion on the functioning of the market for pharmaceutical services will be described.
Similar to the survey of the Dutch restrictions on competition in the previous chap-
ter, this will be done for every category - and simultaneously with the legal provi-
sions.
5.2 Education
Regarding the education there are no notable rules restrictive of competition on the
market for pharmacists in Belgium. However, like in the Netherlands, the sfrivcfure
of the pharmaceutical study is regulated. Students first have to obtain a certificate of
'candidate in the pharmaceutical studies', which takes (at least) 2 years. Then, in
order to obtain the title 'pharmacist', another 3 years of education are needed. No
additional practical experience is required.^ There has never been a numerus
clausus for the admission to the study. Nevertheless, the number of final-year stu-
dents remained roughly constant from the end of the 1980s until the mid-1990s: be-
tween 400 and 450."" A reason for this could be that the career opportunities after
graduation are limited by the strict establishment rules and the high takeover prices
in the case of a pharmacy transfer (to be discussed in § 5.4). However, since no re-
duction in the number of students could be detected at the time; it seemed mainly to
be a matter of a natural stabilisation in the supply of pharmacy students. After all,
there are also career opportunities outside of the community pharmacy for the
graduated, e.g. in the industry. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s the number of stu-
dents decreased again: in 2000 the number of new students was only 250.™ Of the
recently graduated pharmacists three out of four are females. Already since 1988
there have been more female than male qualified pharmacists in Belgium.
APB Statuten, 1994, Articles 1-2.
Furthermore, there is also an EC Directive that regulates the pharmaceutical education: see
Hombroeckx (2000, p. 181) and supra, note 240.
BIGE (1999, p. 60).
De Morgen, Dreigend tekort aan apothekers door te weinig Studenten, 1 September 2000.
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5.3 Registration and title protection
5.3.2 77ie pro/essionaZ monopo/i/ o/ f/ie pharmacist
The protection of the professional monopoly of community pharmacists (officina-
apothekers) is laid down in the Roy/ Decree ;io 7£/ro/n 2967 concerning f/ie pracfice o/
</«; /lea/f/i cflre pro/essioHS."' Article 4 § 1 of this decree holds the following:
'No one is allowed to practice pharmacy who does not have the legal pharmacist's
diploma, obtained according to the legislation on the assignation of academic degrees
and the programme of the university exams, unless that person is exempted from this
by law'.'«
Dispensing drugs, even if this happens free of charge, is not allowed if this is done
'on a common basis' by someone who does not meet this criterion. It is also prohib-
ited for non-qualified persons to prepare drugs, to offer drugs for sale, or to sell
them in the retail trade. The operations reserved for pharmacists are thus listed in-
directly here.™ According to Article 4 § 2, under specified conditions physicians,
dentists and veterinary surgeons have a limited competence to dispense drugs too.
It follows that in Belgium - contrary to the Netherlands - it is not allowed for retail-
ers such as chemists (druggists) to sell OTC drugs.™ The provisions regarding
manufacturers and industry pharmacists can be found elsewhere, namely in the
" ' Koninklijk Besluit nr. 78 van 10 november 1967 betreffende de uitoefening van de gezond-
heidszorgberoepen, B. S. 14-12-1967. Formerly - until 1 September 2001 - called Royal Decree
concerning the practice of medicine, nursing, the paramedical professions and the medical
committees (Koninklijk Besluit betreffende de uitoefening van de geneeskunst, de verpleeg-
kunde, de paramedische beroepen en de geneeskundige commissies). The title has been
changed by Article 27 of the Wet van 10 augustus 2001 houdende maatregelen inzake ge-
zondheidszorg, B.S. 1-9-2001.
332 'Niemand mag de artsenijbereidkunde uitoefenen die niet het wettelijk diploma van apothe-
ker bezit, dat werd behaald overeenkomstig de wetgeving op het toekennen van de academi-
sche graden en het programma van de universitäre examens, of die niet wettelijk ervan
vrijgesteld is'.
"3 The penalty for the practice of a reserved operation is an eight day's to six month's impris-
onment and/ or a fine of between 500 BEF and 5000 BEF. See Royal Decree no 78, Article 38
§ 1. These fines will be raised by a multiplier (the so-called opiteriemen) to correct for currency
depreciation. Currently the multiplier is 200. The disappearance of the Belgian Franc as of 1
January 2002 has led to an adaptation of all the existing fines to the euro. This has been regu-
lated in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Act of 26 June 2000 concerning the introduction of the euro
(B.S. 29-7-2000). As a result of Article 2 of this Act, all existing fines in the acts are now con-
sidered to be euros. Thus a fine of 500 BEF has to be multiplied with 200 and divided by
40.3399 = € 2,478.94. See on this rather complicated system Amo ( 2001-2002, pp. 996-999) and
the reaction by Wailliez (2001-2002, p. 1514).
33« See also 1HS (2003, pp. 76,80).
102
Chapter 5
Roy«/ Decree coMceniing f/ie manu/ncfur?, /nrge saWe rf/sfrifwriori n»irf de/ii>ery 0/ drugs
from I960.*«
In Belgium, for the dispensing of registered drugs a doctor's prescription is required,
like in the Netherlands.™ However, substitution of branded drugs by generic
drugs, like this takes place in the Netherlands is not allowed for pharmacists in Bel-
gium (see § 5.6.1 and supra, § 3.2.1).
5.3.2
A pharmacist who has obtained a diploma is not immediately permitted to practice
pharmacy. He first has to have his title formally approved by the Medical Commis-
sion (Geneeskundige Commissie)"' of the province where he is planning to estab-
lish himself and he has to register with the Order of Pharmacists. The visa is a
procedure that gives the Medical Commission the possibility to prohibit individu-
als, who are no longer physically or mentally capable, to exercise their profession.™
Article 7 § 1 of the Royal Decree no 78 holds that the pharmacist has to pay a certain
amount - determined by the King - to the provincial Medical Committee for having
received the approval (visa). The registration with the Order has been specified in
Article 2 of the Royal Decree no 80 concerning the Order of Pharmacists, which
states that pharmacists must be enrolled in that register in order to be allowed to
practice pharmacy in Belgium. There is a similar register for physicians, on the basis
of the Roy/ Decree no 79 concerning f/ie Order 0/ FVii/sicinns. It is not allowed to prac-
tice medicine and pharmacy at the same time, not even for holders of both diplo-
mas. Exceptions have been made for dispensing physicians. The criterion is
comparable to the Dutch one: in a region, a dispensing physician can only establish
himself if the geographical distribution of pharmacies makes it impossible to meet
the requirements of public health. Moreover, physicians who are allowed to dis-
pense drugs are not allowed to have a public (community) pharmacy. If a pharmacy
is to be established in a region with a dispensing physician, the physician in ques-
tion has a two year term to do away with his drug depot. Account is taken of possi-
ble mitigating circumstances.*" However, in practice these rules are not relevant
anymore; there are almost no dispensing physicians left in Belgium because of the
great number of community pharmacies.
•^ Koninklijk Besluit van 6 juni 1960 betreffende de fabricage, de distnbuhe in het groot en de
terhandstelling van geneesmiddelen, B.S. 22-6-1960.
336 D^g Act (Wet van 25 maart 1964 op de geneesmiddelen), B.S. 17-4-7964, Article 6 § 1.
^ A Medical Commission consists of a chairman and a vice-chairman, who are proposed by the
national board of the Order of Physicians and appointed by the King; and in addition two
members for every medical profession, plus one member for every paramedical profession (if
recognised by the King).
»" Hombroeckx (2000, p. 182).
339 vvet van 12 april 1958 betreffende de medisch-pharmaceutische cumulatie, B.S. 20-6-1958,
Articles 1-4 and 9bis.
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5.3.3 Summan/ ? Ü .^s i-, ,.
One can conclude that in Belgium the professional monopoly of the pharmacist is
protected by legislation. The practice of pharmacy is subject to a double registration
procedure and the tasks of a pharmacist are clearly, be it indirectly/ enumerated.
The King, viz. the government, has a large say in the practice of the pharmacists'
profession.
5.4 Establishment of pharmacies
The rules for the establishment of pharmacies are formally prescribed in Belgium.
Already in 1967 the basis of these rules was formulated in the Royal Decree no 78.
Article 4 § 3 of this decree states:
'For opening, transferring or merging of community pharmacies a prior permit is
required, granted to one natural or one legal person making the application. (...) The
King determines [...] the criteria intended to organise a distribution of the
pharmacies'.™
These criteria have been worked out in two important decrees: the Royn/ Decree o/
25-9-2974 concerning f/ie opening, trans/er nnrf merger o/p/wrmflries open to the puWi'c,*"
and the Roi/fl/ Decree o/ 23-4-2977 seff/i'ng f/ie rw/es f/wf permit to jftx fne iw/ue o/fhe
frnns/er o//'/mr/nnci'es nnd to supervise Mis frans/er.-^
5.4.1 Sn/;erz>isioM o i w fJie estab/j'sfiwiCTtf o/pharmacies
The Belgian establishment law can be characterised as an administrative-legal sys-
tem of permissions supported by a system of criminal injunction and sanctions.**'
Permissions are given by the Minister of Public Health and advice is given by an
establishment committee. Such a permission is personal and is granted to one natu-
ral or one legal person.*" The objective of the establishment policy is stimulating
public health by 'restricting t/ie /iio/iher o/p/inr/nncies to rt m(7xi/ni/;n/or ei'ery nii/nicip«/-
iry' in order to realise a good distribution of pharmacies, according to Article 1 § 1 of
the Royal Decree of 1974. The establishment of new pharmacies is made very diffi-
MO 'Voor de opening, de overbrenging of de fusie van voor het publiek opengestelde apotheken
is een voorafgaande vergunning vereist, toegestaan aan een natuurlijk of een rechtspersoon
die de aanvraag doet. [...] De Körting bepaalt [...] de criteria die erop zijn gericht een sprea-
ding van de apotheken te organiseren'.
**' Koninklijk Besluit van 25 September 1974 betreffende de opening, de overbrenging en de
fusie van voor het publiek opengestelde apotheken, B.S. 5-20-3974.
•^ Koninklijk besluit van 13 april 1977 tot vaststelling van de regeis die toelaten de waarde van
de overdracht der apotheken vast te stellen en toezicht uit te oefenen op deze overdracht, B.S.
28-5-1977.
•^ Nys (1981-1982, p. 2576).
*" See also Hombroeckx (2000, p. 186).
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cult by the strict criteria that are employed. The maximum number of pharmacies in
every municipality depends on the population figure of the municipality concerned
(Article 1 § 2). Depending on whether the population of the municipality is at least
30,000, between 7,500 and 30,000, or less than 7,500, the number of pharmacies may
not be higher than the quotient that is the result from the number of inhabitants di-
vided by 3,000, 2,500 and 2,000 respectively. Next to that, § 3 contains a series of
distance criteria, which allow a deviation from the population criteria. That is, the
establishment of a pharmacy will also be permitted if the pharmacy that lies closest
to the planned pharmacy is located 1, 3 or 5 kilometres away and covers the needs
of 2,500, 2,000 and 1,500 inhabitants respectively. In practice, the criterion 5 kilome-
tres - 1,500 inhabitants is no longer relevant.^
The pharmacy density in Belgium is very high compared to that of other European
countries - and certainly compared to the Netherlands. The operational and trans-
portation costs of the distribution of drugs are high too, because there is a large
network of pharmacies and wholesalers, and often deliveries are made several times
a day to the same pharmacy. Belgium thus opts for quick and small-scaled deliver-
ies and an individual approach to patients, but it has to pay a price for that in the
form of higher costs.***
The Belgian government feared that the 'oversupply' of pharmacies would lead to
too much competition and less service to patients. That is why in 1994 the govern-
ment supplemented the establishment rules from the Royal Decree of 1974 with a
moratorium.^" For a period of five years, lasting until 8 December 1999, it was not
allowed to open new pharmacies; only a better distribution of pharmacies in certain
areas was still permitted. This moratorium was renewed in 1999 for a period of as
much as ten years. At the same time a registration procedure for all existing phar-
macies was adopted, in order to supervise the moratorium more effectively.'**
5.4.2 Si/perpt'sioM oz>er ffie takeover price o//;Jiarmacies
The Royal Decree of 13-4-1977 imposes restraints on the takeover price of a phar-
macy. The implementation of this decree is in the hands of the Minister of Public
Health. Article 1 § 1 dictates that the value of the transfer of a community pharmacy
may not be higher than the sum of three elements:
'1° the furniture and the equipment, estimated by a registered expert; 2° the stock of
products belonging to the pharmacist's profession, estimated by a registered expert; 3°
Demeester (1990, p. 118).
A«fti>erps Farmaceutisc/i Ti/ifec/iri/r, 12,1998, pp. 26-27.
B.S 18-30-1994.
Koninklijk Besluit van 8 december 1999 tot wijziging van het KB van 25 September 1974, B.S.
14-12-1999.
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150 pc of the average of the gross profits which have been gained in the course of at
most the five taxable periods preceding that of the transfer'.
Yet the limits of the takeover prices are quite easy to circumvent because the price
of the building is free. After all, in the Royal Decree of 13-4-1977 no account has
been taken of the price of real estate. Just like in the Netherlands very high amounts
have to be paid sometimes in order to be able to take over a pharmacy in Belgium,
despite the regulated takeover prices.*" Due to the high prices that have to be paid
many pharmacies to be taken over are now bought by commercial chains or private
individuals who are not pharmacists.^ I will deal with the issue of takeover prices
more extensively in chapter 7.
5.4.3 Summary
Concluding, the same problem exists in Belgium as in the Netherlands, namely that
it is extremely difficult for beginning pharmacists to capture a place in the market.
This is not only a result of high takeover prices, but also of the tightening of the es-
tablishment act in the form of the moratorium that has been included into the Royal
decree of 25-9-1974.
5.5 Exercise of the profession
5.5.1 ,Aa*z;erfr'siMg/or drwgs
Advertising for drugs in Belgium is restricted by law, as it is in the Netherlands.^'
Article 9 of the Drw# Arf (Wet op de Geneesmiddelen) of 1964^- states that every
advertising concerning a drug that is not registered or on which a suspension or a
ban is placed, is prohibited. Moreover, the same article prohibits all kinds of adver-
tising intended for the public if it concerns drugs that may only be dispensed on
submission of a medical prescription. The Drug Act deals with bonuses and dis-
counts as well. Article 10 holds the following:
'When providing drugs, it is prohibited to offer - directly or indirectly - premiums or
advantages. It is prohibited for the producers, importers and wholesalers of drugs to
offer or grant directly or indirectly premiums or advantages to persons authorised to
prescribe drugs. It is prohibited to require or accept premiums or advantages'^
•*** Hef NieuicsWad, Apothekers willen minder apotheken, 4 November 1998.
3* Aiirnvrps Farm<nrnhsr/i Ti/ifec/in/r, 4,1999, p. 17.
-^' In fact the advertising for prescription drugs was restricted in some way in all the 15 EU
Member States in 2002, according to the IHS research report (2003).
3 " Supra, note 336.
353 'Het is verboden bij de levering van geneesmiddelen rechtstreeks of zijdelings premies of
voordelen aan te bieden. Het is aan de fabrikanten, invoerders en groothandelaars van ge-
neesmiddelen verboden, rechtstreeks of zijdelings premies of voordelen aan te bieden of te
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The rules about advertising for drugs were first specified in a Decree from 1972, but
today again another Decree applies: the Roi/a/ Decree 0/7-4-2995 concerning f«e in/br-
mahon <md ndperfising wif/i respect to drugs ybr human use.^
5.5.2 Advertising/or pftanwacics
In Belgium, the advertising by individual pharmacists for their practices is super-
vised by the Order of Pharmacists on the basis of their professional rules. The sec-
ond deontological (i.e. professional) rule of the Order of Pharmacists, formulated in
1951, warns against excessive commercialisation of the profession. It states that, for
pharmacists, it is 'not deontological' to provide, encourage or tolerate any kind of
publicity for the benefit of their practice. The Order wants to prevent that the hon-
our and dignity of the pharmacist's profession is harmed by advertising. The third
professional rule, which was formulated in 1955 and which contains provisions
with regard to unfair competition between pharmacists, gives a more detailed ex-
planation of this. Article 3.4 of this rule reads as follows:
'A pharmacist is not allowed to advertise in any form, directly or indirectly, for the
benefit of his practice. For instance by prospectuses, circular letters, by a special
typographical style or special announcements in the phone books, press, radio, cinema,
gifts, travellers, the promise of all sorts of benefits like refunds, discounts, bonuses
etc...'.*«
Finally, Article lc of the same professional rule, prohibits a pharmacist to
'make mention of the soundness of his products and of the value of his preparations,
with the view of making it seem as if his colleagues make no claim to this quality'.^*
However, in early 1999 a very important decision was taken by the Court of Cass-
ation, which considerably weakened this supervisory function of the Order.^ in the
decision in question, the Court of Cassation nullified a decision of the Board of Ap-
peal of the Order of Pharmacists, which imposed a disciplinary punishment on a
pharmacist who distributed carrier bags with the logo of her pharmacy on them.
verlenen aan personen die geneesmiddelen mögen voorschrijven. Het is verboden om pre-
mies of voordelen te verzoeken of ze te aanvaarden.'
•"* Koninklijk Besluit van 7 april 1995 betreffende de voorlichting en de reclame inzake genees-
middelen voor menselijk gebruik, ß.S. 22-5-I995.
•^ 'Het is aan de apotheker verboden, direct of indirect onder om het even welke vorm publici-
teit te maken in het voordeel van zijn officina. Bij voorbeeld door prospectussen, rondzend-
brieven, door een speciale typografische manier of buitengewone mededelingen in de
telefoongidsen, pers, radio, bioscoop, geschenken, reizigers, de belofte van allerhande voor-
delen van welke aard ook, zoals restorno's, rabat, premies, enz...'
356 ' gewag te maken van de degelijkheid van zijn producten en van d e waa rde van zijn bereidin-
gen met het inzicht te doen uitschijnen dat zijn collega's o p deze hoedanigheid geen aan-
spraak kunnen maken. '
357 Hof van Cassatie, 7 May 1999, R.W., 1999-2000, p . 112.
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The Court of Cassation decided that the Order of Pharmacists is an entrepreneurial
association and as such falls under competition legislation.'** Being an entrepreneu-
rial association, the Order is not allowed to impose obligations that significantly
prevent, restrain or distort competition in the Belgian market concerned or in a sub-
stantial part of it, according to Article 2 § 1 of the Act on the Protection of Economic
Competition'^ It is allowed to examine whether the advertising used is reconcilable
with the professional rules of the pharmacist. Only if by advertising the honour or
dignity of the profession is seriously endangered, such advertising may be prohib-
ited. Thus, in principle pharmacists are allowed to advertise their stores.'*" With this
decision the Belgian Court of Cassation follows the European trend, ensuing from
the European competition rules. In an earlier case the European Commission al-
ready decided that the European competition rules with respect to advertising are
applicable to the professions as well.-'*' Moreover, this decision not only brings the
Belgian disciplinary procedures in line with the provisions in European law, but
also with the state of affairs in other European countries, among them the Nether-
lands.'*- In the Netherlands, incidentally, a similar case occurred already in 1998,
with respect to the professional association for veterinary surgeons.*-'
5.5.3 Design o/ ffie pharmacy
The 1964 Drug Act contains provisions with respect to the drugs that have to be
kept in stock by pharmacists. Before drugs can be entered into trade they have to be
registered with the Ministry'" of Public Health-^ and satisfy the requirements of
the /rtr/Hrtco/w, which is published and kept up to date by the government (Article
2). The King is allowed to compel pharmacists - and others who are entitled to dis-
•** Formally the Court of Appeal of the Order of Pharmacists can take a new decision after a
cassation decision. If then a second decision of the Court of Cassation follows, that one is fi-
nal.
359 YYgj y^j, 5 Augustus 1991 tot bescherming van de economische mededinging, B.S. 2 2-10-1991.
A coordinated version of this act, including several changes in the text, was published at 1
September 1999 (Wet van 1 juli 1999 tot bescherming van de economische mededinging, B.S.
1-9-1999).
•**" Hef Be/ang I'd« Limhurg, Vrije beroepen moeten vrij kunnen concurreren, 24 August 1999.
3*' For an overview of the most important cases in this field see Andrews (2002) and European
Commission: Com/vrtfio« DC, Invitation to Comment: Regulation in Liberal Professions and its
Effects, Commission Services Working Document, 27 March 2003, pp. 4-6.
362 [-),, /urisfen/cranf. Na de advocaten, nu de apothekers, September 1999.
3*3 NMa, Decision nr. 397/1998. Supra, note 314. See also § 4.7.2 for a brief discussion of some
competition cases in the Netherlands with respect to the liberal professions.
** In the framework of the so-called Copernicus reform of the federal government, in Belgium
the designation 'Ministry' has been replaced by 'Federal Public Service'. However, I will use
the old designation 'Ministry' for the sake of clarity. For details about the Copernicus reform
see e.g. the official website: <http://www/copernic-us.be>.
365 gee Article 1 of the Roy«/ Decree fomenting f/ie rrgisrrah'ofi o/drugs (Koninklijk Besluit van 3 juli
1969 betreffende de registratie van geneesmiddelen), B.S. 10-7-1969.
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pense drugs - to keep certain drugs from this farmacopee in their pharmacy or de-
pot. The same goes for specific equipment, appliances, instruments and reagents
(Article 3).**
In 1965 the Order of Pharmacists issued a professional rule that has an effect on the
design of pharmacies. In its sixth deontological rule concerning the publicity in the
pharmacy, some instructions regarding the design of the pharmacy and the shop-
window (it is for instance prohibited to 'display therapeutic instructions or recom-
mendations in any way on behalf of the public') and a ban on provocative neon
signs have been formulated.
5.6 Prices and fees
5.6.1 77ie price o/ drags
In Belgium the price structure and the distribution margins on the market for drugs
are determined by law, just as in the Netherlands. The drug prices have to be ap-
proved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.^ Whenever an agreement about the
price is reached with the drug producer, this price is laid down legally. Moreover,
the Minister of Economic Affairs first has to consider a recommendation for the
prices by the Drug Board (Geneesmiddelencommissie). This Drug Board, which is
under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Health, also has responsibility for
the assessment of registration requests for drugs.*"* If it concerns drugs that are eli-
gible for reimbursement by the mutuals (Belgian health insurance funds; see the
appendix to chapter 3), the price is assessed as well by the Gw/missie Tegemoef-
ItoMJiHg GeneesmiVMe/eH of the RIZIV, the National Institute for Health Care and Inva-
lidity Insurance. To qualify for reimbursement by the mutuals, a drug producer has
to file an application for acceptance with the RIZIV, simultaneously with an applica-
tion for recognition of the price at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. If drugs qualify
for reimbursement by the mutuals, they will be assigned by the RIZIV - more spe-
cifically, the CoM/H/issie TVgemottffoH/iHg GeHeesm/rfrfe/en - to one out of five groups
that correspond to different reimbursement rules. The criteria for this classification
are laid down in the Roi/rt/ Decree o/21-22-2002 deferm/Hing f/ie procedures, fer»is
regrmi;;ig f//e compensation o/ f/ie n/aHdntory insurance /or medic«/ care
Under penalty of an eight day's to one month imprisonment and/or a fine of between 100
BEF and 1000 BEF (€ 495.79 and € 4,957.87; supra note 333). See Wet van 25 maart 1964 op de
geneesmiddelen, B.S. I7-4-J964, Article 16 § 2.
See Article 314 of the Act of 22-12-1989; the Ministerin/ Decree ronreming (/«• rrires o/reimfrursa-
We dra^s (Ministerieel Besluit van 29 december 1989 betreffende de prijzen van de terugbe-
taalbare geneesmiddelen), B.S. 6-1-1990; and the Mims/eria/ Decree coMcermng ffor prices o/»ion-
reim(»i/rsaWe drugs (Ministerieel Besluit van 29 december 1989 betreffende de prijzen van de
niet-terugbetaalbare geneesmiddelen), B.S. 6-3-1990.
According to the Royal Decree of 3-7-1969. Supra, note 365.
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prn/menfs in Me cosfs o/p/wrmnceMh'cfl/ speon/ifes.^ " I already discussed the criteria for
classification and the different categories of drugs (A, B, C, Cs and Cx) in detail in
the appendix to chapter 3.
With the exception of the so-called indispensable drugs (noodzakelijke geneesmid-
delen) placed in category A, consumers in Belgium always have to pay an own con-
tribution called remge/rf for every drug they buy. The amount of the own contribu-
tion is limited - by the government - to a maximum for the drugs belonging to
category B and category C."" Because of the fact that the own contribution is lim-
ited, health insurers might run into difficulties, since the prices of reimbursed drugs
have been increasing for years and years already. In particular, it has become very
difficult for the health insurance to reimburse new - and often more expensive -
medicines.
Indeed, despite the fact that the budget for drugs was twice as high in 1999 as it was
ten years earlier, the budget was still too low if one considers how much money is
actually needed to pay for the medical progress. For some new and very expensive
drugs patients had to pay out of their own pockets. The prices of category A drugs
increased from on average 641 BEF (€ 15.89) to 1327 BEF (€ 32.90) in the period 1987-
1996: more than a doubling. In the same period the prices of reimbursed drugs in-
creased from on average 419 BEF (€ 10.39) to 724 BEF (€ 17.95)."'
Moreover, because the drug prices are laid down by law, the same problem of bo-
nuses and discounts exists as in the Netherlands (see § 4.6.1), although in Belgium
the receivers are predominantly hospitals instead of pharmacies. That is, pharma-
ceutical companies often give discounts on drugs to hospitals. These discounts are
not reported to the mutuals.
Unlike the situation in the Netherlands, substitution of generic drugs for (more ex-
pensive) proprietary drugs occurs very rarely in Belgium. At the end of the 1990s
the percentage of generic drugs in Belgium was still only 1% of all reimbursed
drugs."- Part of this can be explained by examining the stringent rules with regard
to substitution of proprietary drugs in Belgium.-™ Article 11 of the Royal Decree no
78, which was added to the text of the decree in 1993 but still has not come into
force for political reasons (including resistance from the physicians and the phar-
maceutical industry), provides:
369 Supru, note 229.
370 gpe t ^ appendix to chapter 3.
^ Het NieuiesMad, Pillen pijlsnel duurde r , 10 February 1999.
" 2 Hf/ Be/iJMg IWI Li'mhurg, Een Limburger o p vijf kent generische geneesmiddelen, 22 October
1999; He/ Brfimg iwi Limfnirg, De ene pil is de andere niet, 6 March 2001. In SFK (2002, p. 48) it
is stated that generic d rugs are hardly used in Belgium, whi le in the Nether lands the percent-
age of generics in the total n u m b e r of prescriptions in 2001 was 42%. See also § 3.1.1.1.
' " See, for these rules, also Hombroeckx (2000, pp . 187-188).
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'The King determines, by a decree consulted in the Council of Ministers, the provisos
and the implement ing measures according to which the pharmacis t is al lowed to
substi tute a prescribed pharmaceutical speciality by another , unde r the condit ions that
the active components of the subst i tute are the same and that the prescriber does not
explicitly resist against such a subst i tut ion and that the price for the patient is cheaper ' .
Today Belgian physicians still prescribe many branded drugs and they generally are
not so favourably disposed towards substitution by pharmacists. Moreover, the
pharmacists' association APB admits that pharmacists do not have an incentive to
substitute, as long as they will earn less on selling a generic medicine than on selling
a branded drug.
Some conditions for substitution of pharmaceutical specialites by generic drugs can
be gathered from the aforementioned Article 11 of the Royal Decree no 78. First, a
generic drug must have the same active components and it must be 'bio-equivalent'.
Second, there should not be explicit resistance from a physician. A similar provision
could already be found in the ninth deontological rule of the Order of Pharmacists
from 1991, which emphasises that 'a pharmacist has to consider how the approval
of the physician can be obtained'. However, as stated earlier, Belgian physicians still
prescribe very little generic drugs compared to specialites, while generally they are
not favourably disposed towards substitution by the pharmacist. Third, the price of
the substituted drug must be lower for the patient. Here the rra/geM is meant and
not the costs of the health insurance, as a result of which drugs in category A are
precluded from substitution in any case. Moreover, the price difference between a
generic drug and an original pharmaceutical speciality has to be at least 26% if a
generic drug wants to qualify for reimbursement by the RIZ1V (as of 1 January 2003;
in 2002 this was 20%).™
Since 1 June 2001 the reference reimbursement system (re/erenfieterugfreffl/m )^ has
been effective. With this system the government wants to encourage the prescrip-
tion of cheaper drugs. The reimbursement base of original specialities for which also
a cheaper generic alternative is available has been lowered, which implies that pa-
tients have to pay a higher remge/d if a more expensive drug is prescribed and dis-
pensed.^
5.6.2 Rewibi/rsemeMf/or tfie ^/ian«acisf
Besides the fact that a pharmacist has few possibilities to substitute drugs and the
fact that there is no incentive measure like there is in the Netherlands, the margins
on drug sale have been fixed, both for wholesalers and for pharmacists.-™ Pharma-
™ Ministen? ran Soria/e Zafen en Pensioene«, O p 1 januari 2003 belangrijke prijsevoluties in de
geneesmiddelensector , press repor t Ministry of Social Affairs, 17 December 2002.
375 gee e.g. the website of RIZIV: <h t tp : / /www. r i z iv .be> . At 1 January 2003 this lower reim-
bursement base was 26%.
376 Pr iceWaterhouseCoopers (1999), p . 15.
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cists receive a margin of 31 percent on the sale of drugs, up to a ceiling of € 7.44 for
every packaging.'" Because more and more expensive drugs and drugs in large
packagings are coming onto the market, margin erosion occurs: already in 1998 the
pharmacists' association APB claimed that the real profit margin was only 26.5%
per prescription instead of 31%. The explanation for this was that as much as 40% of
the sale of drugs was sold at the ceiling price (or above) because of the ever increas-
ing drug prices. The APB feared that it would become more and more difficult for
pharmacists to keep expensive drugs in stock.'"'* Indeed, in 2002 the real profit mar-
gin had decreased further to 18%, according to new computations made under the
authority of the
However, if the price structure of medicines in different countries - divided into the
margin for the producer, wholesaler, pharmacist and government (VAT) - is com-
pared, then it seems that the margin for pharmacists in Belgium was at an average
level in the late 1990s.^ I will come back to this issue in the next section with re-
spect to the recent developments in the Belgian market.
5.6.3
Summarising, it may be stated that competition between pharmacists or between
wholesalers in Belgium has no influence at all on the tariffs, given that prices and
margins are determined by law. The pharmacists' associations, like the umbrella
association APB and the Order of Pharmacists, only function as bargaining partners
and advisory bodies here.
5.7 Recent developments
Whereas in the Netherlands recent measures taken by the government with respect
to the pharmaceutical market were directed in particular at breaking the profes-
sional monopoly of the community pharmacist (see § 4.6.1), in Belgium this was not
the case. Pharmacists in Belgium have always been allowed to own more than one
pharmacy, and there has never been a prohibition on the possession of pharmacies
by non-pharmacists (although of course the establishment must be run by a phar-
macist). Recent measures of the Belgian government concentrated mainly on the
difficult task of keeping the health insurance affordable, e.g. by encouraging the
prescription of cheaper generic drugs (by means of the reference reimbursement
^ AVGI (2002, p. 24).
'7* De SfflMi/flun/, Apothekers vragen opslag, 24 October 1998.
•^ He( Be/ring mil Limhiirg, Sommige apothekers nu al tegen de armoedegrens, 6 November 2002;
Hi'l NifunvMdii, Boze apothekers op vrijdagmarkt, 23 November 2002; Gaze/ ran Anhwrpen,
Generica niet duurder, 20 December 2002.
Mo po,. Belgium the margin on drugs was subdivided as follows by PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(1999, p. 21) for the year 1997: 64.7% for the producers, 8.3% for the wholesalers, and 27% for
the pharmacists. Supra, note 162.
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system introduced in June 2001 and a proposal to introduce prescription on sub-
stance name), increasing the remge/d on large packagings of drugs**' and reducing
the prices for old and often prescribed drugs. In addition, the government proposed
an improved check on the cheating with prescriptions by pharmacists. Such cheat-
ing occurs when pharmacists substitute prescribed drugs with more expensive vari-
ants, which is obviously forbidden by law.**-
Furthermore, no changes took place with respect to the self-regulation by pharma-
cists, again contrary to the Dutch case. Pharmacists in Belgium have recently been
more concerned about their incomes: at the end of 2002 heated discussions between
the Belgian Minister of Social Affairs Frank Vandenbroucke and the associations of
pharmacists - leading eventually to strikes by the pharmacists - were enlarged
upon in the media.**-* Just like previous discussions between pharmacists and the
government, both in the Netherlands and in Belgium, the main argument made by
the pharmacists was that their incomes had been decreasing for years because of
rising drug prices coupled with unchanged profit margins (i.e. tariffs).** In chapter
71 will look at the income of pharmacists in more detail.
5.8 Summary
Pharmacists in Belgium are regulated both by the government and by self-regula-
tion. The former includes the Royal Decree no 78 concerning the practice of the
health care professions, the Royal Decree no 80 concerning the Order of Pharmacists
and the Royal Decrees with respect to the supervision over the establishment of
pharmacies and the takeover price of pharmacies. There are also various price and
fee regulations. The self-regulation consists predominantly of the deontological (i.e.
professional) rules issued by the Order of Pharmacists. In addition to the Order of
Pharmacists there is a second national pharmacists' association in Belgium, the APB,
mainly involved in lobbying and in the provision of information.
With respect to the education (training) of pharmacists there are no notable rules
restricting competition. However, the professional monopoly of the pharmacist in
the preparation and dispensing of drugs is protected by legislation. This monopoly
381 5gg jj^e append ix to chapter 3.
382 £>(, S(,jnd<!<jrd, Dokters dre igen met opzeggen tariefafspraken, 5 October 1999.
*** See m a n y n e w s p a p e r articles as well as information publ i shed on the websi tes of the profes-
sional pharmac is t s ' associations. E.g. Gaze/ fan Anhcerpe«, Apotheker staakt vandaag , 22 Oc-
tober 2002; He( Be/ang i'im Li'mbiirg, D insdag weer u u r lang actie van apothekers , 31 October
2002; De FinaHnef/-£co»iomiscte 77/d, Apothekers sluiten h u n d e u r uit protest tegen bespar in-
gen, 6 N o v e m b e r 2002; Hef Be/ang iw» Limfmrg, Sommige apo thekers nu al tegen a r m o e d e -
grens , 6 N o v e m b e r 2002; De Sfnmiiwrd, Apo theke r sbe roep smaakt zuur , 23 N o v e m b e r 2002;
De Finannrcl-Econoni/sc/if Ti/ii, Ruim 5000 zorgvers t rekkers be togen za te rdag in Brüssel, 11
December 2002; <http://www.kava.be>; <http://www.apb.be>.
** Also mentioned by pharmacists was dissatisfaction with the amount of administrative tasks,
such as the monitoring of physicians' prescriptions.
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includes the sale of OTC drugs. The practice of pharmacy is subject to registration
with the Medical Commission of the province where a pharmacist wants to estab-
lish himself and to registration with the Order of Pharmacists. It is very difficult for
beginning pharmacists to capture a place in the market. This is not only a result of
high takeover prices (despite regulation of this takeover price by the Royal Decree
of 13-4-1977), but also of the tightening of the establishment act in the form of the
moratorium that has been included into the Royal decree of 25-9-1974. The estab-
lishment act itself already contained strict criteria regarding population and dis-
tance to other pharmacies.
The deontological rules of the Order of Pharmacists contain provisions that restrict
the advertising by individual pharmacists for their practice, and they also include
instructions regarding the design of the pharmacy building and the shop-window.
According to the Belgian Court of Cassation advertising may only be prohibited if it
seriously endangers the honour or dignity of the profession. However, even though
most of the deontological rules were formulated decades ago, they have - until 2003
- barely changed in the course of time.
Furthermore, drug prices, wholesale margins and pharmacy margins are almost
completely determined by the government in the form of several Ministerial and
Royal Decrees. Pharmacists have little possibilities to compete by price, because
drug prices are laid down legally. The reimbursement by the raMfiMlito'/f» (health
insurers) is regulated by the National Institute for Health Care and Invalidity Insur-
ance, RIZIV. Constant increases in drug prices are causing problems with the fi-
nancing of the health insurance in Belgium (as in many European countries,
including the Netherlands). An additional problem for the RIZIV is that the amount
of the own contribution, the re»/geM, is fixed, which means that the constant in-
creases in drug prices put extra pressure on its drug budget.
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NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM
From the extensive regulatory frameworks sketched out in chapter 4 and 5 respec-
tively it follows immediately that the regulation of the pharmaceutical market, both
in the Netherlands and in Belgium, is quite complex. For the analysis of these dif-
ferent and complex institutions one could choose various approaches. First of all it
seems interesting to highlight a few similarities and differences concerning the
regulation of pharmacists in the two countries (§ 6.1). After that I will analyse to
what extent these complex regulations can be considered as serving a public interest
goal (§ 6.2) or a private interest goal (§ 6.3).^ That is, the economic theory pre-
sented in chapter 2 will be applied to the different regulations outlined in the previ-
ous chapters. I will show that the public interest analysis and the private interest
analysis come to a joint conclusion, namely that the regulation of pharmacists in the
Netherlands and Belgium is - at least to some extent - outdated and hence also inef-
ficient from an economic point of view. In the next chapter some quantitative data
will be presented to illustrate the extent to which pharmacists in both countries can
be considered as successful rent seekers.
6.1 Differences and similarities in regulation
Table 6.1 summarises the most important regulations that (may) restrict competition
in the Dutch and Belgian pharmaceutical markets. A brief look at the regulation of
the pharmaceutical profession in the Netherlands and Belgium shows that there are
some similarities.-** While neither of the countries has a numerus clausus for the
admission to the study of pharmacy, both countries do regulate the entry into the
profession by means of registration procedures based on minimum educational re-
quirements. They also have in common that the government protects the profes-
sional monopoly of the pharmacist, the definition of which is about the same in both
385
386
These concepts (the puWic interest approach and the
have been discussed at length in chapter 2.
Supra, chapter 4 for the Netherlands and chapter 5 for Belgium.
inferesf approach to regulation)
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countries with the exception that in the Netherlands OTC drugs may also be sold by
licensed chemists (druggists), whereas in Belgium this is not allowed.**" Moreover,
in the Netherlands as well as in Belgium pharmacists have to be registered with a
regional medical commission, although in Belgium pharmacists also have to be reg-
istered with the Order of Pharmacists.^ In the Netherlands the second register for
pharmacists is the public register that protects the title of 'pharmacist'. This may
constitute a relatively small difference in regulation. However, a major difference is
that in Belgium the establishment policy with respect to new pharmacies - includ-
ing the regulation of takeover prices - is completely regulated by Royal Decrees, as
opposed to the Dutch advisory establishment policy of the pharmacists' association
KNMP, which in practice is now of only little importance compared to the 1990s.'"'''
In general it appears that the Order of Pharmacists in Belgium, which has been
called into being by law, has tasks that differ from those of the Dutch KNMP, the
duties of which are not legally prescribed. The KNMP is engaged also in lobbying,
bargaining with health insurers and the government, and the provision of informa-
tion about the profession and its development to KNMP members and third parties.
In Belgium some of these activities are carried out by the APB, the second national
professional association of pharmacists. In both countries the degree of self-regula-
tion in the pharmaceutical profession has always been impressive, but in the Neth-
erlands some competition restrictive provisions have recently been removed from
the KNMP rules of conduct.
.187 See also sii/'ni, note 249.
388 According to the 1HS report (2003, p. 74) membership in the pharmacists' association is com-
pulsory in several EU Member States. Next to Belgium the following countries are mentioned
by the 1HS: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Greece and
Luxembourg. The Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union (PGEU) argues that Ireland
should be added to this list: <http://www.pgeu.org>.
•"" Such legally determined maximum on the number of pharmacies as it exists in Belgium is not
unique in Europe: according to 1HS (2003, pp. 73-74) the number of pharmacists is restricted
in 10 out of 15 EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden (which is a special case because there all pharmaceutical
products are sold via a state-owned company). Only in Denmark, Germany, Ireland (since
2002), the Netherlands and the United Kingdom there is no formal 'economic needs test'. In
some of these countries there may, however, be some kind of self-regulation in force, such as
is the case in the Netherlands. According to OFT (2003, volume 2, pp. 30, 38, 71) the US and
Canada belong to the group of countries without a legally determined 'economic needs test'.
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6.2: Ouerpira» o/mosf «mportanf regw/flh'ons
Category of regulation
Entry requirements
Other entry regulation
Professional monopoly
Conduct regulation
Price regulation
Content of regulation
Netherlands:
educational requirements (6 yrs)
double registration
Belgium:
educational requirements (5 yrs)
double registration (incl. compulsory
membership Order of Pharmacists)
Netherlands:
advisory establishment policy
pharmacist may only practice phar-
macy in one pharmacy
Belgium:
regulation of establishment and take-
over prices of pharmacies
Netherlands:
compounding and dispensing of
medicines (excl OTC)
Belgium:
compounding and dispensing of
medicines (incl OTC)
Netherlands:
since 2002 only minor restrictions
regarding design of pharmacy
Belgium:
some restrictions to advertising
some restrictions on design of phar-
macy
Netherlands:
regulation of drug price
incentive measure
fixed /ee for pharmacist
Belgium:
regulation of drug price
fixed mnrgiM for pharmacist
Public/self-
regulation
public
public
public
public and s-r
s-r
public
public
public
public
s-r
s-r
public and s-r
public
public
public
public
public
Until the end of 2001 the self-regulatory body of pharmacists in the Netherlands
prohibited its members to make the pharmaceutical market transparent for con-
sumers by means of advertising for the individual pharmacy, whereas in Belgium
this is still the case. In addition, some strict rules concerning the design of the
pharmacy and the exercise of the profession could be found in the self-regulation
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issued by the KNMP until 2002 and can still be found today in the deontological
rules of the Belgian Order of Pharmacists. Of course there have always been slight
differences in the content of these rules, but the overall tendency has - until 2002 at
least - been the same in both countries. This kind of self-regulation is obviously re-
stricting competition and inhibits a differentiation of services. The self-regulation of
advertising and other restrictions on the exercise of the profession have come under
attack quite recently in Dutch and Belgian case law.*» In the Netherlands some pro-
visions of the rules of conduct and the Dutch Pharmacy Standards have been re-
moved or changed as a result of investigations by the Dutch Competition Authority
NMa.
In the field of drug pricing policy and tariffs there appear to be similarities too. Both
in the Netherlands and in Belgium pharmacists do not have any influence on prices
of drugs and on the tariffs they may ask for their services.*" However, there are dif-
ferences in the pharmacist's fee: the recepfrege/i'ergoerfi/ig in the Netherlands is a
fixed amount, while the pharmacist's margin in Belgium amounts to a percentage of
the drug price. Furthermore, in Belgium there is no incentive measure directed at
the dispensing of cheaper products. On the contrary, a Belgian pharmacist might
sooner be tempted to substitute more expensive drugs for cheaper ones. Legal pro-
visions prohibit this, but the supervision of this is not always easy.
Looking at the big picture, there seems to be an important difference between the
function of pharmacists in the Netherlands and pharmacists in Belgium. Although
in both countries pharmacists have become (specialised) distributors of medicinal
products instead of producers of medicines,^ the interpretation of this distribution
function has been different. A Dutch pharmacist is allowed under certain circum-
stances to substitute prescribed drugs by cheaper or better alternatives, contrary to a
Belgian pharmacist. In addition, the Dutch pharmacist today seems to have a
prominent role as an advisor to physicians, considering the importance of pharma-
cotherapeutic consultations in the Netherlands. On the other hand, a Belgian phar-
macist is strictly bound by the prescription of the physician and is a mere seller of
drugs. As opposed to their Dutch colleagues, Belgian pharmacists have a monopoly
on the distribution of OTC drugs as well. In chapter 71 will show that this may have
had an effect on the number of pharmacies in both countries.
For the Netherlands, see § 4.7.2, and for Belgium, see § 5.5.2.
According to 1HS (2003, p. 78) in all 15 EU Member States there was a legally determined
maximum price for prescription drugs in 2002. For details about price and fee regulation in
other countries see Danzon and Chao (2000), OECD (2002) and OFT (2003). Supra, note 141.
I discussed this at length in chapter 3.
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6.2 A public interest analysis of the regulation on the pharmaceutical
market
In chapter 21 explained that information asymmetry between pharmacists and drug
users (patients) and the possible occurrence of negative externalities may provide a
public interest justification for regulatory intervention. That is, regulation may in
these cases be needed to guarantee a reasonable level of the quality of pharmaceuti-
cal services. Also, I noted that regulatory intervention differs in the extent to which
it intervenes in a market. In some markets a simple information regulation (in the
form of certification, mandatory information disclosure, or a prohibition on mis-
leading advertising) may be sufficient to solve market failure. In other markets a
stronger regulation of quality may be needed, such as prescribed quality standards
or licensing. However, the danger exists that a regulatory solution to market failure
causes misallocations in other sections of the economy or generates costs that are
bigger than the efficiency gains from the regulation. Therefore regulatory failure
always has to be compared with market failure: is the cure (regulation) maybe
worse than the disease (market failure)? To answer that question the Dutch and
Belgian regulation of pharmacists will be submitted to a proportionality test,
whereby the question is asked whether the regulation is an appropriate answer to
market failure or whether it goes too far in the sense of creating more problems
(raising costs) than it solves. In this section I will examine whether the tightly regu-
lated Dutch and Belgian pharmaceutical markets really serve the public interest.
First the restrictions on market entry will be discussed (§ 6.2.1) and after that I take a
look at the regulations that restrict the competition between pharmacists (§ 6.2.2).
6.2.1 Entry regw/flfr'oM
Pharmacists in the Netherlands and Belgium have a pro/essionfl/ moHopo/y in the dis-
pensing of prescribed medicines to patients.™ In the Netherlands the title of phar-
macist is protected by law, so that consumers can only hand in their prescriptions at
a registered pharmacist who has a legally obtained diploma. In Belgium pharma-
cists have to have their title formally approved before entry into the market. Be-
cause pharmaceutical services are experience goods'** in a market characterised by
information asymmetry between pharmacist and patient, some regulation of the
services provided by pharmacists is necessary to prevent quality deterioration of the
kind described by Akerlof.^ However, the question arises whether this regulation
should take the form of title protection, as is the case in the Netherlands and in Bel-
gium. There is a double registration procedure (regional and national) in both coun-
tries. The regional registration is said to be necessary to keep the administration of
3* For the Netherlands, see § 4.3.1, and for Belgium, see § 5.3.1.
"* This is true if one considers the services of a pharmacist like giving drug advice to customers
and physicians, monitoring of therapy and medication control a specific service. The mere
selling of prepacked drugs cannot be considered a 'service' in the strict sense of the word.
3« Akerlof (1970).
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the number of pharmacists (in all categories) up to date. The fundamental question
that remains unanswered is whether a far-reaching regulatory instrument such as
title protection coupled with a professional monopoly on the sale of prescription
drugs is necessary to reach the public interest goal of protecting public health. Other
instruments that already partially exist, such as ex ante control of the quality of
pharmaceutical products, could also reach that goal to some extent, without the
negative effects as far as the restriction of competition is concerned. Indeed, an ad-
ditional problem is that the specific services of the pharmacist might warrant regu-
lation, but this is less the case for the sale of prescribed drugs. In chapter 3 I
explained that the main tasks of pharmacists have changed considerably over the
last decades. For a modern pharmacist, providing a service (medication control,
monitoring of therapy, customer advice, and providing information and advice to
physicians in the form of pharmacotherapeutic consultations) has become more and
more important compared to the preparation and sale of drugs. However, it appears
that both in the Netherlands and in Belgium the regulation has not been adapted at
all to these new tasks.'* On the contrary, the current regulation still protects the
rfisfnht/h'oH function of the pharmacist, despite the fact that - because of the rise of
industrially prepared medicine - most drugs sold are now prepacked drugs.
Considering the regulation of the esfflWis/imrHf of pharmacies the public interest ar-
gument of correction for market failure is even weaker. Why regulate also the entry
into the market for community pharmacists if there already is a double registration
procedure in order to guarantee good service quality? With respect to the Nether-
lands, the KNMP advisory establishment policy must be examined more closely to
provide an answer to this question. In § 4.4.1 the justification used by the KNMP for
its establishment policy has been presented:
'the financial exploitation of a pharmacy has to be financially sound, and therefore a
minimum number of prescriptions is needed.'
One could ask whether the concept of financial feasibility, which is based on the
desired number of prescriptions, has not been defined too narrowly by the KNMP,
but to determine this would be very difficult. With respect to Belgium it is obvious
"* Until the year 2000 the professional monopoly of the community pharmacist was protected
even more in the Netherlands. However, the measures taken by the Dutch government in the
late 1990s, i.e. enabling pharmacists to be employed by non-pharmacists, enabling health in-
surance funds to run pharmacies themselves and encouraging the competition between
community pharmacies and hospital pharmacies (see § 4.7.1), hint at a new approach of the
pharmaceutical profession, towards a more liberal regime. The ownership of more than one
pharmacy is still prohibited, although a proposal to lift this provision has already been writ-
ten (sii/mi, note 307). In Belgium the incorporation of pharmacies has never been restricted.
According to 1HS (2003, p. 78) incorporation was in 2002 prohibited in most of the other EU
Member States: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Greece
and Luxembourg. Apart from the Netherlands and Belgium, only in the United Kingdom and
Ireland (since 2002) the regulations with respect to incorporation and ownership of pharma-
cies are less rigid.
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that with the Royal Decrees from 1974 and 1977 and the recently prolonged morato-
rium the entry of new pharmacies into the market is regulated in a very restrictive
manner.™" This strict establishment policy was the result of fear for an 'oversupply'
of pharmacies by the Belgian government. Indeed, the pharmacy density in Belgium
has always been very high relative to most other European countries, and also com-
pared to e.g. the United States and Canada.™* However, the question remains
whether it is really in the public interest to have guidelines or rules about the finan-
cial feasibility of a pharmacy: is it after all not up to the pharmacist to determine
whether he or she thinks it is feasible to enter the market? Again one has the im-
pression that the tool used goes much too far in order to cure the information
asymmetry, and again the tool is directed at a protection of the distribution function
of pharmacists instead of the quality level of services. Because market competition
is likely to be severely restricted, in the end the cure may be worse than the disease.
It is highly unlikely that a moratorium on the establishment of pharmacists would
pass the test of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, regarding the general conditions for
exemption of a restrictive agreement under EC competition law. 1 discussed the four
conditions of Article 81(3) in § 2.6.
6.2.2 Conrfwct
As far as the public regulation of ^ es is concerned, one can be brief. Although there
are differences of form between the Netherlands and Belgium, the bottom line is
that both prices of prescription drugs and fees of the pharmacist are regulated and
that price competition is almost totally excluded. Even if there might be a public
interest argument to give a monopolistic right to pharmacists to sell some drugs -
albeit that the question still arises whether the same goal could not be reached via
less interventionist means than the ones observed in the Netherlands and Belgium -
it should at any rate be possible for them to compete with respect to prices and
quality. However, I have shown in previous chapters that there are no possibilities
at all for pharmacists to compete by prices. In the Netherlands pharmacists receive a
fixed amount per prescription, in Belgium they receive a fixed margin on the sale of
drugs. Such tight price regulation is hardly to the benefit of the consumer: there is
no possibility to choose between good service/higher price and little service***/
lower price. This absence of choice constitutes the most important problem from a
consumer perspective. According to the present tariff structure, Dutch and Belgian
"^ The Belgian regulations with respect to the establishment of pharmacies are presented in
§5.4.
3* /„/hi, § 7.2. See also OFT (2003, volume 1, p. 10) and Anftivrps ftinrnirru/isr/i Ti/dsc/in//, 12,
1998, pp. 26-27.
3" One could object to this that we do not want consumers to choose for little service because
negative externalities might occur as a result of the absence of certain pharmaceutical ser-
vices, such as information about the side effects of a drug or the interaction between different
drugs. Even if this would be true, e.g. in cases of a first distribution of a strong medicine, this
still leaves our argument intact. Regulation of fees is not a solution to this externality prob-
lem.
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pharmacists are even inclined to sell as many prescribed drugs as possible while
giving little or no advice, because they do not get extra money for these time-
consuming services.''*' Hence, the current structure of price regulation in the Neth-
erlands and Belgium even has adverse effects on the incentives of pharmacists to
increase the quality of their services.
Without price competition as an option, the only way left for pharmacists to com-
pete with others would be in the gun/ify o/seraces. But also that kind of competition
has long been seriously restricted as a result of (self-)regulation, both in the Nether-
lands and in Belgium.'"" Until recently, there has been an almost complete prohibi-
tion of advertising for pharmacies in both countries. This prohibition can hardly be
said to serve a public interest goal. It was therefore under serious attack from judges
and competition authorities. In the Netherlands advertising was prohibited until
late 2001, whereas in Belgium the professional rules still contain such provisions.
The fact that in the Netherlands the restrictions on advertising were not approved
by the Dutch Competition Authority NMa already indicates that such provisions
will in all probability not be exempted by the criteria of Article 81(3) of the EC com-
petition law.
The same conclusion can obviously be reached as far as the highly restrictive regula-
tions concerning the exercise of the profession in both countries are concerned. Be-
cause in the Netherlands pharmacies until 2002 had to satisfy the requirements
included in the old Dutch Pharmacy Standards of the KNMP, a differentiation in the
provision of services was almost impossible. Every pharmacist had to abide by the
opening hours, the requirement to have a separate room for magistral preparation
of medicines, and the requirement to deliver every sensible prescription. In Bel-
gium, the sixth professional rule defined by the Order of Pharmacists contains re-
quirements that are very similar to these. It goes without saying that for
pharmacists the possibilities to compete in quality decrease largely for these rea-
sons.*^ Hence, these regulations do not seem to serve a public interest goal either,
as was again made clear by the Dutch Competition Authority NMa, which based its
analysis - indirectly - on the criteria provided in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. In
the new Dutch Pharmacy Standards of the KNMP the aforementioned provisions
have been changed.*'"
See, for the Netherlands, § 4.6, and for Belgium § 5.6.
For an overview of this regulation, see § 4.5 and § 5.5 respectively.
This is not to say that the possibilities of non -price competition are totally excluded. It is theo-
retically still possible to compete with better services or the offer of a wider range of non-
prescription goods. However, it remains difficult to convey these competitive advantages to
the consumer, given the prohibition of advertising and other restrictions on the exercise of
the profession.
Because of these recent developments, and the fact that the regulation in this area is 'only'
self-regulation, the IHS report (2003, p. 80) concludes that, compared to other EU Member
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6.2.3 COMC/MSIO«
In sum, although there seem to be valid reasons for some kind of regulation of the
services provided by pharmacists, notably the information asymmetry argument
and the possible occurrence of externalities as a result of low quality services, the
profession appears to have 'abused' the public interest justification by introducing
all kinds of restrictive regulations, which go much further in limiting competition
than the public interest goal would justify.-'*' Moreover, the current regulation of the
pharmaceutical profession protects the rf/sfnhwhon function of pharmacists, whereas
actually only some regulation of the quality of services provided by a pharmacist
(i.e. in the field of pharmaceutical care) seems needed. In other words, the contents
of the regulation are to an important extent disproportionate to the market failure to
be solved. In addition, the definition of the professional monopoly in the Dutch and
Belgian law and the corresponding protection of the distribution function of the
pharmacist is outdated in the sense that it is not related at all to the new tasks of a
pharmacist in the field of pharmaceutical care. Moreover, because of the rise of in-
dustrially prepared medicine nearly all drugs sold today are prepacked drugs.
6.3 A private interest analysis of the regulation on the pharmaceutical
market
In the previous section I concluded that the Dutch and Belgian regulation of phar-
macists is disproportionate to the market failure to be solved. Hence, the private
interest approach (the capture theory, public choice and the Chicago theory of regu-
lation) might to some extent explain the intensity of the regulations examined. In
this section the rent-seeking hypothesis, which has been defined in § 2.3, will there-
fore be tested by means of an analysis of the regulation of the pharmaceutical mar-
ket in the Netherlands and in Belgium. Similar to the analysis above, I first deal
with entry regulation (§ 6.3.1) and subsequently with conduct regulation (§ 6.3.2).
6.3.1
Some of the Dutch and Belgian regulations concerning pharmacies provide a strong
case backing up Stigler's hypothesis that regulation is merely used as a barrier to
entry with the aim of providing rents to the pharmacies.*^ Especially the regulation
concerning the establishment of pharmacies seems to constitute evidence of this
'barriers to entry' hypothesis. Although there are considerable differences of form
between the Netherlands and Belgium, in both countries the self-regulatory bodies
can somehow influence the establishment of pharmacies. In the Netherlands the
establishment (and limitation) of pharmacies has for a long time been based on an
States, the conduct regulation index of pharmacists is low both in the Netherlands and in
Belgium.
*"* I will explain this in more detail in § 6.3.
***" Stigler (1971). For a discussion see also § 2.3.
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advisory policy of the KNMP. The advisory establishment policy is still relevant
today, albeit in practice only via the contracts between pharmacists and health in-
surers. Even if these contracts are no longer based on the guidelines of the KNMP
and no longer result directly from collective negotiations (because this is prohibited
by the Dutch Competition Authority NMa), at least they include similar provisions
regarding the viability of a pharmacy. It is effectively impossible for pharmacists in
the Netherlands to enter the market without consent of the health insurer. Hence, it
is not only the (self-)regulation of the pharmaceutical profession that constitutes the
source for rent seeking in the Netherlands, but also the behaviour of the health in-
surers. Belgium introduced a formal moratorium on pharmacies in 1994, in addition
to the two Royal Decrees that supervise the establishment and takeover prices of
pharmacies. The argument that a pharmacy should be 'financially sound' (used in
the Netherlands) and the distance and population criteria (in Belgium) only serve to
limit the number of market participants, but do not provide any guarantee for an
increased quality of the services provided. In both cases one can ask whether it is in
the public interest to have guidelines about the financial feasibility of the pharmacy
or the distance of a pharmacy to other pharmacies. It is moreover obvious that, by
regulating the entry of newcomers to the market, the 'insiders' benefit, because
there will be less competition in the market.
Next, I have to consider again the regulation of the professional monopoly of the
pharmacist. I noted in the previous section that, while actually the services provided
by a pharmacist should be protected, in the current regulation the <fisfnfrution func-
tion is protected. Moreover, the professional monopoly is linked to the reimburse-
ment for the pharmacist: in the Netherlands by means of the fixed fee and in
Belgium by means of the fixed margin."* It is not clear which group benefits from
this regulation, if any. Definitely not the consumers, since pharmacists are not en-
couraged to offer high quality services. It is also unclear to what extent pharmacists
themselves benefit from the current definition of the professional monopoly. Of
course, the legal protection of the sale of prescribed drugs - which in Belgium even
extends to the sale of OTC drugs - does protect them from competition by e.g.
chemists (druggists) and supermarkets. In addition, because of the fixed drug
prices, pharmacists have a strong bargaining position in the market vis-ä-vis the
pharmaceutical industry. They have a key position in the distribution of drugs be-
cause they can demand high bonuses and discounts in exchange for placing certain
medicines on the shelves. This argument applies in particular to the Dutch market,
where pharmacists have possibilities to substitute drugs and where prescription on
substance name occurs relatively often compared to Belgium (see § 3.2.1 and
§ 4.6.2). However, the system of the fixed fee/fixed margin, which emphasises the
sale of drugs, does not relate at all to the changed function of the pharmacist. In
chapter 3 I showed that the main tasks of the pharmacist have changed considerably
**• Strictly speaking, price regulation is a form of conduct regulation (see § 2.5.1). However,
given that in the pharmaceutical market it is coupled with the registration and the profes-
sional monopoly, I discuss it here.
124
Chapter 6
over the last decades: for modern pharmacists, providing a service (in particular
customer advice and pharmacotherapeutic consultation) has become more impor-
tant than the preparation (compounding) of drugs, which in the late 1950s was still
their main task. The drugs they sell today are predominantly prepacked drugs.
Pharmacists who are indeed willing to concentrate on these new tasks are under the
current regulation discouraged to do so. Some pharmacists therefore argue that they
would rather be reimbursed differently, i.e. they claim to prefer a higher fixed fee to
the present untransparent system of bonuses and discounts.
One could also suggest that the regulation of the professional monopoly of the
pharmacist is beneficial to the pharmaceutical industry, because direct price compe-
tition is excluded and pharmacists are paid for every prescribed drug they sell,
which may encourage them to sell more drugs (or smaller packagings). However, a
pharmacists is only allowed to dispense such drugs on submission of a prescription
from a general practitioner or specialist. The pharmaceutical industry may try to
circumvent this 'problem' by sending medical representatives to the practices of
general practitioners and specialists in order to promote its products. Furthermore,
one could suggest that health insurers might benefit from the current system of
price and fee regulation, since it decreases price and quality competition in pharma-
ceutical products and services considerably. It is however unclear if this is really an
advantage or rather a disadvantage, because health insurance funds and 'mutuals'
that would like to attract new members by offering lower prescription drug prices
(or good pharmaceutical services) are to some extent prevented from doing this in
the current system. This is especially a problem in the Netherlands, where recent
attempts by health insurers, the government and generic drug producers to either
bring very cheap drugs on the market or to decrease the costs of public health care
by increasing the claw back on certain categories of drugs were sabotaged by phar-
macists, wholesalers and the pharmaceutical industry.*'" Summing up, the outdated
and untransparent regulation of the professional monopoly of pharmacists (both in
Belgium and in the Netherlands) is likely to generate rents for different interest
groups, but it is even more likely that none of the interest groups benefit from it
anymore. In the latter case it constitutes a good example of regulatory failure from
the side of the government.
6.3.2
Leaving aside the price regulation discussed above, other aspects of the (self-)
regulation of conduct in the Netherlands and Belgium seem to aim at a limitation of
competition only. This is e.g. the case with the prohibition of advertising. A prohibi-
NRC HdHife/sWnrf, Apotheker wacht een bittere pil, 29 March 2003; He/ Finnwrifc/c
Apothekers boycotten fabrikant, 8 May 2003; Dr Vo/Jcsfcran/, Medicijnenoorlog toont falen
overheidsbeleid, 9 May 2003; He/ FmaHfieWe DngMad, Aanklacht bij NMa tegen apothekers, 9
May 2003. For an analysis of the power block of wholesalers and pharmacists, see also § 7.6,
which contains a case study of the biggest Dutch pharmaceutical wholesaler, OPG.
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tion of advertising will make the market less transparent. Hence, it will become
more difficult for patients to compare service quality between pharmacists. This
seems only to serve a private interest goal.'"'*' The same can be said for the regulation
of the exercise of the profession (notably the mandatory design of the pharmacy and
related aspects). Of course one could argue that it may be in the public interest that
a pharmacy is well-designed, but again such regulations seem to go much further
than the public interest goal would require. In the Netherlands it was prohibited by
the old Dutch Pharmacy Standards (i.e. until 2002) to have opening hours only in
the evening, or to just provide medicines for specific groups of patients. Differentia-
tion of pharmaceutical services is made very difficult by such prohibitions
It is, however, not always clear who are precisely the 'winning' pharmacists in this
private interest game. The interests of pharmacists may indeed well be heterogene-
ous. Some may wish to compete against others in order to gain a larger share of the
market, whereas others may wish to be protected from that competition. It is hence
not n pnon clear that all pharmacists gain from, e.g., a ban on advertising. However,
the fact remains that many of these professional rules limit competition and there-
fore consumer choice. But there again I should repeat that - as far as prescription
drugs are concerned - the opportunities for consumer choice among the drugs they
purchase is often non-existent or at least limited to the services that are offered dur-
ing and after the sale of the drug.
6.3.3 COWCJMSIOM
Indeed, parts of the regulation of Dutch and Belgian pharmacists seem to be pre-
dominantly a result of rent-seeking behaviour by 'insiders' who want to eliminate
competition as much as possible. In particular the regulation of establishment and
the restrictions on advertising and exercise of the profession seem to belong to this
category, as they do not guarantee any increase in service quality, whereas they do
guarantee a relatively 'quiet life' for pharmacists already in the market. However,
other regulations such as the price/fee regulation, do not seem to provide any spe-
cific benefits for pharmacists (or at least, not anymore), especially considering the
recent attempts from the Dutch government to take back some of the 'unofficial'
income that pharmacists receive in the form of bonuses and discounts.
Some regulations may benefit other interest groups. Indeed, the influence of health
insurers in the establishment of pharmacies in the Netherlands points at the fact
that this establishment policy might be in the hterest not only of the pharmacists,
Benham and Benham (1975, p. 423) argue that '/rom f/ie pomf o/i>ira> o/tfw pro/ession, rrsfricfing
ifi/brmrtfion mm/ h" one o/ f/ie most q0ech're /x>fitira(/y uircpfflMe »iffhoifc mirilnWe /or roHsfniimug
f/ie MiiK'/or o/si/pp/ifrs <i»d «msi/nifrs m /he i/esirfrf dirpch'on'. Stephen and Love (2000, p. 997)
furthermore state the existence of empirical evidence in the literature, which shows that le-
strictions on advertising increase the fees charged for professionals' services and that more
advertising leads to lower fees.
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but also of the health insurers. Another element that illustrates the influence of
health insurers is the regulation of drug prices. It is clear that health insurers have
an influence on the drug delivery system, as they clearly have an interest in keeping
the price of pharmaceuticals (and the pharmacist's fee) within a reasonable limit.'»*'
Moreover, the current system of regulated prices decreases the competition between
health insurers. With respect to price regulation one also has to take into account the
interests of the pharmaceutical industry. As a result of the current system of price
regulation in the Netherlands and Belgium, drug producers can only compete by
providing bonuses and discounts to pharmacies and hospitals. However, given that
these drug producers still appear to be able to give huge discounts, it is difficult to
say whether they benefit from the current pricing system or not. Pharmacists and
wholesalers have a strong bargaining position vis-ä-vis the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Anyway, the influence of health insurers, wholesalers and the pharmaceutical
industry in addition to pharmacists provides support for the hypothesis of Becker
that regulation is the result of a competition for political influence among interest
groups/™ but the results, in terms of rents for the different groups, are not always
clear. With respect to the professional monopoly of the pharmacist in the distribu-
tion of drugs and the accompanying tariff regulation, in particular, it is difficult to
draw firm conclusions. Obviously the professional monopoly protects pharmacists
from competition by chemists and other possible retailers, but pharmacists who
would indeed be willing to concentrate more on providing services are discouraged
to do so. In § 6.3.11 showed that it is doubtful whether the combination of a profes-
sional monopoly and a fixed fee/margin, which is based on tasks that pharmacists
had decades ago, serves any group at all. Here the private interest analysis appears
to reach the same conclusion as the public interest analysis.
6.4 Summary
On the basis of a qualitative analysis of the Dutch and Belgian regulation of phar-
macists, one can conclude that although there certainly is a public interest argument
in favour of some regulation of the quality of pharmaceutical services, parts of the
regulation are not in the public interest. The tariff regulation, prohibition of adver-
tising, restrictions to the design of the pharmacy and the establishment policy seem
to go further than what would be warranted to cure a market failure. This corre-
sponds with the prediction in the literature that a profession will seek to obtain mo-
nopoly profits by using regulation to grant them monopoly rights.*"
However, although the regulation clearly is to some extent promulgated in the in-
terest of the pharmacist, it is also likely that, for example, the price regulation is the
*" See also the appendix to chapter 3.
*'" Becker, 1983. Physicians, as well, may have some influence on the regulation of the pharma-
ceutical market, e.g. regarding their succesful opposition against a substitution regulation for
drugs in Belgium.
• " See in particular Shaked and Sutton (1981) and Gehrig and Jost (1995). Supra, § 2.3 and § 2.5.4.
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result of competition for regulation among different interest groups. Price regula-
tion probably promotes the interests of health insurers and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry as well. That is, although one could argue that normal price competition
between drug producers would be more beneficial for health insurers, in the current
system with regulated prices they hardly have to worry about competition with
other health insurers. In addition, the pharmaceutical industry is, despite regulated
maximum prices, able to provide large amounts of bonuses and discounts to phar-
macists and hospitals. It is very difficult to state who exactly benefits from such
regulation.
Furthermore, it is likely that none of the involved parties (pharmacists, health in-
surers, the government, drug producers and consumers) benefit from the current
regulation that links the professional monopoly of the pharmacist to the fixed
fee/margin. This combination only encourages the mere selling of prescription
drugs, while giving no incentives at all to provide services, despite the often as-
sumed new tasks of pharmacists in the field of 'pharmaceutical care', and despite
the fact that nowadays most drugs sold are prepacked drugs. Both the public inter-
est analysis and the private interest analysis come to this conclusion, because nei-
ther the public nor the regulated parties seem to benefit anymore from this old-
fashioned regulation/"^ A solution might be found in a new remuneration system
for pharmacists that strictly separates between distribution tasks and tasks in the
field of pharmaceutical care. I will come back to this proposal in chapter 8. First, I
will provide a number of empirical data to investigate the extent to which Dutch
and Belgian pharmacists can be considered as successful rent seekers.
Although, as 1 noted above, this regulation does still protect pharmacists from competition
from chemists and other retailers.
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It is obviously another question whether the pharmacists in the Netherlands and
Belgium are swccess/H/ rent seekers. That is largely an empirical question. As far as
the contents of the regulation are concerned, pharmacists in both countries appear
to have been quite successful, at least in limiting competition. I will now examine
whether the regulation was also effective in limiting the entry into the profession.
Therefore I will look at the number of pharmacies and the number of pharmacists
(and the development thereof) in the Netherlands and Belgium. In that respect it
will be interesting to relate these developments to differences in regulation between
both countries. In addition I will examine whether these barriers to entry also lead
to rents for pharmacists, although answering this question has proven to be very
difficult. In § 7.1 I first explain u>/iy it is so difficult to conduct empirical research
into the actual rents obtained by pharmacists - if there are any - and also introduce
the methods I used to try to tackle this problem. The analysis of the number of
pharmacies and the number of pharmacists is the subject of § 7.2. In order to find
some empirical evidence of the existence or non-existence of rents obtained by
pharmacist, I will present some data on the (relative) income of pharmacists (§ 7.3)
and some indications of high takeover prices (§ 7.4).
The sections after that focus on two case studies with respect to the Dutch pharma-
ceutical market: a case study of Boots (§ 7.5), which discusses the failed attempt of
this British chemist's chain to open pharmacy departments in the Netherlands, and
a case study of OPG (§ 7.6), a company that was established over a decade ago by
pharmacists and which is now (still) the biggest pharmaceutical wholesaler in the
Netherlands. The section on Boots gives some insights into how the different parties
on the pharmaceutical market reacted to this new market entrant and analyses why
the Boots experiment failed. The section on OPG deals with the increasing market
power of this wholesale chain in the Netherlands, and also briefly discusses the de-
velopment of chain retailing in the Dutch pharmaceutical market.
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7.1 How to measure rent seeking on the pharmaceutical market
Because the pharmaceutical market is very different from other markets I have to
use some rather unusual techniques to measure the effects of rent seeking by phar-
macists. In previous chapters I noted that tariffs on the pharmaceutical market are
(very tightly) regulated. The income of pharmacists depends largely upon the fixed
fee/ fixed margin, which they receive for every sold prescription drug, whereas
drug prices are jointly set by the industry and the government. Because fees are de-
termined by regulation and individual pharmacists do not have any influence on
the prices they are allowed to charge for their services, a price comparison does not
seem to be a meaningful way to start the empirical analysis. That is, a comparison of
prices of pharmaceuticals between the Netherlands and Belgium - or a comparison
with other countries - would not be a useful proxy for the rent seeking by pharma-
cists, since pharmacists hardly influence these prices.
The same goes for an analysis of the income of pharmacists. Although it might be
useful to look at the development of pharmacy incomes, this does not completely
represent the amount of rents gathered by pharmacists. As long as it remains im-
possible for pharmacists to compete in prices, their income is not an optimal crite-
rion for an analysis of rent-seeking behaviour. However, the 'unofficial' income
received in the form of bonuses and discounts from the pharmaceutical industry
would be a better indicator of the success of rent seeking by pharmacists. Unfortu-
nately, estimates of the amount of bonuses and discounts received by pharmacists
differed largely between the comprehensive researches carried out in the Nether-
lands, i.e. by the Dutch Tax Department and PriceWaterhouseCoopers with respect
to the year 1997 and by the Boston Consulting Group and Deloitte and Touche for
the year 2001/"^ Some information could be provided by examining the aggregate
income of the pharmaceutical profession. However, even if one would find, e.g. that
the income of pharmacists is high relative to the income of other liberal professions,
that would not necessarily be any proof of successful rent seeking. High incomes do
not necessarily correspond with high rents; it is necessary to distinguish between
supra-competitive profits and high incomes. A high income may also be - at least to
some extent - an effect of investments in long training (education) or a compensa-
tion for greater responsibilities/"'' Moreover, exact data on the earnings of pharma-
cists are hard to obtain, partly because of non-disclosure policies and partly because
these data are in some cases just not available. This is a well-known problem: in
many papers and research reports that analyse the regulation of the liberal profes-
*" For 1997, the Dutch Tax Deparment calculated an amount of 577 mln NLG £ 262 mln),
whereas PriceWaterhouseCoopers calculated the bonuses and discounts to be NLG 360 mln
(€ 136 mln). See Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, GMV 992292, 23 March
1999. With respect to the year 2001, the Boston Consulting Group came to an amount of € 520
mln and Deloitte and Touche to € 644 mln (see also § 4.6.2). Obviously the differences are
considerable.
*'* See also Ogus (2000, p. 594).
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sions from a quantitative point of view, lack of data (especially on earnings, but also
on prices and costs as a time-series) often excludes the proper use of statistical and
econometric models to assess the effects of restrictive regulation.'"' In the (probably
even more complex) pharmaceutical market the situation is no different.
A more appropriate method to measure the rents obtained by pharmacists seems to
be to analyse the take-over prices of pharmacies. Rents might be incorporated in the
goodwill and the take-over price of the pharmacy. There are all kinds of indications
that the prices of pharmacy buildings in the Netherlands and in Belgium are indeed
significantly higher than those of other buildings in the same area. Hence it is not
only the building that is paid for, but the business as well. Unfortunately it is ex-
tremely difficult to obtain exact data on the amounts of goodwill paid for the take-
over of a pharmacy, again predominantly because of non-disclosure policies. I did
however find some information about take-over prices paid for pharmacies, which
will be presented in § 7.4 in/ra.
Furthermore, I use the case studies of Boots and OPG to analyse the behaviour of
different parties in the Dutch pharmaceutical market, such as pharmacists, health
insurers and wholesalers. From these case studies one can therefore also gather
some (circumstantial) evidence of rent-seeking behaviour by these different interest
groups. In addition, the case studies give an overview of recent developments in the
rapidly changing Dutch pharmaceutical market.
Hereafter I will first measure the rent-seeking behaviour of pharmacists in another
way, namely by looking at the effectiveness of the establishment policy in limiting
entry into the profession. Such regulation decreases competition between pharma-
cists by limiting the number of competitors on the already regulated market. With
respect to the establishment policy of the KNMP in the Netherlands it is especially
interesting to indicate its effects during the 1980s and 1990s. In Belgium the estab-
lishment of pharmacies is regulated by the government in the form of a morato-
rium, the effects of which can be shown easily.
7.2 The number of pharmacists
The evolution over time of the number of pharmacies (community pharmacies, dis-
pensing physicians, and hospital pharmacies together) in the Netherlands is shown
in Figure 7.1 for the period 1970-1998.""' The effects of the KNMP establishment pol-
icy are visible in this figure. During the period in which the policy was obligatory
HIS (2003, pp. 126-127).
Data sources for Figures 7.1-7.3: Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Eurostat and own calcula-
tions. Although some more recent data exist regarding the number of pharmacies and the
number of pharmacists, these data are not always compatible with the numbers presented in
Figures 7.1-7.3. In some cases determinants are not available as a time-series after 1998, whe-
reas in other cases sources contradict each other.
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for KNMP members (1975-1987) the number of pharmacies decreased. After 1987
the number eventually increased again, but it is obvious that also the adz'ison/ estab-
lishment policy - enacted in 1987 - was able to prevent the number of pharmacies to
reach the 1970 level of 2,298. The initial increase was therefore temporary. In 1998
the number of pharmacies was only 2,244 (divided into 1,547 community pharma-
cies, 605 dispensing physicians and 92 hospital pharmacies).
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Looking at Figure 7.2, which indicates the relationship between the number of
community pharmacies and dispensing physicians, it appears that for almost every
new community pharmacy a dispensing physician gave up his drug depot:"' In
1982 the number of established pharmacists on the market was for the first time lar-
ger than the number of dispensing physicians. It seems that newcomers to the
pharmaceutical market are more or less dependent on the possibilities of buying out
a dispensing physician or a pharmacist who is willing to give up his practice.
After 1998 the number of established pharmacists kept increasing. According to the
Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics SFK it increased from 1547 in January 1998
to 1602 in January 2001. Unfortunately, the number of dispensing physicians is not
provided by this source. A different source, NIVEL, states a number for the year
2001 of 578 dispensing physicians. This would imply that the trend shown in Figure
7.2 continued during the period 1998-2001. The total number of established phar-
macists on 1 January 2003 was according to SFK 1654: an increase of 52 community
pharmacies in two years. No comparable data regarding the number of dispensing
physicians are available.
Articles 6 and 7 of the Drug Supply Act of 1958 state that dispensing physicians may only be
established in areas where no pharmacist is established.
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In a market without population growth the fact that newcomers are dependent on
buying out dispensing physicians or pharmacists might be nothing to really worry
about (that is, if the initial number of pharmacies would have been optimal at the
outset), but in the Netherlands, like in all of Europe, the population has increased
enormously during the last decades. The number of patients per pharmacy (includ-
ing dispensing physicians) increased from 5,934 in the year 1970 until 7,274 in the
year 1998, as shown in Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: Pah'enfs per pharmacy in f/ie Nefher/ands
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While, of course, this presentation of the number of pharmacies in the Netherlands
cannot be explained by the KNMP establishment policy alone (also the drug policy
enforced by the Dutch government and the development of the profession itself
may be responsible), it does provide some tentative evidence of rent seeking. In-
deed, the Dutch regulations have apparently been effective in limiting market entry.
Thus these data on the evolution of the number of pharmacies provide some sup-
port for the qualitative analysis presented above.*™ A comparison with other coun-
tries seems necessary to draw further conclusions, although such an analysis will
certainly not be easy because there are many differences in both the regulation of
the pharmaceutical profession across Europe and in the definition of the profes-
sional monopoly of the pharmacist. Here I will provide a comparison with the situa-
tion in Belgium.
With the exception of Greece, Belgium has the tightest web of pharmacies in
Europe.-"'* On average there was one pharmacy for 1,935 inhabitants in 1998. Figure
7.4 shows that the number of patients per pharmacy in Belgium decreased between
1961 and 1986, but since then, while the Belgian population kept increasing, this
number has increased very slowly."™
Supra, chapter 6.
He/ MfuiesMfld, Apothekers willen minder apotheken, 4 November 1998; Anrwerps Farmaco/-
fisWi Tiydsc/inft, 12, 1998, pp. 26-27; OFT, 2003, volume 1, p. 10.
Data sources for Figures 7.4-7.5: BIGE (1999), Eurostat and own calculations. The Belgian data
do not include dispensing phsycians, as there are almost no physicians with a drug depot in
the Belgian pharmaceutical market because of the high pharmacy density.
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Figure 7.4: Pflfienfs per p/wrman/ in Be/gium
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Figure 7.5 presents the number of community (established) pharmacies in Belgium.
As opposed to the Netherlands, one sees an increase in this number, although since
the mid-1980s the number of community pharmacies has remained almost constant.
It seems therefore that the public regulations in Belgium did a reasonable job in re-
ducing the number of new pharmacies. The reason for this regulation of establish-
ment of pharmacies is different from the one used by the KNMP in the Netherlands:
in Belgium the government fears an 'oversupply' of pharmacies. Because the num-
ber of pharmacists active on the Belgian market is still very high (much larger than
the Dutch number), it will remain difficult for Belgian pharmacists to open a new
pharmacy.
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Figwre 7.5: Number o/commMni7y pnarmaries in Be/giwm
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Although I noticed that both Belgium and the Netherlands have been quite success-
ful in restricting the entry of pharmacies into their respective markets, there are
considerable differences between the two countries. Whereas in the Netherlands in
1998 there were 7,274 patients per pharmacy, the average number of patients for
one pharmacy in Belgium was 1,935. Hence, one could conclude that the Dutch
pharmacists have apparently been far more successful in limiting market entry than
their Belgian colleagues. That large difference can not be explained by merely look-
ing at the contents of the rules of establishment, which have over the years been
very strict in both countries. One has the impression that the Dutch started much
earlier to limit market entry than the Belgians. By the end of the seventies, the Dutch
(private) regulations apparently succeeded in reducing an already small number of
pharmacies even further. The Belgian moratorium on the establishment of pharma-
cies came only in 1994, when the number of pharmacies was already large (despite
the population and distance criteria determined by Royal Decree). It succeeded in
limiting the growth of the number of pharmacies, but the average number of phar-
macies remained high.
Finally, one of course has to bear in mind that in Belgium pharmacists have a mo-
nopoly in the distribution of OTC drugs. In the Netherlands there are more than
4000 OTC outlets such as chemists (druggists) and chemist's departments in super-
markets/*-' However, these 'other' OTC outlets are not allowed to dispense prescrip-
tion drugs. If Belgian pharmacists would lose their monopoly on OTC drugs, this
would probably have a large effect on the number of community pharmacies in Bel-
gium. Furthermore, in the Netherlands nowadays the establishment of pharmacies
is more and more determined by the health insurers instead of by pharmacists
themselves. The consequences of this on the number of pharmacies are as yet un-
clear.
7.3 The income of pharmacists
Another way of getting an indication of the success of rent seeking by pharmacists
is by examining data on their incomes. The average income of a profession might
give some estimate of its success in obtaining rents. However, one should be very
careful with the interpretation of such data; high incomes do not necessarily ema-
nate from high rents as a result of rent seeking (e.g. lobbying or self-regulation).
Nevertheless, income data are still interesting if one wants to compare one profes-
sion with others.
Since I just noticed that the average number of patients per pharmacy is a lot higher
in the Netherlands than it is in Belgium, one would expect that on average the in-
comes of the Dutch pharmacists would be higher than the incomes of their Belgian
colleagues. That is, unfortunately, impossible to ascertain. Indeed, data on the n-
Supra, note 135.
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come of Dutch pharmacists are extremely difficult to find,*^ not least because a
large part of their income depends on the bonuses and discounts received from the
pharmaceutical industry. The average h/rnowr of a Dutch pharmacy in 1999 was
€ 1,810,583 «3 The gross profit at this turnover would be € 376,638 (according to the
SFK), which implies a gross pro/if margin per pharmacy of almost 21%. However, if I
add the bonuses and discounts and then compute the gross profit margin, it would
be almost 25%.**• The average bonuses and discounts per pharmacy are about
€ 90.756 (according to own calculations based on numbers given by the SFK and
PriceWaterhouseCoopers).^
It is difficult to compare these data with Belgian data, since the Dutch data repre-
sent turnover, which is obviously not the same as income. However, some compari-
son between Dutch gross profit and Belgian incomes may be possible. I will come
back to that below. First it seems interesting to look at the Belgian data separately,
since they allow for some comparison with other professions. In Figure 7.6 the h-
come of Belgian pharmacists is compared to the income of three other professions
and the income of the average self-employed for the period 1982-1999 «a The num-
bers show that in Belgium the income of all professions exceeds the income of the
self-employed workers, although the architects' income is very close to that of the
self-employed. The data also suggest that the relative income of pharmacists is quite
high: until the early 1990s the average income of pharmacists was even higher than
the average income of physicians. The pharmacists' income is significantly higher
than the attorney's income as well. Hence, there is at least some tentative evidence
that Belgian pharmacists as a group might be efficient rent seekers. However, one
has to keep in mind that high incomes do not necessarily result from rent-seeking
behaviour, but may also be, for example, a reward for investments in prolonged
education. However, the average income seems to be substantially higher than what
could be expected as postponed income caused by longer studies. A part of this re-
*22 This information gathering problem has been discussed in § 7.1. With regard to incomes,
several attempts have been made to acquire these data for the Netherlands, but this appeared
to be impossible because most institutions claimed 'not to have this specific information at
their disposal' (KNMP, SFK, CBS, CTG, Ministry of Health). The Dutch tax department,
which has control of such income data, stated that it has a duty of confidentiality and decided
not to grant an exemption in this case after a 'careful weighing of interests' (letter dated 3
April 2001).
423 SFK (2000, p. 54).
*2* I.e., I add the bonuses and discounts to the nominator and denominator and again compute
the gross profit margin (gross profit as a percentage of total turnover). If one would then
want to compute the net profit margin, one would need to subtract a 'normal income' from
the gross profit. Then one would be able to compare the net margin of a pharmacist to that of
other professions (if available) and - probably even more interesting - to that of 'normal' re-
tailers such as supermarkets.
425 i d iv ide the total n u m b e r of bonuses and d iscounts by the n u m b e r of establ ished pha rmac ies
and dispensing physicians.
426 Data source: Nat ional Insti tute for Statistics (NIS). Convers ion rate: 1,000,000 BEF = € 24,789.
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ward can in that case be considered as rent. A similar conclusion concerning the
relative success of pharmacists in rent-seeking was reached in an earlier Belgian
paper by Faure and Van den Bergh, based on an examination of data from attor-
neys, architects, physicians and pharmacists between 1982 and
427 Faure and Van den Bergh (1991).
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Unfortunately these nice Belgian data cannot be compared with Dutch data, since
the latter are not available. However, I noticed above that the gross profit (before
taxes, before deduction of costs) of an average pharmacy in the Netherlands in 1999
was € 376,638."*^  This can to some extent be compared to the Belgian data, which
provide income before taxes, but after deduction of costs. If one takes the data pro-
vided by SFK on the average costs of pharmacists in the Netherlands*-' and sub-
tracts these from the gross profit mentioned above, the average income of a Dutch
pharmacist would be €69,641. Moreover, if one would also include the estimated
amounts of bonuses and discounts received by pharmacists in these computations,
the difference may be much larger yet. In 1999 in Belgium the average income of a
pharmacist was € 47,360.-™ That the Belgian figure is substantially lower than the
Dutch figure should not come as a surprise, given the fact that the average Dutch
pharmacy has more than three times as many patients as the Belgian counterpart.
On the other hand, Belgian pharmacists have a monopoly in the distribution of OTC
drugs, which is not the case in the Netherlands, but this is clearly not represented
by our estimations. Unfortunately the income data I used do not allow me to distin-
guish between the share of OTC drugs and the share of prescription drugs in the
total income of a Belgian pharmacist.^'
In sum: even though Belgian pharmacists seem to be successful rent-seekers at the
national level if one compares their income to, e.g. that of a Belgian architect, they
do relatively poorly compared to their Dutch colleagues. Obviously that must to a
large extent be due to the average number of patients per pharmacy. However, one
should be careful in attributing this difference solely to a difference in the relative
lobbying force of the pharmacists in the two countries. It may well be imbedded in
cultural differences as well. That is, there may be different expectations with respect
to the services offered by a pharmacist in both countries.^- It is likely that Belgian
pharmacists are regarded - more than their Dutch counterparts - as mere distribu-
tors of drugs, because of their monopoly in the distribution of all drugs including
*** Here I do not take into account the crude data on bonuses and discounts.
*2» Jo estimate these costs, I added the figures for personnel costs, housing costs, general costs,
computer costs, interest, writing-offs and car costs presented in SFK (2000, p. 50) to arrive at
an average amount of € 306,996.
-*•* One has to be very careful in interpreting these numbers, because they come from different
sources and, moreover, they are rather crude (especially the Dutch data). However, because
the difference suggested here between the average income of Dutch and Belgian pharmacists
is so huge, one can still draw some tentative conclusions.
*" One could try to distinguish between the profit margin on prescription drugs and the profit
margin on OTC drugs and investigate if there is some cross-subsidising. The data do not al-
low this, however. Of course, the total profit margin could in theory still be computed, that is,
if one knows the average turnover per pharmacy. Because of incompatibility of data sources,
1 was not able to do this either.
-*32 See chapter 3, which discusses the pharmaceutical market and the service of a pharmacist in
the Netherlands and Belgium, and chapter 6, where some differences between these countries
are presented.
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OTC. The fact that the Belgian public apparently expects quick service offered by a
large body of pharmacists, will also have some influence on the 'optimal' number of
pharmacists in a society. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, pharmacists seem to
have a slightly more service-oriented function, because they are more and more tak-
ing part in pharmacotherapeutic consultations with physicians and they have more
possibilities to substitute drugs.
7.4 Takeover regulation
Takeover prices can be considered as a powerful indicator of rent-seeking as well.
The mere fact that goodwill is paid for the takeover of a pharmacy proves that the
pharmacy itself has a value, other than the value of the real estate, the stocks etc.
Hence, this confirms Moore's hypothesis that a license will confer property rights
upon the licensees.*" The practice in both countries shows that the 'license' to oper-
ate a pharmacy has a real and high value. Indeed, it is obvious that the large
amounts of goodwill that have to be paid both in the Netherlands and in Belgium
restrict the entry into the market. Even if a pharmacist would be able to establish a
new pharmacy despite the strict establishment rules discussed above he would face
the problem of having to pay extraordinary large amounts of money for goodwill.
More specifically, the goodwill consists of the capitalised surplus profits gained
from trade benefits (bonuses and discounts, see § 4.6 and § 5.6 above) and the ex-
pected future profits on the pharmaceutical market. Because the pharmaceutical
market is protected by a high degree of regulation, both in the Netherlands and in
Belgium, the expected future profits on the market are high.''*' This situation creates
opportunities for incumbent pharmacists to capitalise their undertaking, while
young (i.e. recently graduated) pharmacists who cannot afford the high amounts of
goodwill have no choice but to enter employment by the big wholesale chains, the
only entrepreneurs that can still afford these sums of money. In fact, one even sees
these developments happen already in the Netherlands and in Belgium.
Dutch pharmacists who want to set up their own practice by taking over an existing
pharmacy have to pay takeover costs consisting of housing, stock and an amount
for goodwill. The amount for goodwill amounts to at least one time the annual
turnover, but is often much higher. Considering that as mentioned above the aver-
age pharmacy in 1999 had an annual turnover of about € 1,810,583 (see § 7.3), it im-
mediately becomes clear that the average goodwill contributes a substantial
amount. Moreover, in recent years one has seen a considerable increase in this
amount.^ The estimates of the amounts that are actually paid vary widely. In 2002,
C. Roozen, chairman of KNMP-department Limburg, stated in DagWad De Limburger
«3 Moore (1961).
*^ P/iormaceu fisc/i WceMJad, Big goodwill, bad results, vol. 135, nr. 38,2000, pp. 1410-1411.
435 De Jong (1998, pp. 612-13); Hef Finanri«* Dagfc/ad, Zorg op de beurs, 20 February 2002; this
was confirmed as well in an interview with an anonymous Dutch pharmacist (24 July 1999).
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that wholesale chains like OPG and GEHE pay goodwill amounts of up to 9 times
the yearly profit or 1.6 times the annual turnover of a pharmacy, which implies that
'for a moderately big pharmacy between 2 and 3 mln euro is laid down'.'* In an
interview in Hef FiHanriee/e Dngb/ad with C. Oomen, director of the small Dutch
health insurer DSW, an even higher estimate of the goodwill is put forward: 1.5
times the yearly turnover of a pharmacy, which entails that for relatively big phar-
macies (more than 12,000 customers) a goodwill of between € 4 and € 4.5 million is
paid out.'"'' If one considers an average pharmacy instead and takes the average
turnover computed in § 7.3, then the estimate would be about the same as the one
suggested above by Oomen: € 2.7 mln. In any case, it is obvious that for independ-
ent Dutch pharmacists (not to mention recently graduated pharmacists) it is nearly
impossible to set up an own practice, while for already established pharmacists the
temptation to sell the building and capitalise the goodwill is strong. According to
DSW-director Oomen the 'independent pharmacist' is disappearing gradually from
the Dutch market while the market power of the big chains, i.e. the wholesalers, is
growing rapidly: about 23% of all Dutch community pharmacies in 2002 was owned
by wholesale chains.'"*
Also in Belgium very large sums have to be paid sometimes when taking over a
pharmacy, this despite the regulated takeover prices.^' On the contrary, the regula-
tion of entry into the market by means of the legally determined moratorium might
even be the primary cause of the increase in takeover prices (i.e. the amounts paid
for goodwill). After all, the moratorium enhances the economic value of the already
existing pharmacies, which drives up the price.'*'"' Due to the high prices that have
to be paid many pharmacies taken over in Belgium are now bought by commercial
chains or private individuals who are not pharmacists. In 1999 about 20% of the
pharmacies in Belgium belonged to non-pharmacists. However, it also occurs that
established pharmacists buy up pharmacies to form minichains.'"'
DagMad De Linrfwrger, Veel apothekers verkopen zaak, 26 March 2002.
Hef Firumriw/e Dagfr/ad, Ziekenfonds DSW: apothekers eenmalig verkwanseld, 12 April 2002.
/bid. See also Dagft/ud De Limburger (supra, note 280) and § 7.6 in/ra.
Hef NifHH'sWrtd, Apothekers willen minder apotheken, 4 November 1998.
See also Peers (2000, p. 206).
Anfti«f7>s Farmacewfedi Ti)dsc/iri/t, 4,1999, p. 17. Furthermore, the Belgian market is character-
ised by the existence of a fairly large number of cooperations such as Multipharma, PPL+ and
De Volksmacht. These cooperations are united in Ophaco: <http://www.ophaco.be>.
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Although I do not have data on the exact amounts*'- of goodwill to be paid by aspir-
ing pharmacists because of non-disclosure policies, already the fact in itself that in
both countries large sums of money have to be paid for goodwill suggests that there
are rents that can be captured by the already established pharmacists. Of course, as
stated in § 7.1, one should distinguish between, on the one hand, supra-competitive
profits, and, on the other hand, high incomes resulting from investments in training
and compensations for greater responsibilities. However, the problem is that the
amounts paid for goodwill in the Dutch and Belgian markets of pharmacists largely
concern rents that result from protective regulation; they do not always concern re-
imbursements for real efforts. In this respect it is also interesting to refer to a recent
report by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) which investigates the entry regulations
in retail pharmacy in the UK. In the UK, as in the USA, chain store retailing in
Pharmaceuticals (e.g. chemist's chains, pharmacy departments in supermarkets) has
existed for a long time already. The OFT report includes an investigation by a val-
uer and transfer agent of pharmacy businesses."' Apparently, British supermarket
chains 'dnim to /wve pnid h/g/i prices to «a/Mire independent p/uirmaq/ bus/nesses'. These
supermarket chains attributed that to the effects of entry regulations in the UK,
which include the obligation to purchase a NHS dispensing contract, i.e. a license to
sell prescription drugs. However, the OFT report also points to the fact that
'it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on profitability from the prices at which
pharmacies close to supermarkets change hands. High values for some dispensing
contracts may be driven by the supermarkets' desire to increase their footfall.**'
The observation that the number of chain outlets in the Netherlands and in Belgium
is increasing at the expense of the number of independent pharmacies, as in the UK,
is in itself not a problem. After all, to practise as a pharmacist does not imply that
one should also be a conventional storekeeper. Consumers are not deprived of the
pharmaceutical services provided by a qualified pharmacist in a chain store. Still a
prohibition on incorporation exists in many of the other EU countries.*^ Reekie
(1997) argues that this may well be a result of lobbying by pharmacists who are 'suc-
cess/w//y /Mrf/ripnting /n fl cflrte/-/ifce environment u>/iere t/iose innovations are retnnfed'.***
On the website <http://www.beleggingsweb.nl>, which provides information on stocks and
shares, some information is given about amounts of goodwill paid by OPG in the period
1999-2001 (see: Tip van de Week, Week 50-2001). From the information presented there on the
total amounts of goodwill paid by OPG in each year, one can compute that in 1999 the com-
pany paid on average € 3.2 mln goodwill for a pharmacy, in 2000 it paid € 3.4 mln, and in
2001 it paid € 2.1 mln. The huge differences in these amounts can partly be explained by dif-
ferences in the size of the pharmacies in question.
The 'Orridge report': OFT, 2003, volume 2, annexe G, pp. 170-178.
OFT (2003, volume 1, p. 16).
IHS (2003, p. 78). Supra, note 396.
Reekie (1997, p. 279). In this article Reekie (p. 283) explicitly mentions the lobbying against
corporate ownership in Denmark, Holland, Germany and South Africa. He further concludes
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In the next two sections (in particular § 7.6) I will look in some more detail at the
development of pharmacy chains in the Netherlands.
7.5 Case study 1: Boots
In § 4.7.1 I described how, in the late 1990s, the Dutch Ministry of Public Health
tried to stimulate competition in the extramural supply of drugs. The amendments
of 1999, which lifted the ban on the exploitation of a public pharmacy by health in-
surers and the ban on employment of pharmacists by non-pharmacists respectively,
did indeed promote the possibilities to compete in the Dutch market. While, ini-
tially, the health insurers adopted an attitude of expectation with respect to starting
their own pharmacies,-"' the British chemist's chain Boots Health and Beauty re-
acted almost immediately on the amendments. However, Boots' adventure in the
Dutch pharmacy business did not last very long.
The establishments of Boots in England, where the company is one of the three
market leaders in community pharmacies,*** are characterised by large chemist's
and perfume departments combined with pharmacy departments, located in so-
called Al locations in big shopping centres. Since the amendment of 1999 that per-
mitted the employment of pharmacists by non-pharmacists in the Netherlands,
Boots started right away to open pharmacy departments in the Dutch stores as well.
The company did not bother about the advisory establishment policy of the KNMP.
After all, in principle there was free establishment of pharmacies in the Nether-
lands. And, contrary to independent individual pharmacists, Boots expected to be
capable of entering the market relatively easy, because its chemist's department
could compensate possible starting losses of its pharmacy department. As early as
July 1999, Boots had 7 establishments in the Netherlands and big plans for expan-
sion in the near future: the goal of the company was to have 50 Dutch establish-
ments in 2003.
(p. 284) that '[pharmacy] retailers /uroe in/Zuenced negu/adOM and tegis/ah'ori in many [....] coun-
tries. 77iei> si/avss im/n<ies s/oii'ing ifoicn by leg«/ process adranres in tfis/ribufion'.
An exception worth mentioning is the small health insurer DSW, which by 2003 owned 4
pharmacies (He/ Fiminriee/e DagMud, DSW overweegt claim De Geus, 23 April 2003). How-
ever, there is also some criticism on DSW: the Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics SFK
argues that 'it is not clear how € 4 mln worth of premiums spent on goodwill on behalf of an
own pharmacy in Schiedam lead to hundreds of millions of euros flowing back to the public'
(Pnarnma'Hfisc/i IVeefcMnd, De Geus uit de bocht, vol. 138, nr. 10, 2003).
The community pharmacy market in the UK is characterised by a high proportion of phar-
macies belonging to a chain. In 2002 the three market leaders accounted for 27% of all NHS
contractor pharmacies (i.e. pharmacies with a license to dispense prescription drugs). With
1268 outlets. Boots the Chemists had a share in the total number of outlets in the UK of 10.5%;
Lloydspharmacy, which is owned by the wholesaler GEHE AG. (Celesio), had a share of
10.9% and Moss Pharmacy, which is owned by the wholesaler Alliance Unichem, had a share
of 6.4%. OFT (2003, volume 1, p. 11).
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Because of the entry of Boots into the Dutch pharmaceutical market, a differentia-
tion in services came about. Calling their pharmacy departments 'B-pharmacies',
the Boots establishments did not take care of magistral preparation (i.e. the produc-
tion of pharmacy made drugs) or home delivery of drugs. Besides, a Boots phar-
macy could not treat chronic patients, nor could it participate in any observation
schedule. After all, the establishments of Boots do not have office windows and no
arrangements could be made for night duty because the stores are bound by the
opening hours of the shopping centre.'"' The result obviously was that Boots merely
became a supplier of prescribed drugs, which caused a differentiation in the Dutch
market for pharmaceutical services. The pharmaceutical service offered by the Boots
chain can be considered some kind of para-profession.**
Boots soon found out that it was made very difficult for its pharmacy departments
to make contracts with health insurers. The chemist's chain even had to go to court
in order to receive the possibility to hand in prescriptions to two of the largest
Dutch health insurers, CZ and VGZ. Only health insurer Zilveren Kruis, which had
(some years before) also been one of the firsts to experiment with mail order phar-
macy, entered into a contract with Boots voluntarily. Making contacts with general
practitioners and community pharmacists also turned out to be very difficult for
Boots establishments. This can be explained by the fact that the establishment of a
Boots pharmacy in a certain area would cause an enormous decrease in the value of
community pharmacies in its surroundings. General practitioners often showed
solidarity with the incumbent pharmacists, probably because they meet each other
on a regular basis during the meetings within the scope of pharmacotherapeutic
consultations (see § 3.2.1).^' The reaction mentioned above by health insurers such
as VGZ and CZ can possibly be explained in the same way. They might fear to harm
their relationships with the incumbent pharmacists if they would bargain with a
chain like Boots. However, this view is not founded scientifically.''"
In the meantime, however, the Dutch adventure of Boots has ended already. In Au-
gust 2000 Boots terminated all its activities in the Netherlands due to disappointing
results of its pharmacy departments. The company concluded a strategic alliance
with Ahold-daughter Etos and sold all its establishments to this Dutch chemist's
chain.''" The lack of success of the Boots pharmacy departments can partly be ex-
plained by the tense Dutch labour market at the time. There was a shortage of
Pftarmoceuhsdi Wee/SrWad, vol. 133, nr. 27, pp. 919-921.
Shaked and Sutton, 1981. Supra, § 2.5.4.
Supra, note 178.
Plwrmflcewfisdi WeeltWad, vol. 133, nr. 27,1999, pp. 919-920; Dagb/ad de Limfci/rger, Prozac naast
parfum en poeders, 26 June 1999.
More specifically: Boots sold all its 17 establishments - of which 10 had a pharmacy depart-
ment - with its 400 employees to Etos, which gained the exclusive right to distribute Boots
products in the Netherlands. Hef FmanrieWe DagMad, Nederlandse ketens lonken naar Europa,
23 April 2001.
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pharmacists and assistants willing to work in the Boots stores: while the company
owned 17 shops in the Netherlands, for only 10 of these establishments it had been
able to find enough pharmacists and assistants.*** Furthermore, the failure of Boots
in the Netherlands resulted from the fact that the number of rendered prescription
drugs appeared to fall short of expectations, especially compared to the number of
OTC drugs sold. The combination of a chemist's and a pharmacy seemed not to
work in the Netherlands. Perhaps part of the failure of Boots can be explained by
the unfamiliarity of Dutch consumers (i.e. patients) with the pharmacy department
of Boots. However, it is likely that also the opposition from other pharmacists,
health insurers, and physicians had an influence on the course of events. For exam-
ple, some physicians send their prescriptions electronically to a limited number of
pharmacies only. And in § 3.1.2 I already mentioned the case of the mail order phar-
macy initiated by the health insurer Geove that was pushed out of the market by
opposition from pharmacists, wholesalers and health insurers.*^ The failure of
Boots shows once again how difficult it is to create some competition in the heavily
regulated Dutch pharmaceutical market. It is evidently insufficient to break the pro-
fessional monopoly of pharmacists only partially, as long as there is still much re-
strictive self-regulation elsewhere in the market.*^ However, I will demonstrate in
§ 7.6 that other companies, viz. the big national and international pharmaceutical
wholesale chains, have been more successful in entering the Dutch retail market.
In April 2003, less than 3 years after the chemist's chain Etos bought the Boots estab-
lishments, Etos itself opened two pharmacy departments in its stores in the Dutch
city Den Bosch. In addition, so-called Drug Service outlets (Medicijnservice punten)
have been opened in three other Etos stores in Den Bosch. At these outlets prescrip-
tions can be handed in. The medicines concerned can be collected some hours later
or can be posted by Etos to the address chosen by the patient. Moreover, Etos coop-
erates with the supermarket Albert Heijn (which is also a Ahold-daughter), of
which five branches have been equipped with a Drug Service outlet. Initially, it con-
cerns a test, but if the results are satisfactory Etos hopes to attain national coverage
in the long term. Etos expects to do better than Boots, because of the more strategic
locations and the fact that the brand 'Etos' is already known in the Netherlands. The
company expects that the Dutch drug market will remain lucrative in the near fu-
ture because of a strong increase of the ageing population. Problems in finding em-
ployees, i.e. pharmacists and pharmacist's assistants, are not expected; Etos and
Albert Heijn employ flexible timetables and therefore expect to find many part-time
workers. The initiative of Etos is supported by the major health insurers in Den
Bosch, CZ and VGZ, and by the organisations of patients and consumers. The
pharmacists' association KNMP disapproves of the Drug Service outlets, arguing
that the safety of the drug provision and the quality of pharmaceutical care pro-
vided at these counters will be lower than the safety and the quality provided in a
*** De VoWcs/cranf, Apotheker krijgt nieuwe concurrentie, 9 August, 2000.
*55 See also iii/ro, § 7.6, and Horsten (1996/1997, pp. 93-115).
** This conclusion was first presented in Maks, Philipsen and Faure (2001).
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regular pharmacy. According to Etos, however, the safety is guaranteed by an elec-
tronic system of medication guidance. The Drug Service outlets are supervised by a
qualified pharmacist; the distribution takes place by a chemist or a pharmacist's
assistant.^
Like Boots before them, Etos is providing some kind of para-profession. Consumers
have a choice between a regular pharmacy and a drug counter. The emphasis at a
drug counter lies on an accessible and fast distribution; if consumers want more
advice or information, they can always choose to go to a regular pharmacy. Time
will tell if the Etos 'experiment' is indeed more successful than the one carried out
by Boots.
7.6 Case study 2: OPG
OPG, in full OPG Group N.V., is the largest pharmaceutical wholesaler in the Neth-
erlands, with a market share of about 35%. Established as a cooperative in 1899 by a
group of pharmacists, with the aim of purchasing medicines as cheaply as possible
for all of its members,"*^ the profile and mission of the company have expanded in
recent years. That is, in addition to its wholesale activities, the company has also
successfully entered the Dutch retail market, by buying up pharmacies. In fact, the
financial performance of OPG now depends to a large extent on the company's po-
sition in the retail market. OPG became a public limited liability company in Janu-
ary 2001 and today has operations in Poland (Orfe group: wholesale and retail
activities), Belgium (the relatively small pharmaceutical wholesaler Flandria N.V.)
and Norway . ^ In early 2003 OPG announced plans to take over a small number of
pharmacies in Belgium.*"*
One may wonder whether OPG, with its very strong position in the Dutch pharma-
ceutical market and its background as a cooperative of pharmacists, has (had) a role
in preventing unwanted newcomers from entering the retail market. On the other
hand, the market power of OPG may (have) be(en) important vis-ä-vis the market
power of the pharmaceutical industry. For these reasons OPG is an interesting case
to investigate within the context of this research. Furthermore, given that OPG is
not the only pharmaceutical chain that has been engaged in entering the Dutch
pharmaceutical market, I will below briefly consider the most significant other (in-
Sources: <http://www.etosapotheek.nl>; De VoWcsfcranf, Medicijn op recept bij Etos en AH, 11
December 2002; Hef Fiiifl/iciee/e DagWad, Etos ziet nog rek op drogistenschap, 27 December
2002; De VoWcsfcranf, Drogist bevordert zichzelf tot apotheker, 29 April 2003; Eta;, Etos Apo-
theekservice opent deuren voor publiek in 's-Hertogenbosch, press report Etos, 29 April 2003.
Hef Financieefe DagWnd, Apothekers willen tegenwoordig meer vrije tijd, 12 March 2001.
Website OPG Group: <http://www.opggroep.nl>.
De Finanriee/ Economisc/ie Ti/d, OPG wil apotheken overnemen in Belgiö, 15 February 2003;
Hef Loatefe Meines, OPG aast op Belgische apotheken, 18 February 2002.
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ternational) pharmacy chains as well, i.e. the German pharmaceutical chain GEHE
(in April 2003 renamed Celesio) and the British-French company Alliance Unichem.
In early 2001 OPG had taken over 80 pharmacies already in the Netherlands. The
procedure is simple: OPG pays a take-over price to the pharmacists in question and
employs him/her within its so-called Mediveen Groep. I noted in chapter 4 that this
became possible only in 1999, as a result of the lifting of a legal provision that pro-
hibited the employment of pharmacists by non-pharmacists (the old Article 15 from
the Pharmaceutical Practice Decree). Pharmacists who belong to the OPG chain - or
another wholesale chain such as GEHE or Alliance Unichem - do not need to worry
anymore about the management of the pharmacy. Apparently many formerly self-
employed pharmacists wanted more free time and did not mind being employed,
although there are also many pharmacists who rather run their own business. OPG
formulated as an objective to own 150 pharmacies by the end of the year 2002. This
appeared not to be unfeasible: at the end of 2001 OPG owned 117 pharmacies and in
June 2002 the number had risen to 137. Considering the large number of potential
acquisition candidates still 'in the pipeline' at the time, the objective was therefore
comfortably within OPG's reach.^' Indeed, the Annual Report of 2002 stated a
number of 153 Mediveen pharmacies. Because of the plans of the Dutch government
to cut the pharmacists' rates by increasing the clawback (see § 4.6.2), OPG decided
to temporarily stop the acquisition activities to await further developments.*"
But OPG did more than just awaiting further developments: it took legal action
against the government plans, just as the pharmacists' association KNMP did. In an
official press release OPG stated that it
'believes that there is insubstantial support for this measure and that it has been rashly
implemented. Moreover, the government has not demonstrated that the interests of
those directly affected by this measure were properly taken into account in the
decision-making process'.*"'
On 29 April 2003 the judge of the Trade and Industry Appeals Board (College van
Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven) granted the request of OPG and the KNMP and sus-
pended the government measures until, at least, 1 August 2003. Naturally, the
health insurers and the government were disappointed with this result.^
<*' OPG Groep NV, Amtua/ Report 2002, p. 5; OPG Groep NV, Haty/aarfceridtf 2002, p. 3.
**- OPG Groep NV, Ammo/ Report 2002, pp. 7-8.
*** OPG Groep N. V., Legal action against clawback of purchase reimbursement for pharmaceuti-
cals, press release OPG, 18 April 2003.
** M/msferie ;vm Vo/lcsgezomflieiiJ, WWzi/n en Sport, Aanpak kortingen apothekers blijft uitgangs-
punt, press report Ministry of Public Health, 29 April 2004; OPG Groep N. V., Preliminary reli-
ef judge grants OPG's request for suspension of clawback, press release OPG, 29 April 2003;
He/ Fimwiriee/e Dugfr/ad, Rechter stopt extra afromen van apotheker, 30 April 2003;
fisc/i WertMod, Markt in beroering, vol. 138, nr. 21,23 May 2003.
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OPG was (probably) involved as well in a little price war that broke out in May
2003. After expiration of the patent of the cholesterol reducer Zocor, a pharmaceuti-
cal specialite, the generic drug producer Genthon started to offer its unbranded cho-
lesterol reducer simzwsffffnie at record low prices, but Genthon was boycotted
immediately by pharmacists and wholesalers. Pharmacists of course were afraid to
lose the high discounts (of up to 80%) they used to receive for cholesterol reducers
in the past. Again, the health insurers and the government seemed to be left empty-
handed, and the power block of pharmacists and wholesalers seemed to be effec-
tive. Although the health insurers CZ, Menzis and VGZ announced plans to reim-
burse only the cheap Genthon variant of simiwstofiMe/** some wholesalers already
cancelled orders. Moreover, Genthon is a relatively small drug producer that will
never be able to serve the whole Dutch market, and other producers of siV/uwstofiHe
were not taking part in the 'price war'. The branch association of health insurers ZN
wanted the Dutch Competition Authority NMa to investigate the situation and
therefore filed a complaint against the pharmacists and wholesalers that exclude
Genthon from delivery. Apparently, Genthon and some health insurers keep a reg-
ister of those pharmacies and wholesalers that take part in the boycot (which is, un-
fortunately, confidential). The NMa announced that it was going to investigate the
price agreements in the whole drug branch, i.e. producers, wholesalers and phar-
macists.'*'*'
In § 3.1.1.2 I already mentioned that the pharmacists and the big wholesale compa-
nies were also mixed up somehow in the failure of the very first mail order phar-
macy experiment in the Netherlands, initiated by the health insurer Geove in 1992.
Horsten (1996/1997), who wrote an extensive case study on the Geove mail order
pharmacy, makes mention of the fact that OPG was involved again, this time by
refusing to deliver products any longer to a pharmacist who was participating in
this mail order experiment. The other (of the very few) fully sorted wholesalers in
the Netherlands were not willing to take over the delivery either.'"''' It seems that
OPG, together with the other fully sorted wholesalers and the KNMP (which was
against the idea of mail order pharmacy) was using its market power here to sabo-
tage any 'non-cooperative' pharmacists. It is important to put in mind that at the
time (i.e. 1993) the Dutch Competition Act was not yet in force.
The discussion above does not alter my belief already discussed in § 7.4 that chain
store retailing in itself is no threat to the quality of pharmaceutical care. However, in
**s That is, if the physician does not specifically prescribe the original speciale Zocor and holds
to that decision. In that case a pharmacist is obliged to dispense Zocor.
*** Sources: <http://www.zn.nl>; Tro»«', Boycot goedkope medicijnen, 8 May 2003; De Vo/fcs-
krflHf, Medicijnenoorlog toont falen overheidsbeleid, 9 May 2003; Hef FmanrifWe DagWad,
Aanklacht bij NMa tegen apothekers, 9 May 2003. In June 2003 the NMa invaded the main of-
fice of the KNMP in order to look for evidence of price agreements and boycotting of cheap
drug producers: see KNMP, NMa bezoekt KNMP, press report KNMP, 4 June 2003; De
Vo/tefcranf, NMa-overval in kantoor apothekers, 6 June 2003.
** Horsten (1996-1997, pp. 98-101).
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situations where wholesale chains such as OPG have market power in the wholesale
market combined with a large market share in the retail market, one should be
aware of any possible abuse of this market power. The investigations initiated by
the NMa in May 2003, which I mentioned above, will most probably have to deal
with this issue as well.
As a final note to this section, it is interesting to have a look at the development of
chain retailing in the Netherlands: after all, OPG may be the biggest pharmacy chain
but it is not the only company involved in buying up pharmacies. Following the UK
and the USA, and in line with the trend in several other countries, the relative num-
ber of independent pharmacies in the Netherlands is going down at the expense of
the number of chain outlets. In the year 2001 the number of pharmacies belonging
to a chain was 380 out of a total number of public pharmacies of 1630, which is a
percentage of 23%.*'* Looking at the current developments, this percentage will
only increase in the coming years. The most striking targets have been reported by
the German pharmaceutical company GEHE and the British-French company Alli-
ance Unichem. GEHE was at the end of 2001 the owner of 11 pharmacies (all ob-
tained in that year) and reported to strive for 200 to 250 pharmacies within 3 to 5
years from then. Alliance Unichem has since 2000 been the owner of all pharmacies
within the 'Vier Vijzels' group. This group comprised of 27 pharmacies at the end of
2001. The target of Alliance Unichem was to have 100 pharmacies in the Dutch mar-
ket within 3 years from then. In early 2003 it owned 38 pharmacies.-**'
7.7 Summary
This chapter dealt with the question whether pharmacists in the Netherlands and
Belgium are actually successful rent-seekers, by means of a presentation and analy-
sis of a number of empirical data. Also, I tried to analyse whether differences in
regulation between these countries might to some extent explain the effectiveness of
pharmacists' rent seeking. I considered the evolution of the number of pharmacies
and pharmacists, the (relative) average income of pharmacists, and the issue of
goodwill. However, acquiring exact data for the last two categories appeared to be
quite difficult for various reasons, which have been described in detail in § 7.1.
Some parts of the analysis therefore consisted of own computations on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. In addition to the indicators mentioned above, I presented
two case studies (Boots and OPG) in which the rent-seeking behaviour of different
parties in the Dutch pharmaceutical market is analysed.
** He* Financieefc DagMad, Winst OPG groeit met 15%, 19 February 2002. See also SFK (2002, p.
50).
** Interpharm, the second largest pharmaceutical wholesaler in the Netherlands (supra,
§ 3.1.2.1), is also part of Alliance Unichem. For more information on GEHE and Alliance-
Unichem, see: <http://www.gehe.de>, <http:www.celesio.com>, <http://www.4v.nl>,
<http://www.alliance-unichem.com>.
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With respect to the number of pharmacies, there are considerable differences be-
tween the Netherlands and Belgium. In Belgium the number of pharmacies is much
higher than in the Netherlands, but the effect of the establishment policy is visible in
both countries. The reasons behind the establishment policy differ between the
countries, however. In the Netherlands the reason behind the KNMP policy is a re-
striction of entry by the incumbent pharmacists to guarantee 'financially sound'
pharmacies, while in Belgium the government tries to regulate the 'oversupply' of
pharmacies. It follows that the number of patients per pharmacy in the Netherlands
is much higher than the Belgian one. Moreover, in Belgium this number has been
more or less constant (slightly decreasing at first and now slightly increasing) dur-
ing the last decades, while in the Netherlands the number of patients per pharmacy
is high and has always been increasing. One has the impression that the Dutch
started much earlier with limiting market entry than the Belgians and that they suc-
ceeded in reducing an already small number of pharmacies even further.
The data on the average incomes of pharmacists suggest that Dutch pharmacists
have higher incomes than their Belgian counterparts, although Belgian pharmacists
do relatively well compared to a number of other professionals in Belgium. Obvi-
ously this difference will to a large extent be due to the average number of patients
per pharmacy. The fact that Belgian pharmacists have a monopoly in the distribu-
tion of OTC drugs, whereas in the Netherlands also licensed chemists are allowed to
sell OTC drugs, seems to have a much smaller effect on our income data (probably
because this influences the number of pharmacies as well). However, one has to be
careful with interpreting income data, since high incomes do not necessarily ema-
nate from higher rents as a result of rent-seeking behaviour. Also, it is difficult to
obtain data on the average pharmacist's income (especially concerning the Nether-
lands) and the data I found could not be compared with one another without mak-
ing some additional assumptions.
I also considered the 'goodwill-problem'. Both in the Netherlands and in Belgium
pharmacists who want to take over a pharmacy have to pay large amounts of
money for goodwill. This practice shows that the license to operate a pharmacy has
a real and high value (over and above the value of real estate, stocks, and such). The
fact that high amounts of money have to be paid for goodwill already suggests that
there are rents that can be captured by pharmacists. Although one should obviously
distinguish between supra-competitive profits and high incomes resulting from, e.g.
investments in training or compensation for greater responsibilities, there seems to
be a problem with the goodwill paid for pharmacies in the Netherlands and in Bel-
gium. Namely, the amounts paid for goodwill largely relate to rents resulting from
protective regulation (in particular the professional monopoly analysed in chapter
6) as opposed to reimbursements for real efforts.
Due to the high prices that have to be paid for a pharmacy nowadays, many phar-
macies in the Netherlands and Belgium are now taken over by wholesale chains and
chemist's chains. This is in itself not a problem, because consumers are not deprived
of the pharmaceutical services provided by a qualified pharmacist in a chain store.
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However, the first experiment in the Netherlands, undertaken by the British chem-
ist's chain Boots, failed. In 1999 Boots started opening pharmacy departments in its
stores as a reaction to the amendments in the Dutch law that lifted the ban on em-
ployment of pharmacists by non-pharmacists. It offered a kind of para-profession in
the sense that it merely became a supplier of prescribed drugs and was less concen-
trated on providing a service. The eventual failure of the Boots experiment can
partly be explained by the tense Dutch labour market at the time and, perhaps,
partly by the unfamiliarity of Dutch drug consumers with the pharmacy depart-
ments of Boots. However, probably also the opposition from other pharmacists
(non-cooperation, provisions in the Dutch Pharmacy Standards), health insurers
(contracting problems) and physicians (non-cooperation, electronic prescriptions)
contributed to this. The chemist's chain Etos, which bought the Boots establish-
ments in 2001, started a similar experiment in April 2003. Time will have to tell if
this is going to be a more successful one.
I also studied OPG, the biggest wholesaler in the Dutch pharmaceutical market with
a market share of about 35% and also active in buying up pharmacies: at the end of
2002 OPG owned 153 pharmacies. One may wonder whether OPG, with this strong
market position and a background as a cooperative of pharmacists, has had a role in-
preventing unwanted newcomers from the market. Indeed, OPG played a part in
the failure of the very first mail order experiment in the Netherlands, by refusing to
deliver products to a pharmacist who was participating in this experiment. OPG
was also, together with pharmacists, successfully involved in a legal action against
government plans to increase the claw-back in 2003. In addition, it is possible that
OPG (again, together with pharmacists) was one of the wholesalers involved in the
boycotting of Genthon, a generic drug producer that started to offer its unbranded
cholesterol reducer at record low prices. In any case, one should be aware of any
possible abuse of market power in situations such as this where wholesalers have
market power in the wholesale market combined with a large (and increasing) mar-
ket share in the retail market. The Dutch Competition Authority NMa announced in
May 2003 that it was going to investigate the price agreements in the whole drug
branch, after a complaint filed by the health insurers' association ZN against phar-
macists and wholesalers. In that respect it seems necessary that also the 'power
block' between pharmacists and wholesalers is investigated.
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Having passed through every research stage described in the beginning of this the-
sis I am now able to provide an answer to the central problem statement: <fo f/iere
«ri'sf _/brms 0/ (se//-,)regH/<jfiOH 1/1 f/ie p/wrmfleei/h'cfl/ pro/ess/o/i f/wf incrertse socia/ u>e//nre
1« f/ie economy, or is f/iis regu/flfton mere/y « res»// o/reHf-seefa>ig Mw?»!our? In this jour-
ney I had to combine elements from economics, law, and - as far as the investiga-
tion into the activities of pharmacists is concerned - pharmacy, and I have looked at
the situation in both the Netherlands and in Belgium (with occasional comparisons
with other countries and other professions).
The first stage involved an investigation of the existing relevant economic literature,
in order to answer the subquestion: i/>/mr rfoes «TOHO/HJC f//«>n/ te// HS «fron/ (se//-)
regn/<7fion in Me pro/essio/is? It would lead us too far afield to give an extensive an-
swer here (for that I refer to chapter 2), but a brief summary of the results seems
called for. I distinguished between the public interest approach and the private in-
terest approach to regulation. The former looks upon regulation as a remedy for
market failure, directed towards an improvement in social welfare. Most important
for the case of the liberal professions is the information asymmetry argument: be-
cause many professional services, e.g. the provision of pharmaceutical care by a
pharmacist, are 'experience goods' or even 'trust goods', regulation may be needed
to prevent quality deterioration resulting from adverse selection. In addition, the
presence of externalities may provide an argument in favour of professional regula-
tion, as well as the moral hazard problem of demand generation (although the latter
does not seem to be relevant in the case of pharmacists). The private interest ap-
proach, which has originated from the capture theory, public choice theory, and the
economic theory of regulation, stresses the influence of interest groups in the forma-
tion of regulation. The basic idea of this approach is that interest groups are con-
tinually influencing political decisions in order to seek rents for themselves, which
is unproductive from a social welfare point of view. After all, resources are then
devoted to capturing a wealth transfer from consumers to producers. Professional
associations are often small (relative to the public at large), single-issue oriented and
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well organised. These are precisely the criteria that define an interest group accord-
ing to the economic literature.
Regulation should not go further (in limiting market entry or restricting competi-
tion) than is necessary to cure the prevailing market failure. The most efficient regu-
latory instrument(s) should be chosen, taking into account the effects of regulation
on consumer surplus, producer surplus and the deadweight welfare loss. I showed
in that respect that licensing and quality standards constitute a heavier interference
with the market than regulation of information (supervision of advertising, manda-
tory information provision, certification), but are more effective in keeping low
quality services from the market. Naturally, the type of regulation to be used de-
pends very much on the specific circumstances of a market. Price fixing, especially
when backed by the government, is the kind of regulation that is most restrictive of
competition.
The main arguments in favour of self-regulation (as opposed to public regulation)
refer to the specific knowledge of professionals, the flexibility of self-regulating
agencies compared to public bodies and the lower costs of self-regulation. However,
of these arguments only one is left undisputed by the private interest approach,'
namely the 'specific knowledge' argument. Both approaches contain plausible ar-
guments pro and contra self-regulation. Also the formal-economic papers I dis-
cussed do not seem to give clear-cut arguments pro or contra self-regulation. I
concluded the economic overview by stating that there may indeed be room for
(self-)regulation of quality in the professions based on the arguments mentioned
above, but one would like to see a guarantee of an improvement in social welfare.
Therefore, the regulation of a profession should preferably be measured against EC
Competition law, as defined in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
The second subquestion I had to answer is the following: a?/wf wafionn/
rmd st?//-re£H/flfon/ mensures issued fry prq/essionn/ bodies ex/'sf m Me Nef/ier/fl/ids wid i«
Be/gium M'/f/i resperf to f/ie p/inminceuricn/ prq/essio»? Before I could deal with this
question I first needed to give an overview of the pharmaceutical market (produc-
tion, distribution and consumption of drugs) and to analyse the evolution of the
pharmacists' profession and the role and functions of a pharmacist today (details in
chapter 3). Of course, the dispensing of drugs still makes up an important part of a
modern pharmacist's job responsibilities, as it did decades ago. However, he/she
also appears to have a number of 'new tasks' in the field of pharmaceutical care,
while the tasks involved in compounding of drugs have decreased considerably.
The 'new tasks' include medication control, monitoring of drug therapy, advising
consumers and providing pharmacotherapeutic information and advice to physi-
cians. Especially the last task has become very important; the first three tasks can to
some extent also be performed by pharmacists' assistants under the supervision of a
pharmacist.
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It has become clear from the legal analysis that the complex regulation in the Neth-
erlands (chapter 4) and Belgium (chapter 5) has not greatly adapted to meet these
new tasks. For both countries I considered, successively, the regulations regarding
education, registration and title protection, establishment and takeover prices, exer-
cise of the profession (advertising, design of the pharmacy), and prices and fees.
Both countries regulate the entry into the profession through registration proce-
dures and protect the professional monopoly of the pharmacist in the dispensing of
prescription drugs. In Belgium also the sale of OTC drugs is reserved for pharma-
cists. Moreover, in Belgium the establishment of pharmacies is completely regulated
by Royal Decrees. This is not the case in the Netherlands, where the establishment
policy of the pharmacists' association KNMP is now of little importance compared
to the 1980s and 1990s. In general the self-regulatory power of the KNMP, which
was impressive until the beginning of the 21st century, has been decreasing in re-
cent years, predominantly as a result of the introduction of the Competition Act in
the Netherlands and its enforcement by the NMa. Until the end of 2001 the KNMP
prohibited its members (over 90% of all pharmacists) to advertise their pharmacy,
while in Belgium in 2003 this was still the case. In addition, strict rules concerning
the design of the pharmacy and the exercise of the profession could be found in the
self-regulation of the KNMP up until 2002 and can still be found in the 'deontologi-
cal rules' of the Order of Pharmacists in Belgium, which apply to all pharmacists.
However, these rules have come under attack in Dutch and Belgian case law, which
in the Netherlands has already led to some changes in the self-regulation.
In the Netherlands and in Belgium pharmacists do not have any influence on the
price of drugs and on the tariffs they may ask for their services. As a matter of fact,
this is the case - at least to some extent - in all EU Member States. In the Nether-
lands the 'receptregelvergoeding' is a fixed amount, while in Belgium the margin of
a pharmacist amounts to a percentage of the drug price. In the Netherlands there is
an incentive measure to encourage the dispensing of cheaper products: under cer-
tain circumstances a Dutch pharmacist is allowed to substitute prescribed drugs by
cheaper or better alternatives. A Belgian pharmacist is strictly bound by the original
prescription. Considering their professional monopoly that also includes OTC
drugs, Belgian pharmacists seem to be (more than their Dutch counterparts) mere
sellers of drugs, while Dutch pharmacists have a more prominent role also as an
advisor to physicians considering the relative importance of pharmacotherapeutic
consultations in the Netherlands.
On the basis of these economic and legal frameworks I was able to carry out the
qualitative and quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is related to the third
subquestion: does Wie (se//-,)regw/rtfion o/f/ie p/umnaceMfiai/ pro/ession promote socm/ u>e/-
/nre, or s/ion/d z'f (to fl /esser or grrafer exfenf) be co/is/dererf ns n too/ in f/ie /i/mds o/prizwfe
inferesf groups? The answer to the first part of this subquestion is that, although I
just noted that there are some public interest arguments in favour of some regula-
tion of the quality of pharmaceutical services, a considerable number of regulations
found in the Netherlands and Belgium do not promote social welfare. I explained
that the fee regulation, prohibition of advertising, restrictions on the design of the
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pharmacy and the establishment policy seem to go further than would be warranted
to cure a market failure (see chapter 6). Moreover, these regulations generally con-
centrate more on the protection of the distribution task of pharmacists, while one
would actually like to see only a regulation of the quality of services. Most drugs
sold in a pharmacy today are prepacked drugs anyway, because of the rise of indus-
trially prepared medicine at the expense of magisterially prepared medicine.
Should these regulations be considered tools in the hands of private interest groups
then? With respect to pharmacists, in particular the establishment policy, the prohi-
bition of advertising and the regulation of the design of the pharmacy seem to be
promulgated in their interest, at least to some extent. These are exactly those regula-
tions that have always been formulated and enforced by the professional associa-
tions themselves (with the exception of the establishment decree in Belgium). How-
ever, the price and fee regulation may be the result of competition for regulation
among different interest groups, as it probably promotes the interests of health in-
surers and the pharmaceutical industry as well. That is, although one could argue
that normal price competition between drug producers would be more beneficial
for health insurers, in the current system with regulated prices they hardly have to
worry about competition with other health insurers. The pharmaceutical industry
itself is apparently still able to provide large amounts of bonuses and discounts to
pharmacists and hospitals.
Furthermore, it is likely that none of the involved parties (pharmacists, health in-
surers, the government, drug producers and consumers) benefit from regulation
that links the professional monopoly of the pharmacist to the fixed fee/margin. The
professional monopoly in the distribution of drugs does of course protect pharma-
cists from competition from other retailers such as chemists. However, the combina-
tion of this monopoly with the fixed fee/ margin only encourages the mere selling of
(mostly prepacked) prescription drugs, while giving no incentives at all to provide
services, despite the often assumed new tasks of pharmacists in the field of pharma-
ceutical care. Both the public interest and private interest analysis come to this con-
clusion (see, again, chapter 6). Hence, my findings based on the qualitative research
support the position of European Commissioner Mario Monti referred to at the very
beginning of this thesis. Indeed, as Monti stated, the pharmaceutical profession is
one of the oldest and most regulated professions, and I showed that the regulations
have not at all adapted to the new tasks that pharmacists have.
Although pharmacists in both countries appear to have been quite successful in as
far as the contents of the regulation is concerned, it is another question whether they
have been successful rent seekers. Hence the fourth subquestion: /'s f/iere n«y emp/'n-
CY7/ «»id«?«« of renf-striti;i£ Miflz>ionr fry p/mn/mnsfs? Because the pharmaceutical mar-
ket is very different from many other markets I had to use some rather unusual
techniques to estimate the effects of rent seeking by pharmacists (see chapter 7). In
addition, some empirical data appeared not to be obtainable because of non-disclo-
sure policies or non-availability, e.g. with respect to the average pharmacist's in-
come and the goodwill paid for the take-over of a pharmacy. Some parts of my
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qualitative analysis therefore consisted necessarily of own computations on the ba-
sis of circumstantial evidence. . .:
I showed, by presenting a number of figures, that the establishment policies of the
KNMP and the Belgian government have been quite effective. From a comparative
point of view, I showed that the total number of pharmacies and pharmacists in
Belgium is a lot higher than in the Netherlands, whereas in the Netherlands the
number of patients per pharmacy is higher. This difference can partly be explained
by the fact that Belgian pharmacists also have a monopoly on OTC drugs, but it
may also be explained partly by the fact that Belgian patients - apparently - expect
a quick service offered by a large body of pharmacists. The data on the average in-
comes of pharmacists I presented suggest that Dutch pharmacists have higher in-
comes than their Belgian counterparts, although Belgian pharmacists do relatively
well compared to a number of other professionals in Belgium. One has the impres-
sion that the Dutch started much earlier with limiting market entry than the Bel-
gians and that they succeeded in reducing an already small number of pharmacists
even further. The effects of this on the average pharmacist's income appear to have
been bigger (in my rather crude estimations) than the mere fact that Dutch pharma-
cists do not have a monopoly on OTC drugs. Unfortunately it was not possible to
distinguish between the margin on OTC drugs and the margin on prescription
drugs, because the Belgian data did not allow me do to that. With respect to the
amounts paid for goodwill of pharmacies, finally, I found that these are high in both
countries. The fact that high amounts of money have to be paid for goodwill already
suggests that there are rents that can be captured by pharmacists. More specifically,
the goodwill consists of the capitalised surplus profits gained from trade benefits
(bonuses and discounts) and the expected future profits on the pharmaceutical
market. However, one has to be careful in interpreting these data on incomes and
goodwill amounts, since high incomes and goodwill amounts do not necessarily
emanate from higher rents as a result of rent seeking behaviour. One should distin-
guish between supra-competitive profits and high incomes resulting from invest-
ments in training or compensation for greater responsibilities. But there seems to be
a problem with the goodwill paid for pharmacies in the Netherlands and Belgium,
exactly because the amounts paid for goodwill largely concern rents that result from
protective regulation (notably, the professional monopoly) as opposed to reim-
bursements for real efforts.
In addition to this presentation of empirical data, I presented two Dutch case stud-
ies dealing with Boots and OPG, respectively. The failure of Boots and the way in
which power blocks of wholesalers (such as market leader OPG) and pharmacists
sabotage new distribution initiatives and attempts by the government, generic drug
producers (Genthon) and health insurers to decrease the costs of health care, show
how difficult it is to create some competition in the heavily regulated Dutch phar-
maceutical market. It appeared in particular from the Boots case that it is insuffi-
cient to break the professional monopoly of pharmacists only partially, as long as
there is still much restrictive self-regulation elsewhere in the market. However, the
intervention by the Dutch Competition Authority NMa in the pharmaceutical mar-
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ket in recent years has already resulted in some drastic changes in the KNMP self-
regulation. In addition, the health insurers seem to be more and more willing to let
go of the collective agreements with pharmacists: while in the Boots and mail order
pharmacy cases they were mostly on the side of the 'incumbent' pharmacists and
wholesalers, in 2003 they seem to be more and more on the side of the government
(as the Genthon and claw-back cases show).
Although I found qualitative and quantitative proof for the arguments put forward
by the private interest approach to regulation, the empirical question of whether
Dutch and Belgian pharmacists are successful rent-seekers remains a difficult one to
answer, because additional (very difficult-to-obtain) data are needed to make
stronger claims. Hence, this question remains an open one that is certainly worth
further research, not only with respect to the countries dealt with in this thesis but
also with respect to other countries - and other professions. The studies mentioned
in the introduction (and throughout some of the other chapters) commissioned by
the European Commission and by the Irish Competition Authority, as well as the
market investigations carried out by the Office of Fair Trading in the UK show that
a lot of research into the (over)regulation of professions is still being carried out to-
day.
The conclusions to my positive (as opposed to a normative) law and economics
analysis of the regulation of pharmacists have hereby been restated. Indeed, part of
the regulation seems to be a result of rent-seeking behaviour by pharmacists, and it
also seems that some of the self-regulatory rules which aim at a protection of the
distribution tasks should preferably be abandoned, notably those regarding adver-
tising and the design of the pharmacy. This applies in particular to Belgium, be-
cause in the Netherlands the self-regulation has undergone some changes already,
as I noted above. Other regulations do not seem to serve a public nor a private in-
terest goal. From a normative point of view, I already noted at the end of chapter 6
that a solution to one of the main problems I came across in this thesis, i.e. the inef-
ficiency of the current definition of the professional monopoly and its connection to
the reimbursement of pharmacists, might be found in a new remuneration system
for pharmacists. One should think of a remuneration system that rewards pharma-
cists separately for tasks performed in the field of pharmaceutical care, such as ad-
vise to physicians, and for distributional tasks. In this respect the developments in
the Netherlands, where - forced by the government - health insurers are more and
more becoming the directors of the drug market, generate some interesting oppor-
tunities. Health insurers could be given more possibilities to reward pharmacists for
specific tasks performed, e.g. by enabling them to hire or employ pharmacists for
the sole purpose of purchasing drugs, or by rewarding them for certain pre-defined
pharmaceutical services provided to patients. Eventually this may lead to a further
differentiation within the pharmacist's profession: some pharmacists may choose to
specialise more in service, while others may choose to specialise in distribution
tasks, e.g. under the authority of health insurers. More differentiation between ser-
vice-oriented pharmacies on the one hand and pharmacies such as those of Boots
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and Etos specialised in the quick distribution (para-professions) on the other hand
will most probably be the result.
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SAMENVATTING
Hoo/dsh/Jt 1: Jn/eidmg
In dit proefschrift staan de zogenaamde 'vrije beroepen' centraal, waartoe bijvoor-
beeld advocaten, architecten, accountants, artsen en apothekers behoren. Deze be-
roepen worden gekenmerkt door een hoge graad van regulering, die niet alleen
door de overheid wordt opgesteld, maar ook door de beroepsgroepen zelf via zelf-
regulering. Gedurende de laatste jaren heeft de (publieke en zelf-) regulering van
het vrije beroep steeds meer aandacht gekregen van de politiek, d.w.z. regulerende
instanties en mededingingsautoriteiten en als gevolg daarvan ook van Juristen en de
media. Zo is de Europese Commissie in 2003 een onderzoek begonnen naar de regu-
lering van het vrije beroep in de EU-lidstaten, terwijl ook in het Verenigd Koninkrijk
en in Ierland uitgebreide rapporten zijn versehenen over het onderwerp, geschreven
in opdracht van de respectievelijke mededingingsautoriteiten. In Nederland heeft
het onderwerp veel aandacht gekregen in het kader van de zogenaamde MDW-
projecten (Marktwerking, Deregulering en Wetgevingskwaliteit) en heeft de Neder-
landse Mededingingsautoriteit NMa meerdere zaken behandeld betreffende con-
currentiebeperkende zelfregulering in de vrije beroepen.
Enerzijds kan een hoge mate van regulering de toegang tot het beroep en de coneur-
rentie tussen beroepsbeoefenaren beperken; anderzijds zou deze regulering nodig
kunnen zijn om de kwaliteit van de dienstverlening te waarborgen of te verbeteren.
Omdat beroepsgroepen in het algemeen niet onafhankelijk zijn van de belangen die
zij reguleren, is het bovendien interessant om de effecten van zelfregulering op de
sociale welvaart te analyseren. Daartoe is in dit proefschrift het apothekersberoep in
Nederland en Belgie bestudeerd. Echter, de conclusies gaan verder dan de regule-
ring van Nederlandse en Belgische apothekers alleen, omdat zij tot op zekere hoogte
ook van toepassing zijn op andere beroepen en op andere landen. De vraag die cen-
traal Staat in dit proefschrift is de volgende: zi/n fr formen wn (ze//)reg«/enng in de
npof/iefcersmflrfcf die de »Mrtfsc/iflp/>e/i/7ce it?e/ivwirf in de economie i>er/iogen, o/i's deze regu/e-
ring room/ een resu/taflf iwn 'renf seeding' gedrag? Om tot een antwoord op deze vraag
te komen worden vier subvragen gedefinieerd.
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: Ee« ecoMO»nscJ/e «««/i/se i;a« de regw/ering z>a« de uW/e
De eerste van deze vier subvragen betreft een economische analyse van (zelf-) regu-
lering, ofwel: u«jf fcivn/zen u>e /ere« IKJ/I <fe fesftumrie eamomisc/ie Meont-rä oivr regi//e-
nng? Daarvoor moeten de pi/Wic iHfcresf en pmw/e mfcresf benadering van
regulering onderzocht worden. De /»HW/'C /»ifcresf benadering van regulering be-
schrijft hoe (zelf-) regulering zou kunnen dienen als een correctie voor marktfalen.
Het reguleren van marktfalen beoogt te leiden tot verhoging van de maatschappe-
lijke welvaart. Vier vormen van marktfalen worden benadrukt in de economische
literatuur: een gebrek aan concurrence, informatieproblemen (averechtse selectie,
moreel risico, begrensde rationaliteit), externe effecten en publieke goederen. Voor
de vrije beroepen lijkt vooral informatieassymetrie tussen dienstverlener en klant
een belangrijk argument te zijn. Omdat de meeste professionele diensten 'erva-
ringsgoederen' of 'vertrouwensgoederen' zijn, zou regulering nodig kunnen zijn om
achteruitgang van de kwaliteit (als gevolg van averechtse selectie) zoals voorspeld
door Akerlof (1970) tegen te gaan. Ook het moreel risico probleem van vraagont-
wikkeling (hetgeen optreedt als een beroepsbeoefenaar diensten verleent die de
consument niet gewild zou hebben als hij of zij volledige informatie had gehad) en
de aanwezigheid van negatieve externe effecten zouden aanleidingen kunnen
om te intervenieren in de markt.
De /»riz'rt/f iHfcri'sf benadering is afgeleid van drie economische theorieen die alle de
opvatting hebben dat de rol van belangengroepen in de formulering van regulering
erg groot is. Deze theorieen zijn de cvj/>fnre f/ieon/, (elementen uit) /n/W/c dioice en de
economic f/ieon/ 0/ rvgn/rtfioM van Stigler (1971). Deze theorieen hebben als overeen-
komst dat zij alle suggereren dat regulering niet alleen een antwoord is op marktfa-
len (of zelfs helemaal niet), maar ook een resultaat van renf-seefriHg gedrag door
belangengroepen die in Staat zijn om de regelmakers te beinvloeden. Aanhangers
van de />m>flfe »j/eresf benadering beweren dat belangengroepen continu bezig zijn
met het beinvloeden van politieke besluiten, met het oogpunt om zelf winsten, of-
wel rtw/s, te behalen. Rf/i/ seefa'/ig is volgens Olson (1965) het meest succesvol als een
groep relatief klein is, haar belangen zieh toespitsen op een heel specifiek onder-
werp en zij goed is georganiseerd. Organisaties van vrije beroepsbeoefenaren lijken
in het algemeen aan deze criteria te voldoen.
Daarnaast wordt in hoofdstuk 2 een aantal vormen van kwaliteitsregulering geana-
lyseerd, in oplopende mate van ingrijpen in het marktproces. Achtereenvolgens
worden de volgende instrumenten besproken: informatievoorziening en de regule-
ring van reclame, kwaliteitsstandaarden en licenties (vergunningen) en certificaten.
Uit de economische analyse van deze vormen van regulering wordt onder meer
duidelijk dat, hoe verder een regulering ingrijpt in het marktproces, hoe groter de
kans wordt dat regulerend ingrijpen naast algemene welvaartsdoeleinden ook pri-
vate belangen zal dienen. Vervolgens staat het onderwerp zelfregulering centraal.
De hoofdargumenten voor zelfregulering werden reeds gepresenteerd in een artikel
van Miller (1985). Hij verwees naar de speeifieke kennis waarover vrije beroepsbe-
oefenaren beschikken, de flexibiliteit van zelfregulerende autoriteiten ten opzichte
168
Samenvatting
van de overheid en de lagere kosten van zelfregulering. Echter, de pr/mfe i«fwesf
benadering geeft een aantal tegenargumenten. Immers, juist omdat beroepsbeoefe-
naren lijken te voldoen aan de criteria voor belangengroepen, ontberen zij prikkels
om kwaliteitsregulering door te voeren en te controleren. Alleen het argument van
specifieke kennis blijft onbetwist. Beide benaderingen hebben plausibele argumen-
ten ten opzichte van zelfregulering. Helaas is de mathematisch-economische litera-
tuur die poogt zelfregulering te modelleren nog vrij summier. Deze literatuur geeft
bovendien ook geen eenduidige argumenten voor of tegen zelfregulering. Empiri-
sche studies naar de voors en tegens van zelfregulering lijken daarom noodzakelijk.
Men kan dus concluderen dat in sommige markten van professionele dienstverle-
ning er inderdaad enige ruimte zou kunnen zijn voor (zelf-) regulering van de kwa-
liteit, maar er dient een garantie te zijn van een welvaartsverbetering. In dat opzicht
voorziet Artikel 81(3) van het EG-mededingingsrecht, waarin de voorwaarden voor
vrijstelling van een mededingingsbeperkende overeenkomst opgesomd worden, in
een bruikbaar schema. De regulering van een vrij beroep zou getoetst kunnen wor-
den aan de hand van dit schema.
Hoo/rfsff/fc 3: De/<mnacewfisc/»e »««rÄcf
De tweede subvraag, welke behandeld wordt in de hoofstukken 3 t/m 5, is: /ioe zi/'n
rff Nerfer/n/idsf en Be/^ isc/ie rt/wf/r^ers/Hnrtf £i're#n/et?rd? Om deze vraag te kunnen
beantwoorden is het noodzakelijk eerst een inleiding te geven in de structuur van
de farmaceutische markt, welke gekenmerkt wordt door een groot aantal markt-
deelnemers die allemaal in meer of mindere mate met elkaar in contact staan: de
farmaceutische industrie, groothandels, artsen (huisartsen en specialisten), apothe-
kers, consumenten (patienten), de overheid en zorgverkeraars. Figuur 3.1 geeft de
onderlinge relaties weer. Daarna worden in hoofdstuk 3 achtereenvolgens de pro-
ductie, distributie en consumptie van geneesmiddelen besproken. Wat betreft de
prorfMCf/e van geneesmiddelen onderscheiden we verschallende soorten geneesmid-
delen: merkgeneesmiddelen (specialites), parallelimport, generieke geneesmiddelen
en apotheekbereidingen. Bovendien kunnen geneesmiddelen worden opgedeeld in
receptgeneesmiddelen (voorgeschreven door een huisarts of specialist en alleen
verkrijgbaar bij een apotheker of apotheekhoudend huisarts) en OTC, ofwel zelf-
zorggeneesmiddelen. In Belgie zijn OTC geneesmiddelen alleen in de apotheek ver-
krijgbaar, terwijl deze in Nederland ook in (gelicenseerde) drogisterijen of
drogisterij-afdelingen in supermarkten verkrijgbaar zijn. De onderverdeling in soor-
ten geneesmiddelen is grafisch uitgebeeld in figuur 3.2. De prijs van receptgenees-
middelen alsmede de vergoeding door zorgverzekeraars zijn zwaar gereguleerd,
zowel in Nederland als in Belgie.
Wat betreft de rfisfrifri/f/e van geneesmiddelen, dient een onderscheid te worden
gemaakt tussen het groothandelskanaal en de detailhandel. De groothandels vor-
men de link tussen de farmaceutische industrie en de detailhandel. De detailhandel
voor receptgeneesmiddelen bestaat uit de intramurale markt (via ziekenhuisapo-
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theken) en de extramurale markt (via openbare apotheken en apotheekhoudend
huisartsen). Relatief nieuw zijn de internetapotheek en de postorderapotheek.
De consumpfie van receptgeneesmiddelen verschilt van die van 'normale' goederen.
De prijsgevoeligheid is relatief laag omdat consumenten niet de gehele prijs van het
geneesmiddel hoeven te betalen (vanwege vergoeding door zorgverzekeraars). Bo-
vendien kiezen patiönten over het algemeen hun medicijnen niet zelf, omdat zij on-
voldoende kennis hebben over geneesmiddelen om mee te kunnen beslissen over de
benodigde therapie. Echter, de invloed van de consument op het voorschrijfgedrag
van de arts is in de afgelopen jaren enigszins toegenomen door de opkomst van pa-
tigntenorganisaties en door de toename in informatie die verkrijgbaar is via internet.
In Nederland is het percentage 'diagnose met prescriptie' lager dan in Belgie.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ook de ontwikkeling van het apothekersberoep gepresen-
teerd. Volgens Van der Mijn (1989) hebben sinds de eerste helft van de vorige eeuw
drie gebeurtenissen een grote invloed gehad op het apothekersberoep: de opkomst
van het industrieel vervaardigde medicijn ten koste van de eigen bereidingen, de
toenemende complexiteit van de geneesmiddelenmarkt en de differentiate in de
uitoefening van het beroep. De rol van de openbare apotheker is hierdoor behoorlijk
veranderd. De moderne openbare apotheker heeft een aantal nieuwe taken gekre-
gen op het gebied van farmaceutische zorg, terwijl zijn/haar taken in de bereiding
van geneesmiddelen aanzienlijk zijn afgenomen. Distributie (verkoop) van genees-
middelen vormt nog steeds een belangrijk onderdeel van het takenpakket van een
apotheker.
De hiervoor bedoelde nieuwe taken op het gebied van farmaceutische zorg zijn me-
dicatiebewaking, therapiebewaking, het geven van voorlichting aan de gebruiker en
het verstrekken van farmacotherapeutische informatie en adviezen aan de arts.
Vooral dit laatste is erg belangrijk geworden; de eerste drie taken kunnen tot op
zekere hoogte ook uitgevoerd worden door apothekersassistenten onder toezicht
van een apotheker.
Hoo/ufsrwit 4: De regw/m>i£ pa« a/>or/»efcers »« Neder/and
Het regulerend kader van de Nederlandse apothekersmarkt bestaat uit publieke
regulering (Wet op de Geneesmiddelenvoorziening, Besluit Uitoefening Artsenijbe-
reidkunst, Wet op de Beroepen in de Individuele Gezondheidszorg en verschillende
bepalingen met betrekking tot prijzen en vergoedingen) en zelfregulering opgesteld
door de Nederlandse apothekersvereniging KNMP. De zelfregulering anno 2003
bestaat uit de (nieuwe) Nederlandse Apotheek Norm van 2002, de Beroepscode en
het Professioneel Statuut. Ook is er een KNMP vestigingsadviesbeleid, maar in de
praktijk is deze tekst nauwelijks relevant meer. Een zeer groot gedeelte van de apo-
thekers is lid van de KNMP, dus het bereik van de zelfregulering is erg groot.
Er zijn geen buitensporige restricties betreffende de opleiding tot apotheker in Ne-
derland. De toegang tot het beroep wordt geregeld door een dubbel registratiesys-
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teem. Een apotheker met het juiste diploma moet zieh inschrijven in het register van
de regionale Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg en in het titelregister van de Wet
op de Beroepen in de Individuele Gezondheidszorg. Het bereiden en afleveren van
geneesmiddelen wordt beschermd door de Wet op de Geneesmiddelenvoorziening.
Alleen apothekers - en onder bepaalde voorwaarden apotheekhoudende huisartsen
- mögen receptgeneesmiddelen afleveren. Zij hebben derhalve een domeinmonopo-
lie in de extramurale levering van geneesmiddelen op recept. OTC geneesmiddelen
mögen in Nederland ook verkocht worden door gelicenseerde drogisten. Voor elk
afgeleverd receptgeneesmiddel ontvangen apothekers een vast bedrag: de zoge-
naamde receptregelvergoeding. Tot het einde van de jaren negentig waren openba-
re apothekers geheel beschermd tegen concurrentie van zorgverzekeraars,
ziekenhuisapothekers en ketens van groothandels en drogisten. Echter, een aantal
concurrentiebeperkingen, dat bij wet bepaald was, zoals een verbod op loondienst
en een verbod op extramurale levering door ziekenhuisapothekers, is inmiddels
opgeheven door de overheid.
De vestiging van apotheken wordt al lang gereguleerd door de KNMP: hassen 1975
en 1987 in de vorm van een privaat vestigingsbeleid en vanaf 1987 in de vorm van
een vestigingsadviesbeleid. Volgens dit vestigingsadviesbeleid moet een apotheek
een minimum aantal prescripties hebben (vroeger was dit nog een minimum aantal
patienten) om 'bedrijfseconomisch haalbaar', ofwel levensvatbaar, te zijn. Hoewel
strikt juridisch bekeken de KNMP nooit heeft kunnen verhinderen dat niet-leden
zieh vestigen, hebben de vestigingsregels in de praktijk een grote invloed gehad op
de Nederlandse markt. Ten eerste natuurlijk omdat KNMP-leden gebonden waren
aan deze regeis. Net zo belangijk is echter het feit dat de medewerkersovereenkom-
sten tussen zorgverzekeraars en apothekers, die een essentiäle voorwaarde vormen
voor overleven in de Nederlandse apothekersmarkt, gebaseerd waren op het KNMP
vestigingsadviesbeleid. Hoewel collectieve onderhandelingen expliciet verboden
zijn door de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit NMa, bevatten veel medewer-
kersovereenkomsten tegenwoordig nog steeds bepalingen die zijn gebaseerd op de
KNMP-bepalingen aangaande de bedrijfseconomische haalbaarheid van een apo-
theek.
Naast de vestiging van apotheken, legde de zelfregulering van de KNMP tot voor
kort ook restricties op met betrekking tot het adverteren voor de eigen praktijk en
de concurrentie tussen apothekers. Deze restricties werden opgeheven in 2001, toen
de KNMP gedragsregels werden ingerrokken. Op papier zijn er nu geen adverten-
tiebeperkingen meer. Daarnaast werden drie bepalingen van de Nederlandse Apo-
theek Norm gewijzigd, die eisen stelden ten aanzien van de inrichting en
toegankelijkheid van een apotheek. Deze veranderingen in de zelfregulering zijn in
hoge mate een resultaat van het ingrijpen in de farmaceutische markt door de NMa
op basis van de Mededingingswet van 1998.
Er zijn bijna geen mogelijkheden voor apothekers in Nederland om te coneurreren
in prijs. Geneesmiddelenprijzen worden gereguleerd door de overheid, met name
via de Wet Geneesmiddelenprijzen en het Geneesmiddelenvergoedingssysteem. De
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prijzen worden vastgelegd in een prijslijst, genaamd de tare. Het gevolg is dat de
enige prijsconcurrentie die zieh voordoet in de geneesmiddelenmarkt, concurrentie
is in de vorm van kortingen en bonussen verstrekt door de farmaceutische industrie
en groothandels aan apothekers. De overheid wil dat deze bonussen en kortingen
terugvloeien naar de gezondheidszorg en introduceerde daarom het zogenaamde
'claw back' systeem in de jaren negentig. Dit houdt in dat de vergoeding die betaald
wordt door zorgverzekeraars aan apothekers voor een afgeleverd geneesmiddel,
welke is gebaseerd op de taxeprijzen, niet de volledige prijs is: een percentage (de
'claw back') wordt van deze taxeprijs afgetrokken. Het debat rond bonussen en kor-
tingen is vandaag de dag nog steeds gaande.
Ook Belgische apothekers worden zowel door de overheid als door de beroeps-
groep zelf gereguleerd. Eerstgenoemde categorie bestaat onder meer uit het Ko-
ninklijk Besluit nr. 78 betreffende de uitoefening van de gezondheidszorgberoepen,
het Koninklijk Besluit nr. 80 betreffende de Orde der Apothekers en de Koninklijke
Besluiten aangaande het toezicht op de vestiging van apotheken en de overname-
prijs van apotheken. Ook zijn er verschillende regels betreffende prijzen en vergoe-
dingen. De zelfregulering bestaat voornamelijk uit de deontologische regels van de
Orde der Apothekers. Naast de Orde is er een tweede nationale apothekersvereni-
ging in Belgie, de APB, welke zieh vooral bezighoudt met lobbyen en informatiever-
strekking.
Wat betreff de opleiding tot apotheker zijn er geen concurrentiebeperkende regels.
Echter, het domeinmonopolie van de apotheker in het bereiden en afleveren van
geneesmiddelen, inclusief OTC geneesmiddelen, wordt beschermd door regulering.
Om actief te kunnen zijn als apotheker dient men zieh eerst te registreren bij de Ge-
neeskundige Commissie van de provincie waar men zieh wil vestigen en bij de Or-
de der Apothekers. Het is zeer moeilijk voor startende apothekers om een plaats in
de markt te veroveren. Dit is niet alleen een gevolg van hoge overnameprijzen (on-
danks regulering van de overnameprijs door het KB van 13-4-1977), maar ook van
het moratorium dat is opgenomen in de vestigingswet. Deze vestigingswet, het KB
van 25-9-1974, bevatte voorheen reeds strikte criteria betreffende bevolkingsgrootte
en de minimum afstand tot andere apotheken.
De deontologische regels van de Orde der Apothekers bevatten bepalingen die het
adverteren voor de eigen praktijk beperken en die instructies opleggen voor de in-
richting van een apotheek en de etalage. Volgens het Belgische Hof van Cassatie
mag adverteren alleen verboden worden als het de eer en waardigheid van het be-
roep in gevaar brengt. Echter, hoewel de meeste deontologische regels reeds tiental-
len jaren geleden geformuleerd werden, zijn deze tot 2003 nog nauwelijks
veranderd.
Geneesmiddelenprijzen, alsmede de marges voor groothandels en apothekers, wor-
den volledig door de overheid bepaald door middel van verschillende Ministeriele
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en Koninklijke Besluiten. Apothekers hebben weinig mogelijkheden om te concurre-
ren in prijs, omdat geneesmiddelenprijzen wettelijk vastgelegd zijn. De vergoeding
door de mutualiteiten (de Belgische zorgverzekeraars) wordt gereguleerd door het
RIZIV, het Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering. De almaar stij-
gende geneesmiddelenprijzen leveren problemen op voor de verzekering van de
gezondheidszorg in Belgie (zoals in vele andere Europese landen, waaronder Ne-
derland). Een bijkomend probleem voor het RIZIV is bovendien dat het bedrag van
de eigen bijdragen, het zogenaamde 'remgeld', vast ligt, zodat de stijgingen in de
geneesmiddelenprijzen het budget voor geneesmiddelen verder onder druk zetten.
Hoo/dsfi/fc 6; £e« ecoMom/sc/ie awa/i/se uan rfe re^w/enn^ in NedeWand en Be/#j£
De derde subvraag heeft betrekking op een kwalitatieve analyse van de regulering:
bezwderf de (ze//-) regw/en'ng zwi de npof/iefcersn/flrA'f de mflrtfsc/mppe/i/le zt'e/zvwf, o/moef
deze 0» »ieer o/znwidere »wfe) fresc/ioiwd worden n/s een »isfrun/enf /'» de /m/ideii zwi be-
/rtMgefigroepe?! ? Een public interest analyse van de Belgische en Nederlandse regule-
ring laat zien dat, hoewel er argumenten zijn voor enige regulering van de kwaliteit
van farmaceutische diensten, een gedeelte van de bestaande regulering zeker niet in
het algemeen belang is. De regulering van de tarieven, het verbod op reclame, de
voorschriften omtrent de indenting van de apotheek en het vestigingsbeleid lijken
alle verder te gaan dan nodig is om marktfalen te corrigeren. Dit komt overeen met
de voorspelling in de literatuur dat een beroepsgroep zal proberen om monopolie-
winsten te behalen via regulering die hen beschermd tegen coneurrentie.
Hoewel de regulering tot op zekere hoogte in het belang van apothekers zelf is op-
gesteld, is het ook aannemelijk dat bepaalde regeis, zoals de prijsregulering, het re-
sultaat zijn van coneurrentie tussen verschillende belangengroepen. Prijsregulering
zal waarschijnlijk ook de belangen van zorgverzekeraars en de farmaceutische in-
dustrie dienen. D.w.z., hoewel men kan beweren dat normale prijsconeurrentie tus-
sen producenten van geneesmiddelen gunstiger zou zijn voor zorgverzekeraars,
zullen zij zieh in het huidige systeem van gereguleerde prijzen nauwelijks zorgen
hoeven te maken over coneurrentie met andere zorgverzekeraars. Bovendien is de
farmaceutische industrie ondanks de gereguleerde prijzen blijkbaar nog steeds in
Staat om hoge bedragen aan bonussen en kortingen te verlenen aan apothekers en
ziekenhuizen. Het is zeer moeilijk vast te stellen wie nu eigenlijk profiteert van een
dergelijke regulering.
Verder is het onwaarschijnlijk dat een van de betrokken partijen (apothekers, zorg-
verzekeraars, de overheid, de farmaceutische industrie en consumenten) profite-
reert van de huidige regulering die het domeinmonopolie van de apotheker koppelt
aan de receprregelvergoeding (Nederland) en de apothekersmarge (Belgie). Deze
koppeling moedigt slechts de verkoop van receptgeneesmiddelen aan, terwijl het
geen enkele prikkel geeft aan apothekers om diensten te verlenen, dit ondanks de
veronderstelde nieuwe taken van apothekers op het gebied van 'farmaceutische
zorg' en ondanks het feit dat de meeste geneesmiddelen op de markt tegenwoordig
voorverpakt zijn. Zowel de pnWic m/eres/ analyse als de pn'zwfe inferesf analyse in
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hoofdstuk 6 komen tot deze conclusie, omdat tegenwoordig noch het publiek (de
consument), noch de gereguleerde partijen baat lijken te vinden bij deze ouderwetse
regulering. Een oplossing zou gevonden kunnen worden in de introductie van een
nieuw vergoedingssysteem voor apothekers dat strikt onderscheid maakt tussen
distributietaken (inkooptaken) en zorgtaken.
Hoo/dsfMJt 7: Ee« e»«p»rtsclie en ueigefi/ifceMde ana/yse
In dit hoofdstuk wordt de vierde en laatste subvraag behandeld: is er en ig empin'sc/i
bra'iy's win renf-seeJtiHg gerfrag door flpof/ietars? Hierbij is het tevens zinvol om te bekij-
ken of verschillen in regulering tussen Nederland en Belgie leiden tot verschillen in
de effectiviteit van re/if seeding door apothekers. Hiervoor beschouw ik het aantal
apotheken en apothekers, het (relatieve) gemiddelde inkomen van apothekers, en
de goodwill betaald bij de overname van een apotheek. Echter, het verkrijgen van
gegevens omtrent inkomens en overnameprijzen blijkt behoorlijk lastig te zijn: ener-
zijds worden sommige gegevens niet openbaar gemaakt of wordt geclaimd dat be-
paalde cijfers niet beschikbaar zijn, terwijl anderzijds informatiebronnen elkaar
behoorlijk kunnen tegenspreken (een voorbeeld hiervan zijn de enorme verschillen
in de schattingen van de bonussen en kortingen in Nederland). De analyse bestaat
daarom noodzakelijkerwijs gedeeltelijk uit indirect bewijs. In aanvulling op de bo-
vengenoemde incidatoren worden daarom ook twee cnsesfMrfies gepresenteerd, res-
pectievelijk betreffende Boots en OPG.
Wat betreff het aantal apotheken zijn er aanzienlijke verschillen tussen Nederland
en Belgie. Hoewel in Belgie' het aantal apothekers veel hoger is dan in Nederland,
zijn de effecten van het vestigingsbeleid door de jaren heen in beide landen zicht-
baar. De redenen achter het vestigingsbeleid verschillen echter: in Nederland is de
reden voor het KNMP-beleid een beperking van toetreders door zittende apothe-
kers om financieel haalbare apotheken te garanderen, terwijl in Belgie de overheid
het 'overaanbod' van apotheken wil reguleren. Het aantal patienten per apotheek is
in Nederland veel hoger dan in Belgie. Bovendien is dit aantal in Belgie min of meer
constant gebleven gedurende de laatste decennia, terwijl in Nederland dit aantal
hoog is en steeds is blijven stijgen. Het lijkt erop dat de Nederlandse apothekers
eerder begonnen zijn met het beperken van de markttoegang dan hun Belgische
collegae en dat zij erin geslaagd zijn om een reeds klein aantal apotheken verder te
beperken.
De gegevens over gemiddelde inkomens van apothekers die gepresenteerd worden
in hoofdstuk 7 (welke gedeeltelijk zijn gebaseerd op eigen berekeningen) suggere-
ren dat Nederlandse apothekers hogere inkomens genereren dan Belgische, hoewel
in Belgie apothekers het relatief goed doen qua inkomen ten opzichte van een aantal
andere vrije beroepen. Dit verschil zal voor een groot deel verklaard kunnen wor-
den door het gemiddeld aantal patienten per apotheek. Het feit dat Belgische apo-
thekers een monopolie op OTC geneesmiddelen hebben, terwijl in Nederland ook
gelicenseerde drogisten deze producten mögen verkopen, lijkt een veel kleiner ef-
fect op de inkomensgegevens te hebben (waarschijnlijk omdat dit ook het aantal
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apotheken beinvloedt). Men moet echter voorzichtig zijn met het interpreteren van
inkomensgegevens, aangezien hoge inkomens niet noodzakelijkerwijs voortvloeien
uit hoge winsten als gevolg van rent see/ring gedrag, maar tot op zekere hoogte een
gevolg kunnen zijn van investeringen in een lange opleiding of een compensatie
voor grote verantwoordelijkheden.
In Nederland en Belgie worden hoge bedragen voor goodwill betaald bij de over-
name van een apotheek. Dit laat zien dat de licentie om een apotheek te houden een
reele en hoge waarde heeft (bovenop de waarde van het onroerend goed, de voor-
raden en dergelijke) en dat er sprake is van rente die kunnen worden bemachtigd
door apothekers. Hoewel er naruurlijk onderscheid dient te worden gemaakt hassen
bovenmarige winsten enerzijds en hoge inkomens die het resultaat zijn van investe-
ringen in onderwijs of grote verantwoordelijkheden anderzijds, is er een probleem
met de goodwill die betaald wordt voor Nederlandse en Belgische apotheken. Het
betreff hier namelijk winsten die voortkomen uit beschermende regulering (met
name het domeinmonopolie zoals geanalyseerd in hoofdstuk 6) in tegenstelling tot
vergoedingen voor reele inspanningen.
Vanwege de hoge prijzen die betaald moeten worden voor een apotheek, worden
veel apotheken in Nederland en Belgie tegenwoordig overgenomen door groothan-
dels- en drogisterijketens. Dat is op zieh geen probleem, omdat consumenten hier-
door niet onthouden worden van farmaceutische dienstverlening door gekwalifi-
ceerde apothekers. Toch mislukte het eerste experiment, dat was opgezet door de
Britse drogisterijketen Boots. In 1999 begon Boots met het openen van apotheekaf-
delingen in haar winkeis als een reactie op de wijziging in de Nederlandse wet die
het verbod op loondienst schrapte. De onderneming bood een soort 'para-professie'
aan doordat zij zieh specialiseerde in het aanbieden van receptgeneesmiddelen en
niet of nauwelijks in het verlenen van diensten. De uiteindelijke mislukking van het
experiment van Boots kan gedeeltelijk verklaard worden door de gespannen Neder-
landse arbeidsmarkt toentertijd en wellicht ook door de onbekendheid van de apo-
theekafdelingen van Boots bij het Nederlandse publiek. Echter, de analyse in
hoofdstuk 7 laat zien dat waarschijnlijk ook de tegenwerking door andere apothe-
kers (het niet willen samenwerken, bepalingen in de Nederlandse Apotheek Norm),
zorgverzekeraars (problemen met medewerkersovereenkomsten) en artsen (het niet
willen samenwerken, elektronische voorschriften) hieraan bijdroeg. De drogisterij-
keten Etos, die de Boots-vestigingen in 2001 gekocht heeft, is een vergelijkbaar ex-
periment begonnen in 2003. De tijd zal moeten uitwijzen of dit project meer succes
heeft.
De tweede casestudy betreff OPG. Dit is de grootste Nederlandse groothandel in
medicijnen met een marktaandeel van rond de 35%, die bovendien actief is in het
opkopen van apotheken. Eind 2002 beheerde OPG reeds 153 apotheken. Men kan
zieh afvragen of OPG met haar sterke marktpositie en een achtergrond als coöpera-
tie van apothekers een rol heeft gespeeld in het weren van ongewenste nieuwko-
mers op de markt. Inderdaad heeft OPG een aandeel gehad in het mislukken van de
eerste postorderapotheek in Nederland, doordat zij weigerde te leveren aan een
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apotheker die deelnam aan dit project. OPG was ook - samen met apothekers - be-
trokken bij juridische stappen die werden ondernomen tegen de overheidsplannen
om de 'claw back' te verhogen in 2003. Verder is het mogelijk dat OPG (opnieuw
samen met apothekers) een van de anonieme groothandels was die betrokken wa-
ren bij de boycot van Genthon, een fabrikant van generische medicijnen die zijn
cholesterolverlagers tegen zeer läge prijzen aanbood. Men moet zieh tenminste be-
wust zijn van eventueel misbruik van marktmacht in situaties zoals deze, waarin
groothandelaren marktmacht in de groothandelsmarkt combineren met een groot
(en stijgend) marktaandeel in de detailhandel. De Nederlandse Mededingingsauto-
riteit NMa kondigde in mei 2003 aan dat zij de prijsafspraken in de gehele genees-
middelensector onder de loep zou nemen, als gevolg van een klacht die werd
ingediend tegen apothekers en groothandelaren door Zorgverzekeraars Nederland.
Het lijkt hierbij noodzakelijk om ook het machtsblok van apothekers en groothan-
dels nader te onderzoeken.
8. CoMc/«sf'es
De centrale probleemstelling, ZI/'H er uormen zwi (zeZ/Jregu/ering i;i de rtpof/zefcersnwrÄi
rffi? di? ff«w/sc//flppe/»yite tw/wmrf ;;i rfe econom/e i>er/iogeM, o//'s deze regu/eririg yoora/ een'
resu/frMf :wi 're;/f seeW/ig' gedrag, is in het voorgaande uitgebreid beantwoord aan
de hand van de vier subvragen. Hoewel er kwalitatief en kwantitatief bewijs voor
de argumenten van de pritwfe iwferesf benadering van regulering gevonden werd,
blijft de empirische vraag of Nederlandse en Belgische apothekers succesvolle re/if
seeJters zijn moeilijk te beantwoorden, aangezien additionele (en vaak moeilijk te
verkrijgen) gegevens nodig zijn om hardere claims te maken. Deze vraag blijft dus
gedeeltelijk onbeantwoord en is zeker verder onderzoek waard, niet alleen met be-
trekking tot de landen die in dit proefschrift behandeld zijn, maar ook met betrek-
king tot andere landen - en andere beroepen. De Studie door de Europese Commis-
sie en de rapporten in opdracht van de Ierse mededingingsautoriteit en de Britse
OFT geven al aan dat er vandaag de dag nog veel onderzoek gedaan wordt naar de
(over)regulering in het vrije beroep.
De conclusie van de positieve (in tegenstelling tot een normatieve) rechtseconomi-
sche analyse van de regulering van apothekers is derhalve dat een gedeelte van de
regulering inderdaad een resultaat van rent-seeking gedrag door apothekers lijkt te
zijn, terwijl het bovendien erop lijkt dat enkele bepalingen uit de zelfregulering be-
ter geschrapt kunnen worden. Het betreft de bepalingen die zieh richten op een be-
scherming van de distributietaken, met name de regeis over reclame en inrichting
van de apotheek, en dan vooral in Belgie, aangezien in Nederland de zelfregulering
recentelijk al onderhevig is geweest aan een aantal wijzigingen. Verder zijn er regeis
die noch een /wWic inferesf noch een pmvite /'nferesf doel lijken te dienen. Vanuit
normatief oogpunt kan over de inefficientie van de huidige definitie van het do-
meinmonopolie van de apotheker en de koppeling hiervan aan de vergoeding voor
de apotheker, gezegd worden dat een oplossing gevonden zou kunnen worden in
een nieuw vergoedingssysteem. Hierbij moet gedacht worden aan een vergoedings-
systeem dat apothekers apart beloont voor taken op het gebied van de farmaceuti-
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sehe zorg - zoals advies aan artsen - en voor distributietaken. In dat opzicht bieden
de huidige ontwikkelingen in Nederland, waar zorgverzekeraars meer en meer ge-
dwongen worden door de overheid om de regisseurs van de zorg te worden, inte-
ressante mogelijkheden. Zorgverzekeraars zouden nog meer opties moeten hebben
om apothekers gericht te belonen voor het uitvoeren van bepaalde taken, bijvoor-
beeld door apothekers in te huren of in dienst te nemen voor de inkoop van medi-
cijnen, of door hen specifiek te belonen voor bepaalde vooraf gedefinieerde farma-
ceutische diensten aan patienten. Dit zal uiteindelijk (kunnen) leiden tot een verdere
differentiatie binnen het apothekersberoep: sommige apothekers kunnen ervoor
kiezen om zieh te specialiseren in dienstverlening, terwijl anderen zieh zouden
kunnen specialiseren in distributietaken, bijvoorbeeld in opdracht van zorgverzeke-
raars. Meer differentiatie tussen zorggerichte apotheken enerzijds en apotheken zo-
als Boots en Etos, die gespecialiseerd zijn in een snelle distribute (para-professies),
anderzijds, zal hoogstwaarschijnlijk het resultaat zijn.
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